"We’re sending our audit people to audit their quality control systems and processes to make sure that every aircraft that comes off that production line, that comes to Alaska has the highest levels of excellence and quality," he said.
This seems crazy to me. Alaska Airlines doesn't trust Boeing enough that they're sending their audit team to Boeing to check for quality.
Though safety inspections were initially estimated to take between four and eight hours per plane, Whitaker said they’ve “been longer than that.”
“We’ve required a lot of measurements,” he said. “Once the area’s exposed, we want to understand bolt tensions and gaps and things of that nature. So we’ve required more data than would normally be the case because we really wanted to understand the issue.”
Also, the FAA is at Boeing checking their quality process. They're only doing it for the door and bolts. The problem is that we don't know which other parts and systems Boeing might have quality issues for. Yes, I'm confident they'll make the bolts tighter on the door. But what about the entire plane's quality check? I feel like the FAA should ground the plane until they audit every single thing about the plane. That's the only way I would personally feel confident.
> So, where are the bolts? Probably sitting forgotten and unlabeled (because there is no formal record number to label them with) on a work-in-progress bench, unless someone already tossed them in the scrap bin to tidy up.
So this is like when I would take apart and re-assemble everything when I was a little kid. Sometimes I would have several screws left over. It's a good thing I wasn't making airplanes!
This seems very funny/strange to me. Way back in the early/mid-90s, the company I worked for invested a lot of money to switch to some new computer accounting/inventory system that ran on AS400 (just to show its age). The software was originally built to track all of the parts and pieces to build an airplane. What type of airplane I don't know, but we made VHS tapes so the level of complexity between and airplane and VHS cassette always seems to be out of whack.
After that, I just assumed all airplane manufactures used something like this.
That comment thread is wild. Do you think it is genuine?
If what that commenter says is true, the whole company ought to be shut down.
It’d also be an easy sell for either of the two presidential candidates - one can say he’s clamping down on incompetent elites who aren’t that elite after all; the other can talk about a profit-seeking company killing Americans.
>If what that commenter says is true, the whole company ought to be shut down.
No it won't. Boeing has reached too big to fail status.
They employ many millions of people directly and indirectly between commercial and military aerospace.
Boeing has reached PEAK too big to fail recently too when they announced that due to their too big to fail status, they are unable to estimate or control costs anymore and will no longer bid for any US military contracts that are fixed-price.
What you will see is billions in bailout funds given to Boeing shareholders.
Still ought to be shut down though. Given they're outsourcing so much of their maintenance and shitting their bed on their existing products, at some point too big to fail just turns into a big failure.
I think the cracking down on incompetent elites that aren't that elite is something Republicans feel should be left to the market to decide. I don't think it's an easy sell to argue the government should shut down an entire company over issues rather than letting the issues lead to fewer sales and having the market sort it out. I think most Republicans would vehemently disagree with a statement like "the government should decide who the elites are", which this action seems to be doing.
I agree the profit-seeking company killing Americans is an easy sell with democrats and possibly even a good chunk of independents.
Sure, but due to its nature the aircraft industry for commerical planes isn't really a free market.
Obviously, Boeing and Airbus represent a duopoly. When you factor in one of them is US-based and is relied upon to deliver on certain national security projects, defense etc no politician is going to let the commercial arm fail and risk the national security arm failing too.
Also there is a lag in the system around failure. The market could decide that Boeing planes are poorly constructed, but how many accidents and deaths would have to happen in order for customer (airlines) to decide to no longer put in orders. That's not really feasible.
Boeing is also a major defense contractor, and has facilities spread out across many states. No politician of either party is going to call for the shutdown of a major employer of their constituents and a key component of national security.
seems to me that you might want quality control on those defense/weapon systems. if the rot is this bad in one part of the company like as not it is just as bad on the govenrment contract side as well.
The US doesn't do government-owned (except in exceptional circumstances). For one, they would be sued by the shareholders (unfair seizure) and competitors (unfair competition). It also is not clear that the government acquiring something would make it run better.
It’s hard for both candidates. Boeing is our only airline manufacturer and an American institution. If it shuts down all we have is an European Airbus and creates an opening for a Chinese COMAC.
I spent 15 years of my career working in contract manufacturing, building and managing engineering teams building manufacturing & quality systems. A lot of what our company did was for regulated industries (defense & medical). What's not surprising at all is that Boeing customers would have conducted independent audits of the materiel being delivered to them, either while the planes were on the line, or post-delivery. That's to be expected, as is periodic external audits by regulatory bodies. What's mildly more interesting, but still not surprising, is that Spirit was so consistently upset with finished product quality that they contracted with Boeing to have Spirit employees colo'd at Boeing shops to inspect and warranty repair their planes. This is also not remarkable in electronics contract manufacturing: very frequently there are OEM employee squads staffing QA & Repair/RMA benches at contract manufacturer factories, for two reasons. 1) The OEM knows their product better than the manufacturer, and 2) Risk. Ultimately the OEM is accountable for quality to the consumer, no matter who the constructor is.
It mildly more interesting to learn that Spirit was not granted access to Boeing's MES, which leads me to believe that Boeing's stance toward Spirit is more like "they're our customer and they insist on on-site inspection & repair so we'll begrudingly allow it" than "they're our customer and we have a shared interest in quality manufacturing so we'll partner with them to ensure that happens." This is a failure of leadership and extremely short-sighted, and is virtually guaranteed to result in the sort of process failures and outcomes the throwaway describes.
It's not uncommon for OEMs to take over contract manufacturer's sites, either because of a strategic decision to conduct manufacturing operations internally [again], or due to persist or pernicious quality issues arising from specific partners' operations or at specific plants. This is relatively feasible in the case of most electronics and smaller mechanical devices, and contract manufacturers operate in a state of existential fear most of the time, knowing their destiny is in the hands of a small handful of OEM customers (just look at the impact Apple's quarterly reports and projections have on partners like Foxconn, Jabil and Pegatron). It's not practical -- or even really possible due to capital expense -- to do this in aerospace. For that reason primarily, I see no alternative than for Boeing (and others) to be forced into 100% process compliance by presence of permanent external audit teams based in corporate offices and every manufacturing & assembly location. I wouldn't be surprised, too, if Boeing were forced (for political rather than anything to do with quality) to onshore more of their supply chain[1]).
My impression was the the Spirit mentioned in the comment was Spirit AeroSystems, not Spirit Airlines, so the relationship between the two companies is the other way around; Boeing is the customer.
Spirit Aerosystems also used to be Boeing, but Boeing spun out that division years ago. I don't know, but it seems to me that history makes the relationship between the two more than just supplier/customer.
Interesting, I see this attitude too often in the healthcare industry as well, often leading to recalls.
It sounds like someone under pressure came up with a "loophole" that was compliant with a motivated but literal reading of the CMES reporting requirement. In this case, I would wager dollars to donuts that the CMES reporting requirement only anticipated door separated/not separated.
Mental gymnastics is used to argue compliance with some technical requirement, like it is some legal proceeding where you can debate what the definition of "is" is.
No amount of formal quality process can defend against business pressure and incentives to hack the same system. Requirements dont and cant cover every corner case, like someone saying a door was never fully separated because you tied them together with a shoelace before dethatching it.
Asking if a justification passes the "red face test" is ultimately more valuable than asking if it passes a literal reading.
>Alaska Airlines doesn't trust Boeing enough that they're sending their audit team to Boeing to check for quality.
Granted they are different divisions, but after the CST-100 debacle [1], NASA also sent a team to audit them [2]. Some of the off-channel remarks by NASA were striking.
> “If we would have run the integrated test with ULA through the first orbital insertion burn timeframe, we would have seen that we would have missed the orbital insertion burn”
I can't believe I've read that. There's no saving this company.
That section reads like a Bad Advice column for software testing in general. "Ehh, don't bother with end to end testing -- testing each part in isolation will be fine."
Maybe fine for an e-commerce site or game, where the stakes are measured mainly in lost revenue/customers and a team of engineers burning the midnight oil to sort the problem. Not so fine for spaceflight.
You're going to be very sad to discover the sentiments around software-intensive systems testing in a lot of places & industries that you'd rightfully assume should know better and do better.
I had a safety critical embedded engineer who had worked on everything from weapons systems to automobiles first not have any idea what property-based testing was and then proceed to tell me at length how it was pointless because unit testing is all you need as long as you keep making your units smaller and smaller.
At the time I worked in FinTech and was aghast at what I was hearing as they worked on self-driving. If I had to pin down what made me shift my career path into "cyber-physical systems", it was probably that conversation.
Since making the transition and later founding a company dedicated to testing in that domain, I've heard dozens and dozens of sentiments even more concerning.
> and then proceed to tell me at length how it was pointless because unit testing is all you need as long as you keep making your units smaller and smaller.
I've encountered devs that think this nonsense before, but always assumed that this attitude couldn't be held with systems that are actually critical. I'm a bit less naive now.
I thought that too, early on. Sort of a perfect-bricks-make-perfect-walls idea. And when problems emerge at the integration stage, it’s often traceable to a gap that a lower-level test could have caught. So the mentality is a bit self-reinforcing.
