http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/No-cloning_theorem and the uncertainty principle suggest to be that while it might be possible to create a model which appears indistinguishable from an existing person, and could be considered "similar enough" philosophically or legally, by definition it would have to be considered a 'different' object because perfect copies are impossible.
Sure. But from one nanosecond to another, we're perturbed by thermal noise, without any qualms about what that noise does to ourselves.
I think we can safely assume that a copy whose imperfections are on the same order as thermal noise is a second original. That, or we admit that room temperature is enough to change us.
That, or we admit that room temperature is enough to change us.
It might be, at some level, I don't know.
Am I the same person I was when I was born? Am I the same person when I wake up as when I dream? Was Phineas Gage a different person after taking an iron shaft in the brain as before?
Maybe it's more accurate to describe people as processes rather than objects. Which could support your premise while not necessarily invalidating mine, since the whole concept of a singular, coherent self would itself be an illusion.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/No-cloning_theorem and the uncertainty principle suggest to be that while it might be possible to create a model which appears indistinguishable from an existing person, and could be considered "similar enough" philosophically or legally, by definition it would have to be considered a 'different' object because perfect copies are impossible.