So what's the most likely outcome for all the grounded planes at this point? As someone who has some fear of flying I'll definitely make sure none of my trips include a 737 max in the future, no matter how many patches or upgrades boeing releases
> According to a detailed FAA briefing to legislators, Boeing will change the MCAS software to give the system input from both angle-of-attack sensors.
> It will also limit how much MCAS can move the horizontal tail in response to an erroneous signal. And when activated, the system will kick in only for one cycle, rather than multiple times.
> Boeing also plans to update pilot training requirements and flight crew manuals to include MCAS.
> These proposed changes mirror the critique made by the safety engineers in this story. They had spoken to The Seattle Times before the Ethiopian crash.
> The FAA said it will mandate Boeing’s software fix in an airworthiness directive no later than April.
After the fixes are implemented I wouldn't worry too much about it. Lots of planes have had terrible design flaws that were fixed. The pre-MAX 737 included.
IMO, the most likely outcome is: initially, they'll stay grounded until the flight recorders from the latest crash are analyzed, and it's confirmed that it's probably the same or a related cause (if the cause was unrelated, they might be allowed to resume flying earlier). Then a fix to the software will be developed, taking into account the preliminary results of the investigation; Boeing has a head start here, since they started developing the fix after the previous crash. After it's validated that the fixed software would have prevented both accidents, the authorities will change the rule from "all planes of this type are grounded" to "all planes of this type are grounded, unless they have software version at least X.YY on that subsystem, or are flying with no passengers to a maintenance facility to install that software version". And then the companies which own these planes will install the fixed software, and normal flying will resume.
They'll be patched to take input from both angle-of-attack sensors (it has two, but the MCAS only used input from one of them) and limit how much the MCAS can override pilot input.
I'd be more concerned by the regulatory capture that permitted this to happen than the specific model of aircraft.
My uninformed assumption is that once a suitable issue is isolated some sort of remediation (training/software/airframe/cockpit) all under the onset of various international gov bodies. No idea if the is a 1 year or 5 year process.
I would expect them to be flying prior to the end of the year. The airplane has two AoA inputs and, between that and limiting the authority of the MCAS and adding an MCAS indicator on the panel, I suspect this is a short, mostly flight control software patch. ("Short" in aviation still might be 3 months.)
Actually, assuming this article is correct, the 737 MAX will possibly be safer than other planes because Boeing's leash with the FAA is about to get a lot shorter.
Ignoring all other issues pointed out in TFA, two really stand out: The use of a single AoA sensor for a "Hazardous" component seems flat out wrong to me. The ability of MCAS to cause maximum deflection of the trim, rather than some limit (2.5 vs 0.6 is a quibble compared to 2.5 vs unlimited) also seems bad.