Exactly. All the products we make are focused at the integration and system level because it's crystal clear that's where enormous amounts of issues arise and unbounded numbers of 11th hour fire drills occur. The various industries who've had multiple product cycles with lots of software are starting to figure this out, but it took awhile.
Despite how obvious it is with a little outside observer perspective, the "perfect bricks" way of thinking is pervasive because that's how the builders and supply chains are organized.
Ariane V is an interesting case study in that regard [1]. It failed because they didn't feel the need to retest the software reused from the Ariane IV design. No need to re-test the bricks that already worked before...
Or that your bricks aren't square, or they are actually made of sand, or that they collapse under load.
To leave the analogy behind, any non-trivial component has a testable surface area, but typically has additional modes of behavior associated with internal state, environmental conditions, or other areas that well-meaning unit test writers didn't think about.
I have often found issues in simple caller/callee pairs of two components, both of which are tested, but the caller contains subtle expectations of the callee that the unit tests don't match up with.
Software testing needs a unique mindset compared to traditional hardware reliability testing. The software doesn't "wear out" like the hardware but tends to fail in coordinating functions. Too often, we rely on simplistic measures like a hard restart to manage coordination failures, but that isn't always an option on safety-critical applications.
Well we do that all day long when we write to a file system and expect it to actually persist data to disk. It's usually only db engines and loggers that attempt to flush, and even then the disk will usually lie in response.
When lax QA testing / engineering practices / boost the share price strategies from move fast break stuff e-commerce/social media practices seep into real world systems companies.
>"move fast and break things" worked well enough for SpaceX.
Counterpoint: SpaceX had to re-learn well-known practices that are so commonplace in aerospace it's shocking they weren't being conducted [1]. One example is more complete material testing on critical components as part of supplier quality control. When they lost a rocket due to this process gap, their solution was to layer on those common QC practices. IMO these are risks that, over time, may turn SpaceX into the dinosaurs they are competing with. (reference to Chesterson's fence is probably apt.)
"Moving fast and breaking things" may be fine, but to the GP's point, it has to be a risk-based decision. We probably shouldn't be aiming to move fast when lives are at risk.
> Instead of simulating an entire mission from launch to docking, “the team decided they would rather run multiple tests with chunks of the mission,” Mullholland said. “Going forward, for every flight, we will do launch to docking and undocking to landing in addition to the other tests we were doing in our qualification testing.”
Given the amount of money and lives at risk, this level of process short-cutting is mind boggling.
I suspect this is a result of schedule pressure. The legacy AE firms were falling way behind SpaceX and I'm guessing they felt the need to play catch-up and didn't want to "waste" time on testing.
They don't trust Boeing enough or their customers don't trust Boeing enough and it's a PR measure to calm the passengers' nerves. Could also be a bit of both.
Alaska was the airline who had their door ripped off. A reasonable take is to expect them to want to ensure that things like that don't happen again. PR is an added bonus.
Very valid point, but it's been twenty-three years since that crash - is it irony, or an attempt to be better than that? Hard for any of us to say, but the fact that they're taking these steps now suggests that perhaps it's moreso the latter.
it's not baseless at all. any company that has any respect for quality, safety, and its employees do not fire the employee that brings attention to poor quality resulting in diminished safety either for the employees or the customer.
Sure, but grounding planes doesn't buy Alaska's (or Boeing's) CEO a new yacht. I suspect they will spend the minimum amount of time necessary, modulo whatever amount of time the IR and PR people think makes it appear they've accomplished something.
I don't think PR is an added bonus, I think it's the entire point.
Even if the only care they had is PR, they surely realize that the worst possible PR for Boeing and Alaska is for these incidents to begin happening on a regular basis, which will lead to consumers flying less, which leads to less demand for Boeing airplanes.
If I were a PR person, thinking only about PR (not caring about anything else), the #1 thing that seems obvious is "what do we need to do to have these incidents stop occurring ASAP".
Or they could be just putting on a show like you're suggesting, but that would do a huge disservice from a PR perspective if that results in the underlying issues not being fixed.
"Door fell off airplane during flight" headlines a couple times a month would be some of the worst PR you could possibly have (with the exception of planes crashing, obviously even worse)
Pressurization problems are not uncommon in aviation. Most planes will drop to a safer altitude or divert to "safer" routes in case something goes wrong. They did what they are supposed to do in those circumstances.
I'm finding these type of apologists comments placing fault towards the airline really hard to sympathize with.
How would you feel if you were on a flight where a door fell off, and the pilot said "only 2% of flights on this specific plane have had unexplained depressurization, and now we have an explanation, folks"?
They hadn’t had unexpected depressurization. They had an error in one of the redundant automatic controllers for pressurization. That controller isn’t even required equipment.
Airplanes fly around ALL THE TIME with equipment that isn’t working. They have a procedure for determining what is and isn’t necessary for a given flight both legally and by the airlines own standards. In this case it very much looks like the pressurization controller was a red herring.
I was on a flight where the ADS-B transponder failed (the captain told us after takeoff) and they got approval to change routes, lower the flight ceiling and we continued on our way.
It's a tough question. If a plane starts behaving a little wonky, per sensor, but you can't figure out what the sensor is complaining about, and the sensor doesn't match human observation, do you have to throw it away? What fraction of planes would be discarded under this model?
Pressure loss can be mitigated by dropping oxygen masks and descending to a lower altitude. The plane falling apart is more tricky. The door leading to pressure loss is a red herring. What about a wing falling off?
NTSB has said there is no indication that those warning lights were correlated, and that the pressurization system is triple-redundant and only the first layer was generating warnings.
To me it says their lawyers don’t trust Boeing enough. My cynical side says companies never give a shit what their customers think in an industry like aviation where they have so few or no other real options.
I think we should nationalized Boeing, fix it and re-ipo it. Not because I think government can do better at operating at a profit, but because it would be a sick burn: your company was so poorly managed, it had to be taken over by the feds because an airplane version of Amtrak is a better alternative to letting the you clowns continue to manufacture aircraft.
Strongly agree, I just don't believe there is the political will to do it at this, so we're left with capital market and corporate leverage mechanisms to encourage a positive outcome.
Much easier to get everyone in a room and say, "We're going to starve Boeing of revenue until it walks into Chapter 11, at which point we'll be ready to recapitalize and install new folks." Absolutely not my preferred thoughts on fixing a rotting enterprise, but you go to work with the tools you have.
I just don't see how this can happen unless you have global consensus. They are booked until what the next 8 years? Whats to stop non-american airlines desperate for slots on the new aircraft from snapping up those slots?
The risk is that this simply makes their culture problems worse. Governments aren't famous for turning around failing private companies.
And then there's, y'know, the whole DEI angle. Being acquired by the US Government isn't going to make them more likely to promote white male engineers to sort things out.
You're using facts in an emotional argument. When the phrase "doesn't feel" is used, logic goes out the window. Have you not ever had an argument with a significant other?
Commercial aviation is about 10X safer than driving per mile. That is a valid comparison if you need to cover a distance and have a choice of driving or flying. You should also add an amount of risk for driving to the airport. Flying is clearly safer than driving for long distances.
It is less clear if the choice is driving to a beach two hours away or flying to a different beach two hours away by air.
I think that -people- care for customer well-being.. but that it's barely cynical to say that a board of a publicly traded company only cares about it insofar as it effects shareholder returns.. and with proper market positioning, customer well-being is barely necessary..
The board orders subordinates to be safe and cheap. When safety fails to materialize without throwing money at the problem they pretend it's not their fault. What's missing is not care, but commitment. Care without commitment is wishful thinking and I'm sure there's plenty of that.
If an airline is shown to take risks with its passengers' safety, that airline is dead, so here I would expect shareholder returns to do the job very effectively.
And in calculating that tradeoff I would expect them to weight passenger safety very, very highly, unless they want to go out of business (and possibly be liable for corporate manslaughter and go to jail?)
If Boeing really cared about their customers, they would tighten the bolts on outgoing planes to make sure that they wouldn't lose doors and windows and stuff. Maybe Alaska does really care, but I must confess my first thought was also "cagey PR move."
I've seen many products and services clearly making their products worse in order to make more money. Airlines have done similar things with passenger space and various fees, it's not so hard to imagine them cutting corners only to be surprised that they've gone too far and inadvertently impacted airplane safety.
Sure they care about customer wellbeing but isn't making money higher on their list of priorities?
It’s too reductive to talk about what “Boeing” thinks and does as if it’s one single entity with a single purpose and complete alignment on all things. The person(s) who failed to tighten bolts could easily have been doing exactly the right thing, for instance if training and documentation were screwed up.
Boeing in general seems to have a serious culture problem that we should condemn, but it’s not like the “they” that set cultural norms is the same “they” that’s out there on a supplier’s factory floor with a torque wrench.
Being reductive can be a good rhetorical tool, but in this case I think it’s better to view the problem as culture and system rather than a single personality with ill intent.
yeah that's my attitude during working hours. maybe a person cares, but a corporation can't. i expect a corporation cares about making money, and to some extent that correlates with not killing me, but who knows.
A corporation is a legal fiction. It doesn't actually do anything, it doesn't make decisions. The people who work for the corporation do. Liability should not stop with the corporation but with the actual human beings making the decisions.
