If this random stat I found on Gizmodo (yeah, I Googled and couldn't find anything better) your chances of dying of an accident in a year are 1 in 1656.
So "immortality" is really a couple thousand years.
Don't get me started on "brain uploading". Unless you can guarantee me that I'll still be me (which is really a religious question) I'm sticking with a couple thousand years tops.
Impressive life extension. Not immortality. Not even talking about the "heat death of the universe" here - you're getting nowhere near that.
You can live your life through robotic surrogates, and that could extend your life further, but wherever you warehouse your body becomes a single point of failure so it had better be secure.
> Don't get me started on "brain uploading". Unless you can guarantee me that I'll still be me (which is really a religious question) […]
Luckily, religions are false. The supernatural is unlikely, and immaterial souls even more so. But we have quantum mechanics.
Current quantum mechanics say that copy&paste transportation doesn't kill you. (Yep. The question was philosophical, and the answer came from physics.) The reason is, you're not a heap of atom, you're an arrangement of atoms. Mind uploading goes a bit further, but should work just as well. Imagine a "temporary" uploading, where your memories from the Matrix are downloaded back into your brain (by rewiring your neurons accordingly). It's still you, only older. Anyway, a deeper understanding of our brains' inner workings may resolve the question of mind uploading more definitely. We'll see then.
Current quantum mechanics say that copy&paste transportation doesn't kill you. (Yep. The question was philosophical, and the answer came from physics.)
[citation needed]
As far as i'm aware, there's no evidence that the mind is anything more than a physical construct. As such, the idea of 'uploading' it makes no sense. You can create a copy, sure, and perhaps even a running simulation might be self-aware and identify as you, but you still only last as long as does the hemisphere of jelly in your head.
I agree though that it is a question of philosophy, but a different philosophy altogether. We will have to redefine what a 'mind' is to take into account the persistent pattern of the brain in whatever form it takes as software, but that's not actually going to solve the problem of mortality any more than religion does.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/No-cloning_theorem and the uncertainty principle suggest to be that while it might be possible to create a model which appears indistinguishable from an existing person, and could be considered "similar enough" philosophically or legally, by definition it would have to be considered a 'different' object because perfect copies are impossible.
Sure. But from one nanosecond to another, we're perturbed by thermal noise, without any qualms about what that noise does to ourselves.
I think we can safely assume that a copy whose imperfections are on the same order as thermal noise is a second original. That, or we admit that room temperature is enough to change us.
That, or we admit that room temperature is enough to change us.
It might be, at some level, I don't know.
Am I the same person I was when I was born? Am I the same person when I wake up as when I dream? Was Phineas Gage a different person after taking an iron shaft in the brain as before?
Maybe it's more accurate to describe people as processes rather than objects. Which could support your premise while not necessarily invalidating mine, since the whole concept of a singular, coherent self would itself be an illusion.
So, if the exact same arrangement of atoms were to appear somewhere else in the universe, would I be both? Would I be controlling two bodies at once, and see two worlds/viewpoints superimposed over one another?
I'm afraid I don't feel physics really answers that particular philosophical question. I do a lot of philosophical questions arise from edge-cases in our relatively informal definitions of things.
Assuming that we accept that the 'arrangement' is what we are, and not the specific atoms, copying that arrangement would produce a new arrangement that isn't you, since all the atoms are arranged differently relative to all the other atoms in the universe.
Assuming that the preceding is wrong, and that it's only the relative arrangement of atoms inside the brain that matters, a computer representation of the arrangement of atoms is represented by a totally different arrangement of atoms that is the computer, and therefore cannot be you.
Uploading only works if we can say that you are just an abstract mathematical pattern that can be represented in any medium. Quantum physics does not address this question. It is a question of philosophy.
(I studied this kind of philosophy in college, mostly determinism, epistemology and the computational representational model of the mind)
Agreed.
What do you mean when you say "I".
Sure you can point the the brain. But when we look at the brain, we see the following "physical" attributes:
1. Atoms and their more complex configurations (molecules)
2. Electricity
3. Chemicals
4. Causal connections between the above 3.
So I ask again, where exactly is "I"? The easy answer is to say "I" is the conjunction of this system.
So that would mean that if we can take that system, and recreate it somewhere else, then that system would represent "I" as well.
This is problematic. Take the above as true and then think what it would mean to not CUT and paste, but just COPY and paste.
There are now two "I"'s walking around. Would you, looking at the copy and paste version of yourself then say that you are still "I"? Or are both of you "I"? Well, you are certainly not the "I" that your other self is saying is "I". Because you are looking at it. It can't be "I". So what the f#$k is powering that thing?
By that logic, what you are is more than just the physical. There are things like Qualia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Qualia), meaning, memories and the associations between completely unrelated things that, as far as I am aware, we cannot map to the physical manifestation of the brain.
None of this is to say that brain uploading is impossible, because we just simply don't have enough information to refute or defend its possibility.
But I believe that the brain is more complex then the pure physical.
I think we are in agreement. Although I'll comment that I think the brain is purely physical, but that the mind is an abstract entity that we don't have a good understanding of. It extends beyond the brain, not in a supernatural sense, but in a causal one.
Healthy life expectancy is only 75.0 max (in Japan)
If we expected to live much longer than that, we might be more cautious of accidents.
If you only have ~10-50 years to live, you might be prepared to take some small risks to save time: cross the road 100m in front of a speeding vehicle... it's a tiny risk and you might die of an acute disease tomorrow anyway.
If you have ~1000-unlimited years to live, people might generally take fewer accident-causing risks: the cost of an accident is hugely greater.
Then again, who knows? Maybe a society of immortals would need to take more risks in exchange for status.
But, you essentially decide your own level of accident-risk and I'm sure you could get it way down from 1/1656.
How much slower would someone drive if they knew they had a good shot at 2000 healthy years ahead of them? Would the airline industry be able to survive and still use jumbo jets? Perhaps the long-lifers would pay to ride in pods with parachutes which that can be ejected from the plane.
So "immortality" is really a couple thousand years.
Don't get me started on "brain uploading". Unless you can guarantee me that I'll still be me (which is really a religious question) I'm sticking with a couple thousand years tops.
Impressive life extension. Not immortality. Not even talking about the "heat death of the universe" here - you're getting nowhere near that.
You can live your life through robotic surrogates, and that could extend your life further, but wherever you warehouse your body becomes a single point of failure so it had better be secure.