You are not exhibiting nonlinear-systems thinking. A corporation is not purely hierarchical. Effects are very diffuse from decisions. Humans don't control things; humans interact with things.
You are blaming the wrong party. They’ve gotten that perspective from experience not thought vacuum. There are many industries, commercial airlines included that do not have competitive capitalist environments. There are typically 3-5 big players, typically heavily in bed with the gov whose incentives aren’t aligned. Telco, domestic automakers, insurance come to mind initially.
There is also a corporate greed, which is leaking into tech with commoditization, problem in America where fewer and fewer companies treat their employees as assets and rather treat them as cogs. People are loosing their tolerance.
> There are typically 3-5 big players, typically heavily in bed with the gov whose incentives aren’t aligned.
Things are just as bad in big tech. Ever tried to get support from Google? Many modern companies cut customer support to the bare minimum.
Then there's stuff like the 23andMe saga (also on the front page of HN right now), where the company actively blames their customers for their fuck up.
Yep. Heck I am a part of the tech industry and have pretty much lost all trust in the tech industry. It's hard to see and experience widespread misbehavior without beginning to expect it.
The airlines are one of the few industries where almost everyone comparison shops for each and every purchase. The list of airline bankruptcies is very very long as are the new entrants.
Sure if you fly to some very small destinations you will have very limited choices, but almost definitionally that's a small fraction of the total trips.
which works on a fundamentally different model from other airlines (limited network, fewer flights per week.) It is getting harder and harder to see the difference between traditional airliners like Delta and "low cost" airlines like Southwest.
People do compare prices on competitive routes. Airlines, in the US at least, try pretty hard not to compete on quality and the mediocrity of the 737 is part of that. Every other commercial airliner built today has a modern fly by wire system which can accomplish what MCAS was supposed to do in a safe way. The 737 is noisy for its size
not just in the passenger cabin and on the ground but particularly in the cockpit (years back I wrote a comment on an av blog about the noisy 737 and pilots joined in.) The 737 struggles to take off under good conditions and has to be grounded under conditions that other airliners handle easily. The 737 also lacks the anti-turbulence feature of the A320 which uses the fly-by-wire system to smooth out the ride.
People are so used to the dismal 737 and only somewhat better A320 that they have a hard time believing that modern airliners like
can be much smaller but much more comfortable than the 737 but people who fly it become believers, the more people who get to experience them the more people will demand them. They cost less to operate too and being a little smaller could support a more efficient network just as 2-engine widebodies replaced 4-engine widebodies.
That is what the feet message and communicate. If they say we do a deathmarch on this project, that is what your managers polished shoes tell the world.
True. The reality I think is that many of those who do believe that they care just don't actually care as much as they'd have to for a positive effect. Delusion is a strong force.
While I think it is commonplace to assume that, it's just an assumption and I feel HN would be better if we just stuck to known facts and marked hearsay as hearsay.
Probably projection. Maybe also motivated by office jobs having tons of people freeloading and genuinely not giving a fuck, which just doesn't work in labor jobs.
In the current situation, sending your own engineers to the manufacturer is the best way to ensure an independent check of the whole production chain. Much easier than having your mechanics take the airplane apart after delivery.
The problem is that there are many of these planes that have already been delivered. They're going to have to find some way of ensuring QA for those before they're allowed in the air again.
Right. They have to be taken apart. All doors have to be checked systematically and also they need to do random probes to sample for possible other systematic manufacturing defects.
Probably talking to their mechanics, they might quickly identify other problematic components which might have been noticed during maintenance but not strongly enough reported and tracked. Basically everything that needed repairs which shouldn't have been needed.
This is pretty standard for people manufacturing in China. I guess someone assumed because it was "Made in USA" meant the due diligence wasn't necessary?
In decades past, you could actually trust Boeing's QA processes. I think there may be a lot of people who haven't got the memo that Boeing is a different company now.
I recently did a public tour of one of Airbus' major assembly lines. I remember the tour guide telling us, that their customers (the airlines) either have their own QA people on the line when their planes get assembled, or pay another company to do it for them.
I would like to phrase this as “trust and verify”, because the state of trust arises from being open to verifiability, contrary to common misconception that they are against each other.
Meanwhile Boeing just inspects itself, or at least they did before they fired most of their inspectors. It's really no surprise that they now have the build quality of the average aliexpress product.
".... We will follow the lead of the FAA and support our customers every step of the way.”
It should be: "we will lead the way in putting engineering first, and building in quality from before the first part is built"
But those financialists just cannot see anything but their short term profits. Executive earnings for the past decade+, when they goosed profits by cutting quality, should be clawed back.
It's also the case that Alaska doesn't trust the FAA - for good reason. There used to be FAA-linked auditors that reported back to the FAA directly, even though they were paid by Boeing (i.e. they could be fired by the FAA, but not by Boeing). This was the case up through 2004:
> "This all changed in 2004, when a committee made up largely of industry backers passed a rule establishing the Organization Designation Authorization (ODA) system. The ODA system transformed the way DERs worked. Now called Authorized Representatives (ARs), these employees reported not to the FAA, but to Boeing managers."
Regulatory Capture at the FAA, Claremont Journal of Law and Public Policy
Leo Kalb Bourke, November 12, 2021
When you're buying a ~$100M/unit where the manufacturer is making 15+% margin, you get pretty good access to do what you need to do in order to feel comfortable with the purchase.
This is pretty normal is it not? In the automotive world when you have quality or run rate problems the big 3 company will have someone on the line watching.
Yeah, same for consumer tech. We always had our own people embedded in the manufacturing operations in China/Taiwan/Vietnam to keep things running smoothly and ensure there were no miscommunications around specifications.
>This seems crazy to me. Alaska Airlines doesn't trust Boeing enough that they're sending their audit team to Boeing to check for quality.
I wouldn't say it's crazy. When buying industrial equipment, it's commonplace to have a Factory Acceptance Test (FAT) where engineers from the customer travel to the supplier factory to verify everything is built to spec and functions as expected. Upon passing FAT, equipment is shipped to site and installed where it then undergoes a site acceptance test (SAT). After SAT, the equipment is "handed over" to the client. The FAT-SAT process can be applied to anything from small individual pieces of equipment all the way up to huge skids/packages.
In shipbuilding, classification agencies like ABS or DNV have inspectors that monitor the construction of a ship.
> The problem is that we don't know which other parts and systems Boeing might have quality issues for.
We don't need to go through everything, at least not immediately.
We know the door/bolts have issues, so we can just scrutinise those really carefully. The crucial part is not looking at whether there are issues (we already know there are), but at the nature of those issues. Are they localised and contained, or are they systemic? The extent to which they're systemic tells us how worried we need to be about everything else in the planes
(Personally, given the MCAS situation, I don't believe for a moment these issues are not systemic, but a layperson's semi-educated guess isn't a valid basis for an airplane audit)
It's not that. It's the fact that Boeing is letting an Airline do this. So now what? Every Airline is going to send their team to check their own Max planes during production?
And if an Airline doesn't send a team to check on their plane, does that mean quality control is worse?
Let’s say Alaska Airlines returns all Max planes… They can go bankrupt, because it will disrupt their business too much. So, as in every negotiation, they can’t submit Boeing to the maximum penalty.
In the commercial/industrial space, having the ability to do on-site QC visits of your supplier/manufacturer of goods is completely normal, often written into the contract itself and sometimes mandated by quality control certification standards.
Part of it is to be able to challenge QC reports submitted by the company. If you have a good you receive with QC paperwork which Boeing no doubt generates, you may want to go see how legitimate the process the paperwork is certifying.
The power of this paperwork extends into lawsuit ammo if a need ever arises.
The job of QC in commercial/industrial is legal ass-covering for both sides of a contract.
4 years ago Boeing cut their quality inspection staff as part of its "Quality Transformation". "In the Puget Sound region, there are currently [2019] just over 3,000 Boeing Quality Inspectors, who typically work as a second set of eyes. For each of the tens of thousands of jobs that go into assembling an airplane, they formally sign off that it has been completed and done right. By the end of next year, Boeing’s plan would bring that down to not many more than 2,000 people." [0]
"They got quality inspectors, quality managers, out of the picture," one former quality manager said, adding that the positions had been reduced from about 15 inspectors per building per shift, to one. [1]
This is unfortunately common when cost and schedule take priority. Quality can be seen as an unnecessary cost that delays delivery, particularly when dealing with low-probability events. When the probability is low, you can roll the dice many times without consequence and convince yourself you're good rather than just lucky.
IOW rather than having "air-tight" procedures proven beforehand, apparently flight 1282 served as a full-scale early-warning system for the entire fleet, or the entire aircraft supplier, whichever is more realistic.
How clever, you can't get much more realistic of a mock-up than that. The undeniability is undeniably palpable.
Some people are just not quality people.
Thankfully there weren't any fatalities this time, it may be risky but hey you pays your money and you takes your chances.
Boeing moved a lot of their staff to South Carolina to avoid the negligent union parasites who assembled the max in Washington. The 787 made in SC isnt having this widespread a problem.
You can't look at just the Sound to calculate their safety staff changes.
1. QA issues almost shut down 787 production a few years ago (~2019), all stemming from its Carolina based operations.
2. The 787 is an older airplane than the current hot topic.
>negligent union parasites
This perspective is so tired and it's quite frankly exhausting to deal with. Please reconsider your perspective and opinion on this matter, fairly new account.
3. Pretty much all of Airbus is unionized, vs. only 1/3rd at Boeing. If "unions bad", Airbus aircraft should have had dozens more major issues in the previous decades.
That's a different union, what's your point? Unions aren't inherently negligent or parasitic. What's telling is I describe one bad one and you assume all are described that way, which is 'tiring' presumption that's exhausting to deal with that i hope will be reconsidered.
It's like you criticize one negligent union, the woodwork comes out to protect the bad apple.
If you use emotionally charged language like "parasites", don't be surprised people find meaning beyond the most literal interpretations of what you say.
To avoid being misunderstood, explain how those quality issues arose from something that is attributable to the union, instead of simply calling their workers negligent and parasites.
You: Does the phrase "negligent union parasites" refer to one union or is it applicable to many different unions?
ChatGPT: The phrase "negligent union parasites" is a derogatory and generalized statement that is not specific to any particular union. Instead, it seems to be a broad and negative characterization that could be directed towards members or aspects of various unions. It's important to note that such language is highly biased and does not reflect an objective or fair assessment of unions or their members. Unions can vary widely in their practices, effectiveness, and the satisfaction of their members, and like any large organization, they may have both strengths and weaknesses. It's always more constructive to address specific concerns or issues rather than using generalized negative labels.
You intentionally shortened 'the negligent union parasites who assembled the max' which explicitly tailored to the union who assembled the max. The fact you left out the qualifiers says it all. If I put something like 'the nasty Americans who sold slaves' into chatGPT but cut off 'who sold slaves' you'd get the same sort of inaccurate output.
This provocative language severely undercuts your point, especially because the fatal problem with the MAX was the designed-in MCAS system and management decisions to hide it & hush up the problems they knew about years before it killed hundreds of people.
If that's your angle your most direct attack would have been questioning GGPs criticism of the Quality Inspection staff. It's telling you severely undercut your argument by searching child nodes of a parent thread for your pet disagreement rather than your true contention against GGP that assembly quality control wasn't the issue.
That is, the whole predication of GGP was quality inspection was a factor, which you baffling instead chose to only argue against here in selected predicated children (of course we probably know why).
Common knowledge is not “searching child nodes” - I mentioned MCAS because that’s what caused all of the deaths so far and it was due to poor management decisions. There’s similarly no indication that any of the safety issues in the news currently have anything to do with the workforce, and we know that could not be the case because this is a failure of the quality control system setup by Boeing’s management, not the workers. It’s hardly novel to note that a failure like this is a systemic problem - Deming was talking about that in regards to WWII manufacturing!
You had no issue with the shift quality inspection mention until the sanctity of the assembling unions were questioned, then magically your argument appears. Your aim is transparent. We know why you didn't attack the quality inspection number argument, even though it's the parent generalized counter to your position.
Dude, it would be far less embarrassing to admit you were being provocative and drop it than spiraling into the ground like this.
I don’t know why you’re so confidently wrong about my position on quality control but it’s irrelevant to the simple fact that all of the failures we’ve seen are the responsibility of Boeing’s management: even if the unionized assembly workers are caricatures straight out of union-busting propaganda, aerospace safety is famously based on the principle of not relying on a single safety mechanism, but in these reports we’re seeing systemic failures where cost savings was prioritized over safety.
What do unions have to do with this at all if it was spirit aero systems fucking it up?
Also from what I've seen the Boeing union has been raising alarm bells about... Literally exactly all of these little things that caused the quality issues
You're saying "we know" like a single person has agreed with your line of reasoning in this thread
Touch grass bruh. No idea what's got you so frothed up, but it's not constructive.
Fire the board and put an actual engineer in the CEO seat until the company gets fixed. The wrong culture of people are in charge and until this is addressed substantively there won’t be change.
Radical action is required or the company could be destroyed.
For me this argument always made 0 sense. Dennis Muilenburg was a engineer through and through, and he did pretty much all his career at Boeing. But this is during his time as CEO that all the previous issues with the 737 Max arose, which led to him being fired.
You want an engineer CEO, you got one and it didn't help anything.
Because that's not what a CEO does in any case. At this level of management, especially in those huge company, you are so far removed from the craft that it is really irrelevant if you have any experience in it.
I think, it is way more important to look at the actual owner of Boeing and its general environment. Boeing is now mostly owned by big institutional investment firm [0], and they are the one who choose the CEO.
Boeing is also one of the most insanely protected company in the U.S. Whatever Boeing does, the U.S government will always be here to make sure Boeing stays dominant and make life very difficult for any competitor.
The situation with the 737 Max was actually a good example where the FAA and the U.S Govt was again very lenient with Boeing, and just gave them a slap on the wrist.
So if you were the owner of such company, why not abuse this amount of protection ? Why not push for the maximum profitability at the cost of quality ?
If Boeing received more than just a slap in the wrist for the previous 737 Max fuck-up, they would be way more inclined to reevaluate their whole quality process and make sure no incident every happen.
> Because that's not what a CEO does in any case. At this level of management, especially in those huge company, you are so far removed from the craft that it is really irrelevant if you have any experience in it.
An engineer CEO is going to value different things than a non-engineer CEO.
If your anecdote says anything it's more about where is the pressure coming from that caused an engineer CEO to behave like a non-engineer?
this hypothetical engineer-CEO is going to put a lot more stock in what the engineers are saying, so even if it'll cost a lot of money, reducing profits, the engineer-ceo is going to say we're not not launch until the engineers say it is good to go. The MBA CEO is going to say the engineers are stupid, they don't know the whole picture, they're going to bankrupt the company, and we're going to launch anyway.
No, I am just putting into question this seemingly undeniable claim that someone who happen to have been an engineer in their career would somehow end up being a more engineer focused CEO.
This naively would make sense, but does it actually have any factual weight ?
There is so many counter argument to this. Becoming a CEO, from an engineering start, usually involve spending a lot of your career in higher management. At this point, why would you be more sensible to the engineer issues, than the higher management/board/owner ?
Climbing the ladder also require at some point to satisfy the requirement of non-engineer, shifting you own goal if what you aim is to be at the top of the ladder.
Having an engineer past doesn't guarantee at all that you will listen to engineer more once you have climb the ladder.
People just want to continue to create this weird tension between engineer and business people, both trying to act as if they are much better than the other at handling a company, when in actuality, it is the collaboration of both which is successful, and some of the best company manage to harness exactly this.
> People just want to continue to create this weird tension between engineer and business people
because there _is_ tension between business and technical people.
a business person can walk into a room and through charm and sheer force of will get what they want. No amount of charm will ever find and fix that bug.
It's a fundamentally different approach to the world, hence why they clash so often and why an engineer turned CEO is going to act vastly different than business person turned CEO.
and just as clearly, what a CEO values matters or they wouldn't be paid so much because they could be replaced by anyone otherwise.
I think this accountability is a good point… if someone told me absent any other information that a company had the issues Boeing has been having, then I would assume they get shut down or forced into a restructured management with hugely increased regulatory oversight.
The point is that Quality flows from the top down. If the people on top of the organization don't take it seriously, then it's hard for the actual working engineers to get the support they need to do their jobs. Having an engineer as the CEO at least makes it likely that that person understands what is needed and makes it happen.
It's not a guarantee, but I'd trust an engineering organization with an engineer at the helm a lot more than someone with a sales background.
You could say that obviously most engineering types are not good enough to run an engineering company.
But that wouldn't be true, in reality almost nobody is good enough to run an engineering company.
Having an engineer type sure improves your odds compared to general business practitioners, though.
It may be like unobtainium but if you had your choice of engineers at an aircraft company you can't do better than one whose mathematical ability puts general business leaders to shame, and who started out building planes at an early age and hasn't forgotten how for their entire career. In fact only gotten better by focusing so strongly on the finances that directly contribute to the most reliable aircraft that can be produced. Even then some will still crash. As we have seen, it's lots better without the temptation to be distracted by the general business trends that come and go, which encourage little manipulations of large resources in ways that any negative outcomes, unforseen or not, will be pushed far enough into the future for decision-makers to have fully cashed out before that time.
The worst you could do is have somebody who has never participated in aircraft design, assembly, and maintenance allowed into the chain of command anywhere between the entry-level engineers and the top decision makers.
It should go without saying that natural leadership ability has got to be there for it to be sensible for someone to move up the chain of command, but also it needs to be fully rewarding for highly skilled engineers to prosper progressively without having to be very near the ladder that has to be climbed leading to executive duties.
As each decade goes by and people overall settle more and more for having non-leaders in leadership positions, you can't expect things to ever be the same in any way unless this pervasive defect can be reversed.
It didn't get this way overnight and it can't be fixed overnight.
To reframe the point the parent made: Boeing is a special case due to the fact that those above the CEO are uniquely institutional (large investment) and the company enjoys a level of "socialized failure protection" from the US government that few other companies get.
At least other companies that get cushy treatment from the US government often have more competition, like GM.
People busting on the past and current CEOs, and for sure they deserve it.. however in my experience, many of these decisions happen at the board level. The Boeing board of directors need to be replaced, and held accountable for allowing quality measure to drop (for whatever the cause: outsourcing or pure cost cutting/staff skills).
But instead, as is so common in corporate politics, we pick a figure head like the CEO to be sacrificed, while the root problems don't get solved.
I emphatically agree with you about it being a board first, CEO also situation, but when the CEO is also in charge of the board it’s difficult to see how effective second guessing of a CEO’s decision can reliably happen.
Obviously this is legacy, and ironically the CEO at the time was a qualified engineer, so perhaps my statement was rash.
But I do think a CEO and board who will put some teeth back into engineering is required right now, however that is accomplished.
This is how capitalism works, right? Public companies are under a constant squeeze. Profit, profit, profit. Growth, growth, growth. If the CEO doesn't deliver they get removed and the board simply installs a new one. The growth machine must never stop, even at the expense of employees and customers.
Experienced, knowledgeable employees costing too much? Get rid of them. Q2 profits fell short of expectations? Hike the prices. Supplier too expensive? Find another one.
Not necessarily. The moment these issues hit critical systems you'll see a change. DoD officials have already sounded the alarm on monopoly in general:
There has got to be some way to fix this problem. How is it that as a society we have collectively built up so much bureaucracy and bloat that causes this?
It literally wasn’t worth it to return? I might have a biased view of this site but I thought we were mostly engineers who understood how complicated a “simple” change could be. Logistics for physical goods is hard enough for coordinating moving items from a factory to a front which is order -> chaos.
Moving from a war front back to storage is going from chaos -> order and significantly harder.
Either way, still not trillions to my original point
I don't think you need an engineer as CEO for that. Might on the margins help but other things such as ability to change processes or reporting lines might matter more.
If you want cultural change you need a CEO that wants that and knows how to get there - which is not an engineering problem.
Friend, as a software engineer who’s become a CEO I can’t disagree with you more.
The traditional culture of CEOs in the western world isn’t healthy: it’s top down focus and focus on pushing down responsibility and departmental compartmentalization tends to create a lot of the problems the very same management theory fancies itself to solve.
Having an actual “buck stops with me” CEO who has experience in the trenches and not managing other people to get the results that would reassure the market and has been shown to work very well in company after company.
First principles and the culture of questioning need to be nurtured by competent leaders, and not MBA lead presentations and check in meetings for progress. Sleeping in the factory until this situation is fixed is what needs to happen and it is not this board and management team.
Also, this is a board issue first, a CEO issue second.
That is not really related to my point unless you want to say that engineer CEOs are intrinsically better/not susceptible to bad culture etc.
I have worked with great, bad, and middling CEOs and I would not say that it comes down to their degree background where they place in the spectrum of quality. Not having experience in managing other people but only some sort of trench experience will likely fail at a place of the size and complexity.
A lot what you describe is more like poor management.
And, yes, there is a big role for the board to play.
How many have law degrees? The majority of CEOs in the top 100 were not engineers it seems.
And performance is stock performance/TSR, if I understand correctly.
Edit: How is it sea lioning if your link is not establishing what you claim? An intrinsic link between being an engineer and being a high performance CEO would, for example, be that proportionate more engineers than MBAs, etc. are good CEOs.
That just compares MBAs and engineers (not sure what happens if someone has both), not the many other non-engineer educations CEOs can have (law, mathematics, physics, ...). MBA is quite US centric.
> I don't think you need an engineer as CEO for that.
You need a CEO who actually understands the business. If your business is building planes and your CEO has never built a plane, then your business will inevitably have problems because the CEO fundamentally doesn't understand the business.
It won't happen immediately but a slow rot will set in. The CEO won't pay attention to the details because he never understood the details in the first place.
Optus recently had a major network outage. Part of the reason why that happened is they picked a CEO with no telecommunications background. She fundamentally didn't understand the business she was in:
So what exactly would the CEO have to have done to "build planes"? Some wiring? Screwing in things? Ordered parts? Quality tested a component? Why not the need to also piloting a plane to understand how it works? What specific part imbues the required understanding?
To actually have done something and contributed to designing and producing aircraft. To actually have an aeronautical engineering background. That's the business Boeing is in.
Putting inexpert people in positions of authority is guaranteed to damage a business, as Boeing is now finding out.
In most Western countries the most senior person in command is a civilian, not a general or admiral (and there are civilians in various other positions, too).
So when currently in country A something is done by the military and in country B by civilians, only country A has it right?
The US army corps of engineers being in charge of levees isn't the only way, for example. A lot of generals don't fight wars. And those who do, are under civilian supervision.
Civilians control but don't manage the military. They control it, in the sense of setting the goals, but they don't generally manage things after that.
I think that goes to the heart of it: I am not sure generals would necessarily be better at achieving the political objectives of what the military is for.
In the same way, I couldn't say if Boing would need something more closer to a priest or a technocrat.
You need two types of experience: deep and abstract.
You need the deep experience of having worked inside the beaurocracy of a huge effort on some tiny piece of the project.
You need the abstract experience of having built a smaller, less complicated version of an entire plane yourself. Think RC model plane here. And yes you should be at least an RC pilot.
With both of those experiences you will be able to extrapolate very closely everything you need to know to be succesful in establishing an engineering culture.
„Cultural change is not an engineering problem“ - cannot count how often i heared this.
But if you want to have an „engineering culture“ - let an engineer handle it!
But why would anyone whish to hange to said „engineering culture“ if no engineer is around?
Why would it need to be an "engineering culture" as opposed to, for example, a "quality culture"? And even if you want to former, why does it need an engineer to create that culture? Does a good movie director also need to be a good writer or actor?
No it’s the executives role to set the culture and nurture the concerns of quality that are lacking in this organization. And quality is a product engineering attribute and a product of manufacturing concerns being powerful enough within an organization to be addressed, so I was making the suggestion that perhaps an engineer should be in the seat until the problem is remedied.
Lots of other disciplines are irrelevant when you’re talking about actual aircraft manufacturing and not the soft concept of quality.
Edit: aircraft engineering organizations require an executive that understands the airline market and how to build airplanes. This company in particular needs a fixer to address quality problems and reassure the market that substantive changes to the quality of manufacturing will be made.
An expert in toy manufacturing who ran Mattel shouldn’t be overseeing jet aircraft production and this idea that they can do so effectively is a big part of the reason companies continually fall down on manufacturing quality and flame out like GE, HP, and now Boeing are doing. Sorry. This idea that a CEO without a background in aerospace can just fly in and fix everything because of transferrable skills sounds good but it’s just simply not true and in fact is the exact and very specific management theory and corporate ideology that is the root cause of the problems at the core issues this company is experiencing*.
For these type of job hops many fundamental quality principles carry forward, but each is a whole new ball game when you got into it. Also for instance with pharmaceuticals as well as fuels you still use the exact same models of the latest spectrometers and chromatographs, so specialized expertise here carries over ideally but that is just the instrument, not the particular science being conducted.
What it comes down to is that someone with decades of experience in pharma can be useful in the fuel lab and vice versa, but it still takes years to get up to speed before the wisest decisions can be made since either way this type of thing is not soft about quality. That much it shares with aircraft reliability.
It takes a certain type of leadership to prevail in a situation like Boeing (and many others) did during World War II, and this has been so sorely lost by now that there is very little remaining linkage back to the real thing.
And while I'm here don't ask me how I know the airline companies' fuel is tested as reliably as their fuselages, and by a bureau with management hierarchy having a degree of dedication that's noticeably more modern than what was once expected in the past.
I don't think the pedigree matters as much as for the leadership of a company to really know their product and market. I don't think that ex Boeing engineer turned ex Boeing CEO really knew their product given how absurd the procedures sounded to pilots around mcas and now with this de-icing issue.
what did ballmer do at microsoft before he was CEO? What did microsoft look like after he became CEO?
Same questions, but with Satya. There's a reason Apple strongly prefers to hire from within. Actually, you could ask the same questions about jobs and cook.
You need to live and breathe the company. Further, the executive's background WILL play a role in the company's direction.
Not who you’re responding to, but I agree with the notion that if you want an engineering culture, you need an engineer at the top.
Engineering is one of the few fields that understands value. Most other functions, within a corporation, are more process oriented and have a more transactional world view as a consequence of dealing with costs for most of their activities.
In other words, if you want to slash budgets, lay off staff, and deliver value to shareholders, your faithful MBA is your go to. If you want to build cultures that create products that strive to satisfy arrays of non-functional requires, like efficiency, reliability, and safety, engineering managers have spent their careers building these departments.
I assume it’s easier to find an engineer who went to engineering school to learn how to build airplanes that are safe than it is to find an MBA who went to business school to learn how to build planes that are safe. (It’s not about the knowledge but about the root desire)
Similarly, I assume it’s harder to find an engineer who went into the field purely for money.
I do think on average engineers will prioritize safety (since they likely understand failure modes and production and long tail statistics better. We literally have to take engineering ethics classes), at the cost of doing a worse job at running the business. But when the business requires this level of safety, that IS doing a good job.
You need to be able to steer a large and complex organisation - being an engineer has nothing to do with that. And, yes, incentives matter, but those can be set.
No. This just says some engineers can (like some MBAs). There is no intrinsic link between being an engineer and being a great CEO. Most engineers are not executives.
This argument relies on false equivalence and isn’t even rational.
Except top executives are engineering degree holders. They are, and that’s a fact. The majority of top performing companies are headed by engineering degree holding CEOs.
But you keep making the same wrong points and trying to play devils advocate on positions that you don’t back up.
If you want to claim an intrinsic link between being an engineer and being a top performing CEO, you need to show something different anyway. For example, that the proportion of engineers that are great CEOs is higher than the proportion of MBAs or lawyers or chemist or ... that are great CEOs. Maybe that is true, but I haven't seen it.
Edit: we could also look at a narrower problem, for example: is the performance of engineer CEOs in "engineering companies" better on average than that of non-engineer CEOs in that sector?
I am not saying engineers cannot be good CEOs, just that the link between being an engineer and a good CEO is (probably) not intrinsic.
"If you have a great executive ticking all the boxes - splendid.
But there is no intrinsic link between being an engineer and being a good CEO (same holds for other disciplines, btw.). You could have engineers that qualify, lawyers, MBAs, mathematicians, physicists, ...
Who do you want, a good director, a good actor, or a director who's a good director and a good actor? Which do you want, a quality culture, an engineering culture, or a quality and engineering culture? Of course one is "in charge" but pretty clearly "engineering" and "quality" aren't even in the room....
Let me put it this way: someone who is a great engineer but has no skill in running and steering a large organisation will fail. Someone who knows how to do the latter might succeed by "using" talented engineers within the organisation.
Or someone who is an engineer with experience running large organizations? Why engineer means automatically no experiencing running large organizations in your mind is baffling.
If you have a great executive ticking all the boxes - splendid.
But there is no intrinsic link between being an engineer and being a good CEO (same holds for other disciplines, btw.). You could have engineers that qualify, lawyers, MBAs, mathematicians, physicists, ...
Citation, please. And, no, having a plurality of top performing CEOs being engineers is not showing an intrinsic link between being an engineer and top performing CEO.
Find your own citations. You have received a reply of substance to your multitude of questions and requests for evidence many times. This is the reason I said you were sea lioning.
> Sealioning is a type of trolling or harassment that consists of pursuing people with relentless requests for evidence, often tangential or previously addressed, while maintaining a pretense of civility and sincerity, and feigning ignorance of the subject matter.
This is what you keep doing and it’s rather exhausting.
You want engineering quality experts, but not clear at all that needs to be at CEO level. If you have someone with that skill and great experience running large and complex organisations - great take them. If not, take someone who knows how to get organisations to change and do stuff.
There is plenty of evidence that engineers in the CEO seat are effective drivers of companies and shareholder value. This is false equivalence reasoning presented over and over in this thread and I dare say this opinion is quite antiquated and precisely the thinking that has put Boeing on its current destructive course.
Not really. My arguments have been pretty consistent that being an engineer and being a good CEO are not really linked. Some engineers are good CEO, so are some MBAs, physcians, ...
Not clear at all that the best CEO is an MBA either. Putting an MBA in charge of engineering processes is like arguing anyone can do it, so if that's the position then why the resistance towards it being an engineer? If you want a culture expert, how about a history prof or an anthropologist? "Experience running large organizations" usually just equates to failing upwards.. run the last few orgs you admin into the ground and hide the debris with outsourcing, mergers, acquisitions, anything that hides your responsibility long enough to dodge accountability, move on to the next before it gets pinned on you. Do that 10 or 15 times, and that's a great career for most of the leadership/culture "experts" in the CEO world. I don't get the apologism or tendency to lionize these people
Quality is an engineering attribute: a byproduct of a culture that by definition survives in a company despite profit drive by putting minimum standards and support for people who keep them before or in balance with the bottom line concerns. Quality isn’t a culture, it’s literally a product engineering concerns that get prioritized.
The old school management theory is that engineering leaders are accountable to shipping quality products on time and within budget. That’s it.
But a CEO's historical understanding of engineering operations has been pretty opaque: ships on time, or doesn't. Of course this is lacking everything meaningful about software.
So the same visionary management theory has come up with a concept of DORA metrics. This provides the competency with quality management metrics that allow for decision-making around whether engineering is delivering or not and a whole new level of understanding and abstraction.
But understand that most of the companies that are getting themselves in deep shit right now are doing so because they have removed power from their engineering organizations to the point where, and the service of relentless extraction of shareholder value, they have destroyed their companies and crippled their products. It is happened to quite a few companies and manufacturers in the United States, from GE to Boeing, and from IBM to GM.
The current profit comes from revenue not reputation culture thinks that you can build some level of abstraction to engineering management, and then layer on traditional management theory in order to extract value from a chain of command.
The truth is that engineering lead organizations deliver a great deal, more value to shareholders in the long-term, as they are more focused on building the platforms that create competitive long-term foundations. Companies like Netflix, Google, Apple, and other “tech companies” occupy the top value of the stock market in equities positions around the world, because of the fact that they are able to use software to amplify the value of their innovations at profound levels. But America’s Legacy companies continue to operate as if this lesson is not true they continue to prioritize optimization over platform.
The old system continues to persist with the idea that there must be a professional manager at the top of the organization, rather than someone who is focused on creating value with platforms, and the culture tends to produce these situations of crisis in exploitation, because they do not understand how important it is to create a culture of platform value creation.
So of course, I make the comment that we should have an “engineering experience CEO,” or even an actual engineer in the CEO seat, and predictably it ends up being criticized for the fact that we could have a professional manager in that seat, and don’t actually need an engineer to be a CEO. That’s fine, and I can understand the point you’re raising.
But, it’s been my experience that CEOs that have been in involved in platform, engineering and large scale systems management do a much better job of preserving the culture that creates lasting and durable platform value for companies like Boeing, and this is the value which has been destroyed and the culture which must be resurrected before the company crashes.
So, rather than bringing another abstraction specialist, who will find another metric values system to manage things, which isn’t working, I was suggesting that we should bring in an actual engineer to sleep on the factory floor and make sure that this culture stops before someone dies and the share price drops to unrecoverable levels (where it’s going!).
To expound I’ll say this.
The current culture at Boeing is very much a culture where the engineers don’t speak up. Many of the most passionate people who worked there have been fired or let go because they spoke up so, I think it’s time for a change before one of the most storied and important companies in American history becomes yet another casualty of the MBA-lead, value extracting management theory.
So in sun, it really doesn’t matter if the CEO is an engineer, but it matters that the CEO is not working with abstractions, and therefore I was making the suggestion that the CEO should be an engineer, or at least come from engineering as a background, so that we do not continue the pattern of incompetent management that has gotten this company to the brink of failure.
Forgive my typos, I had to dictate this as I’m traveling.
Putting in an engineer at the top alone won't fix endemic culture issues. You'd have to do a more in-depth rethinking of all the processes and purge all the penny pinching cruft. But that isn't palatable to shareholders so it won't happen.
The CEO was his own chairman from 2016-2019, so there’s that too…
Getting back to basics around following procedure and having a single process sure would have helped in this situation. Just read what the leaker actually wrote. It’s a comical parody of a company that’s off track and not empowering engineering to set boundaries on procedure.
So if you don’t address the executives in charge and bring in someone who will change the situation, which this board and CEO have utterly failed to do and in fact have made worse since 2019, who is going to change that?
Two planes crashed. That's four years ago and that was root caused to a single issue which has since been addressed. Before that the 737 had a great safety record. In fact it still does. Not perfect but pretty amazing considering it's the most widely use plane ever produced. After that there have been a few incidents, including the non fatal one with the door. But nothing out of the ordinary.
Here's a list of all the incidents with the 737 over the years.
If anything, this decade is looking pretty good so far.
I'm not saying there's nothing going on at Boeing in terms of management and quality control. But hadn't it been for the issues a few years ago, this would barely register in the news as anything else than the minor incident this was. But because that was in the news, now any Boeing related news is causing world + dog to panic. And that apparently includes FAA leadership and management at major airlines. They are apparently more worried about how it reflects on them than about the actual facts.
I think the grounding of the aircraft has much more to do with politics and appearances than with actual safety. It was premature and probably overkill. People insisting on expensive audits and other draconian measures have basically persuaded the FAA to do what they otherwise wouldn't dream of doing: ground loads of planes over an issue that can probably be excluded with a simple, straightforward inspection. There hasn't been a lot of detail about what exactly went wrong. Nobody waited for that to be revealed even. But I bet it's something straight forward like a missing bolt or something similarly easy to check and verify.
If you are an airline and you own anything even mildly resembling a 737 and you haven't at this point checked if the bloody doors are fine, you should not be operating planes at all.
At least, claiming ignorance after all the attention in the news is not a thing. You shouldn't be waiting for the FAA to tell you to do this as it's both obvious and you are responsible for your fleet.
On one hand I agree with you that people are likely overreacting, but i disagree that anyone is acting irrationally. Boeing has lost _all_ credibility amongst the public and we're not all aviation experts so we don't know that a 4-bolt-gap is fine or whatever their current issue is.
>But hadn't it been for the issues a few years ago
By "issues" you mean hundreds of people being killed by a known manufacturing/training issue? Where does your faith in these people come from?
> Where does your faith in these people come from?
The unchanged safety record. Yes, it's tragic when planes crash. Thankfully it's not happening a lot. And as I've argued, it actually seems safer than ever.
People seem to insist there are all sorts of issues with Boeing. Except that doesn't seem to be translating into a major increase in accidents or incidents. So, the attention and paranoia seems a bit over the top. People who know nothing whatsoever about any of this calling for CEOs and boards to be fired and the FAA to do this or that.
You know what's not happening? A lot of pilots, mechanics, airlines, etc. reporting doors with the same issue. Just not a thing. And all of them are aware and looking. That's 100% guaranteed. Nobody needs to be told to start looking. These doors are probably safer than they've ever been because world+dog has been looking at them for the last few weeks.
This article is about an airline finding loose bolts. That's a serious issue of course. Exactly the kind of thing an inspector should notice on countless inspections that happen to planes throughout their life. There are of course many bolts in airplanes and torquing them correctly kind of is a big deal to the point where companies are keeping detailed records about who torqued them, when, and how strongly.
Airlines are doing exactly what they are supposed to be doing: inspecting their airplanes on the off chance there might be something wrong. I expect most pilots would also care to look at the door panel in question when they do their routine inspection of the plane before taking off. I know I would; and I'm not even a pilot. Maybe not in depth and just a cursory glance. But they'd be aware and on the lookout for trouble. After all, it's their job to make sure the plane is safe before taking off. This mentality is ingrained in the aviation industry. Which is why safety records are so good. It's rare for something this bad to go unnoticed.
The culture has to be changed. CEO pay is completely out of whack, giving early retirement to higher paid engineers so Boeing can hire people at lower wages, moving parts of the manufacturing to areas that do not have Labor Unions, putting the screws on manufactures so they cannot make a decent profit. Is this corporate America. We need an airplane manufacturer in the US, but I say fire the Board and the CEO. Maybe those who want to protect Boeing should talk to families who lost relatives on the 2 fatal crashes. Shame on Boeing leadership. It all started with the merger of Boeing and McDonnell Douglas. Management was not willing to go back to the drawing board and now look at the cost.
Fire the CEO and the Board. This all started with the merger of Boeing and McDonnell Douglas. Profit above all else. Just like Jack Welch of GE. It is pathetic. Take all the money and squeeze the bottom. Retire experienced engineers and hire new ones with less experience and lower pay. Move manufacturing so you will not have Labor Unions to worry about. Squeeze companies suppling parts so they do not have a fair profit. It is pathetic. We all must demand change. I am flying overseas but not on a Boeing plane. And my heart goes out to families who lost loved ones in the 2 fatal crashes.
In the current economy who cares if the company is destroyed? Shareholders with insider knowledge will already have reduced their exposure. See what PE firms are doing, only thing that matters is ROI. I don’t see how it will change until we go back to pre-Reagan times, I.e. companies purpose are not just to make money for shareholders.
In college, I knew someone who went on to become a quartermaster for the US Army. They were in charge of a group that packed parachutes. As CO he was required to periodically jump with one of the parachutes that his team had packed. Having skin in the game provides a natural incentive to keep quality up.
A commercial airplane is a tremendously complex piece of equipment. Failure can come over time and in unexpected places. But Boeing executives and high level managers should fly commercially rather than having a fleet of private jets.
It will be interesting to see how this all plays out. At this point, it seems likely that they will be forced to take some extreme measures to counteract the bad publicity.
"Alaska Airlines placed restrictions on the Boeing plane involved in a dramatic mid-air blowout after pressurisation warnings in the days before Friday's incident, investigators say."
Boeing absolutely deserve every single bit of the criticism they get for the Max, but it's worth keeping in mind that in this instance Alaska possibly share some of the responsibility for flying an aircraft with known issues.
The pressurization warning was a sensor glitch unrelated to the door plug blowout. Even if Alaska had fixed the pressure sensors the door still would have blown out. So I don't see what responsibility they share in the incident.
> On Sunday, the NTSB reported that Alaska Airlines had previously restricted this particular plane from long flights over water, specifically to Hawaii, because an auto pressurization alert light that had illuminated during three prior flights, twice in the days leading up to Friday.
> But aviation experts told NBC News on Monday that based on the information provided thus far by federal authorities the light was going off as the result of a computer glitch of some kind and not indicating there was a mechanical problem on the plane.
> "It’s not unusual in the aviation world for there to be issues with warning lights and most of the time the issue is with the warning light itself," Jeff Guzzetti, a former NTSB investigator. "It’s not like Alaska Airlines ignored it. The fact that it restricted this plane from making flights over water while they were looking into this warning lights issue points to a robust safety culture."
> John Cox, who weighs-in regularly on aviation issues for NBC News, agreed.
> "The pressurization system, from what I’ve read, was acting normally," said Cox, who said he flew Boeing 737's for 15 years. "This appears to be more a sensor problem. But Alaska Airlines, being a conservative airline, said this has happened a couple times now and we need to look into, but let’s not do that over the Pacific Ocean."
> Homendy said at Monday night's news conference that it does appear the auto pressurization system and its alerts were not involved in Friday night's accident, although she cautioned that the investigation was ongoing.
It would depend on what the guidelines and other requirements say with regards to such warnings. It definitely is not a good impression for Alaska for most people, though.
Right, which is why air crash/incident investigations look at all causes. It would be absolutely the wrong conclusion from this to say "the problem is solely Boeing".
The problem can be Boeing, Alaska Airlines and the regulatory system under which they operate since an intervention at any level here would've prevented the incident: Boeing should be doing their job properly, but Alaska Airlines could've done more then the minimum with a plane displaying persistent pressurization problems, and the regulations shouldn't have allowed them to get an exemption to fly with a persistent issue like this on their records since the mitigation wasn't remotely safe.
Not fly the specific aircraft which had three pressurisation warnings in the days prior to incident until they've carried out some checks? They were serious enough that they decided it wasn't safe to fly that plane over water.
Maybe the actions of Alaska Airlines were absolutely fine, but the CEO passing all the blame to Boeing before the incident report is understandable, but a little off to me.
Planes constantly have numerous issues. And there are processes in place on how to deal with them. It seems like the followed all the necessary processes and even did additional non-required steps.
Looking on Google the closest I can find to your claim is the NTSB chair saying it might not be related after she gave out the details of the previous warning lights (as you'd expect in her position before the investigation has completed).
but that's because if they flew over water and had a depressurization event then the plane and everyone on it dies. There aren't a lot of airports between the continental US and Hawaii and jets burn an insane amount of fuel at 10,000' MSL, which almost guarantees a water landing. However, over land, the plane can simply divert and land. And at the time of the incident, Alaska believes the problem was with the light/sensor and not the structure.
Forgive me for my ignorance, but I understand that the only bolts which have been checked are those which secure door plugs. The checks have found that in many cases they are not tightened to spec.
I imagine there are hundreds of thousands if not millions of bolts on an airliner. How is it that the industry has confidence in the rest of them, and that the investigations are limited to the plug door bolts?
A convincing explanation I saw is that usually all doors are loosely attached by the subcontractor, since Boeing needs to remove them to build the interior. Then puts them back to specs.
A miscommunication probably happened where the plug doors were not tightened to specs same as every other doors, but Boeing didn't touch them (or checked) for their usual interior setup.
The whistleblower said they don't usually do that but had to open this door (not remove it) and merely opening the door doesnt require someone to signoff on the bolts being put back in place
You may have seen my comment. I was quoting my neighbor's speculation, who was career QA/QC at Boeing.
Since then, we have the whistleblower's account.
TLDR: A bureaucratic snafu where the record keeping didn't match the actual work. The repair of the plug's air seal was miscategorized ("reopen" vs "removal") in the system, so did not trigger the required post-repair inspection, which would have (most likely) spotted the missing nuts.
My neighbor said he'll look into the whistleblower's account, though he admitted it was plausible.
Also:
IIRC, castle nuts, which use cotter pins, are used for the plug's bolts. Meaning no tightening or torquing. The pressure differential keeps the plugs sealed. The bolts just keep the plug in place.
You probably know more about these details than me, I was referencing Real Engineering's video [0] on the subject.
If the whistleblower's information is true, then it's an even bigger fuckup than expected. But I'm worried it could lead to the management throwing a random worker under the bus to cover their dangerous practices.
For one, the door plugs are installed not by Boeing but by Spirit Aerosystems. Alaska’s maintenance will be focused on that specific vendor’s performance.
Secondly, other bolts will be checked far more frequently as part of standard maintenance. Door plug fitments typically are only checked during heavy checks (which occur every few years depending on type and interval) unless there’s a specific incident that demands an immediate assessment.
I saw some Netflix documentary a while back where they said after their merger with McDonnel Douglas. MD people took over, moved their head quarters out of their engineering place(in Seattle). To keep the decision makers and bean counters away from engineering culture, and pivot the company's culture from being engineering driven to be (more)profit focussed than it already was.
With that of course comes things like firing Quality Assurance staff, and thinning out the need for safety and quality on the very long run.
There also seems to be some sort of a feeling in these companies that might have maxed out of what they can do with passenger airline segment of products. So they have to pinch dollars to make more money.
Once you arrive there, I do expect a long term slump in quality and trust.
You don't arrive here in a day. Nor do you recover quickly from here, that is if you can recover at all.
Between this and Scott Kirby (United CEO) saying they're removing the MAX10 from future planning, Boeing is in serious trouble, and Airbus should definitely break out the _good_ champagne.
It doesn't really help Airbus. Their production lines are sold out for ~7 years. They expect to increase production over time, but there is a long complex supply chain, so it is a slow steady uptick, not a rapid change. (Rapid changes are also how you stress suppliers financially and cause quality issues.) Then engines on some Airbus planes are having supply problems too, and existing engines are requiring more maintenance and earlier parts replacements than expected, leading to grounded aircraft.
It is very normal for airlines to mention the manufacturers, because that is how they do price negotiation.
Extra market barriers to entry, a hobbled competitor, a now (relatively) outstanding brand, eyes diverted from them, 10 years head start / catch-up, lessons to be learnt from Boeing, solid backing from shareholders, etc.
I'm sure I'm biased by now, but reading this from Boeing:
>> We are taking action on a comprehensive plan to bring these airplanes safely back to service and to improve our quality and delivery performance. We will follow the lead of the FAA and support our customers every step of the way.”
I though "follow the lead of the FAA" because you are lost when it come to such things. Not the image I want in my head of a company that should be a leader in that area...
Why would following the lead of the single organization that has the most authority in this area an issue?
They’ve made it clear they have their own auditors stepping in to assess Boeing’s processes, which doesn’t signal “lost”, and most of the public would see that comment about the FAA as a good thing I’d think.
In what way does this shift the responsibility, specifically?
The responsibility here is clearly still on Boeing. But when it comes to public communication, no one trusts Boeing right now, so it makes sense to highlight the involvement of a governing body that is not Boeing.
I realize there are major issues with the FAA/Boeing dynamic right now, but if the Alaska Airlines CEO instead said “We’re following Boeing’s lead in this matter”, I don’t think that would be an improvement.
"Follow the lead of the FAA" is a laughable claim.
After the autopilot crashes, the FAA grounded the 737 until they all had safety upgrades. Boing threw a pile of money at congress, and the FAA was overruled.
This is textbook regulatory capture. They will bribe their way out of this like last time. Boing is /too big to fail/, which is the penultimate pathology before /too big to keep alive/.
The company that once was known for the phrase “If it ain’t Boeing, I ain’t going” is now seeing airlines sending their own auditors. There’s really no other way to interpret this than a complete breakdown of trust and confidence. Absolutely wild.
Some planes fly 3-4 times each day. Each time, they carry ~150-200 people. They are incredibly mechanically, electronically and software -wise complex machines, and fly under huge range of conditions (number of conditions and range of values for each), withstanding elements, forces of physics, material exertion / fatigue etc etc.
So if there's an airplane manufacturer, delivering hundreds of planes to airlines, where processes allow for something like this to happen to a plane, and it's confirmed that it wasn't a single exception, it really brings to question how many out of tens of thousands of parts/aspects of those planes do not meet the expected parameters/standards and how many disasters are waiting to happen.
Both. The risk to an individual passenger on an individual plane is overblown. The cultural changes at Boeing that led to a decrease in quality control that increased risk to all passengers on all planes is not overblown, and will take years and years to remedy.
Their reputation (and by proxy, United States’ manufacturing since Boeing planes are one of the most publicly known American products) will not recover for decades I think.
The reality is that whether Boeing choose to do a re-brand of the Max, the underlying airplane is here to stay. For this class of airline, there are basically two suppliers in the west - Boeing and Airbus. Boeing has about 6,000 orders for the Max, and Airbus has about 10,000 orders for the A320 Neo. Airbus is delivering about 500 planes a year. So let's say an airline bites the bullet and cancels their orders for the Max and goes to Airbus - Airbus won't be able to deliver for the best part of a decade at best. Meanwhile, it would be enormously expensive for Boeing to design a replacement for the 737 Max from scratch and it still has tonnes of outstanding orders. And that's not even considering the fact that these airplanes have a lifespan of 25 years.
So in general there's simply no replacement for the 737 Max. People will be flying on them for the foreseeable future unless something causes a massive drop in air travel.
> Boeing is a world leader in stock buybacks. Between 1998 and 2018, the plane manufacturer also manufactured a whopping $61.0 billion in stock buybacks, amounting to 81.8 percent of its profits.
It actually isn't a question of the money so much as of time. A new airplane would take about 10-15 years to come to market. And then nothing is won. The problem isn't that the doors are bad on the Max, the problem is, that they are not properly attached.
Also rushing a new plane is more likely to be a safety risk. The 737 fundamentally is a safe plane - there is plenty knowledge on how to operate it safely. A completely new design would start that from scratch.
All of them. As shown by the overall statistics. And no, I haven't forgotten the MAX crashes. But the issue was addressed. And I hope all 737 pilots have checked the corresponding cutoff switches.
But that is exactly the point: a new plane would mean a new learning phase how to operate it safely. It can and should be done, but it isn't a silver bullet, especially none which would arrive withing the next 10 years.
Without the 737 max the airlines would need to change the way how they operate. And use more smaller and bigger planes. So not necessarily a drop in air travel is needed. Also the lifetime of existing planes could be extended a bit.
The problem is with the quality management throughout the manufacturing process and not with the specific airplane model except that the manufacturing sites vary between the models.
As the production probably cannot be easily moved, a replacement just isn't available and the market just needs a ton of 737-sized airplanes, the only solution is to up the game along the production line quickly and massively.
they survived two decades or so of penny wise pound foolish management, maybe they can weasel themselves out of this mess to keep the show going for another two
Off topic as hell hopefully, but "Why we lubricate threaded fasteners was a semi recent submission & it's had surprising uhh sticking power in head. Lubrication overcomes a lot of friction that can create variability in tensioning.
The standout example was giving students a bunch of torque wrenches & telling them to fasten a bolt, & then measuring the applied tension. And folks getting absurdly different numbers. The lubrication is there to allow the torque to consistently get applied.
By now one has to start to wonder why the doors didn't fell off much earlier.
While Boeing has to change a lot about how they manufacture airplanes, the airlines themselves should install a much more aggressive process to look out for these kind of manufacturing defects. There needs to be processes in place where e.g. any loose bolt found during maintenance gets reported and tracked to spot these kind of things early on. On top of that, there should be random probing of the components of the plane.
Wow, so Boeing doesn't even make its own fuselage? That's like most of the plane and they spun that off into a separate business they are a customer of?
It reminds me of the kind of corporate malfeasance that happened with Sears - sell of the buildings they own (to a company controlled by the CEO on the side) and make the individual stores rent them back and hope they can't pay so you can rent the space to more profitable tenants.
They never once mentioned the word Boeing. Every news article about the incident mentions the plane type, but not this skit.
The plane in the green screen backdrop at the terminal isn't even a 737. The side windows on the cockpit of a 737 are lower than the front, on an A320 they're in a straight line like in the skit. I'm pretty sure that's an A320.
Maybe the SNL lawyers were scared of getting sued and vetoed earlier scripts, or maybe they got paid off, or maybe my wife is right and I'm just a skeptic, but that seems suspicious.
On the other hand, the aircraft taking off with a slide deployed is a 737, so maybe they were working mostly with off-the-shelf assets to complete one skit in an entire show of same, and saved the relatively time-consuming animation work for where they had to use it.
Presumably they assumed no one would be paying all that much attention to stuff like an aircraft out a terminal window in the background, which looks nothing much like Boeing or Airbus and would not much surprise me to learn was produced by a diffusion model.
There are passengers that don't want to fly on a Max plane, never heard of anyone that doesn't want to fly on Airbus. This might just be one more tiny reason for airlines to buy Airbus.
So which Boeing plane is well reputed at this point? I've been avoiding the MAX 8 if two flights were offered and one had another aircraft model, but I guess the entire MAX lineup is tainted now.
For this class of airliner it’s really just Airbus and Boeing, unfortunately.
Even if a smaller manufacturer decided to build a full size jet like the 737, it would take many years to construct a manufacturing facility capable of handling that.
Embraer is probably the closest competitor, but they’ve only made 82 of their largest jet family according to Wikipedia. Only regional airlines use them.
But this might be the time they decide to work towards that goal.
It’s unlikely in this situation that the bolts were ever tightened correctly the first time.
There are plenty of ways to ensure bolts stay tight that work, and these plug doors have been in service on other planes for a long time with no issues.
This doesn’t appear to be a case of the engineers not designing it safely - but it not being installed correctly and no one catching it before it rolled out the door.
Nothing can be “guaranteed” which is why proper procedure for inspection and maintenance exists. This whole controversy isn’t around random acts of god but the corruption of one of aviation’s most sacred and fundamental rules: that procedures are followed and improved, not stretched and bypassed for profit.
Forever is a long time. But with proper engineering you have a setup which can be either guaranteed for the designated life time (using loctite or safety pins) or inspection intervals which would ensure tightness. Assuming of course, the bolts were installed correctly in the first place.
The type of fastener used doesn’t matter much if the bolt was missing completely, which is still a distinct possibility. Perhaps we'll never know, but at least some information will be disseminated sooner or later from the investigations now ongoing.