Isn't attacking postmodernism kind of boring/easy these days? Even fellow continental philosophers enjoy indulging in a little pomo-bashing now and then--- it's a favorite pasttime of Slavoj Žižek, for example.
While I don't much like the "school of thought" as a school of thought, I've been somewhat confused by why Derrida in particular seems to anger everyone. As far as I can tell, he's mostly working through some pretty narrow problems in linguistics and literary theory about the difficulty of resolving webs of mutual references into logically consistent, stable frames, not making some sort of general claim about reality (and he rarely mentions science at all). The "Derrideans" may be another story, as often is the case with disciples.
As far as I can tell, he's mostly working through some pretty narrow problems in linguistics and literary theory about the difficulty of resolving webs of mutual references into logically consistent, stable frames, not making some sort of general claim about reality (and he rarely mentions science at all). The "Derrideans" may be another story, as often is the case with disciples.
I think the real problem is not Derrida, who very few people have actually read, but what some of Derrida's followers and imitators have done. If you're interested in how this plays out in a deeper level, Francois Cusset wrote a book called French Theory: How Foucault, Derrida, Deleuze, & Co. Transformed the Intellectual Life of the United States, which delves into how theory and postmodernism became so powerful in the United States. He treats them as epiphenomenon as a way to explore what's happening.
In his description of the 1970s academic milieu, Cusset says that a number of avant garde journals came about, which, although wildly different in concerns, were similar in style: "Acronyms and wordplay, together with a ludic relation to the translated concepts, reduced [the writers'] cultural distance. A similar allusive or parodic relation to one's own erudition signaled a self-critique of academic procedures" (62). That's part of the problem: these kinds of writers lacked Derrida's rigor and narrowness. Some of them still do. The "allusive or parodic relation to one's own erudition" can quickly devolve into "lacking erudition or rigor."
Thanks for the reference; sounds like a book I'd find interesting.
As far as allocating blame, that matches my impression that, although it's often seen as a problem of "French theory", much of the worst stuff is actually by American critical theorists developing it, rather than the original stuff. At least, they're the ones who developed it into a somewhat poisonous and derivative culture, full of political posturing and semi-nonsense writing, and dominated entire fields with that sort of thing (I don't think it has nearly the same dominance in French universities, oddly enough).
Derrida is just one of the most famous names, so he gets an extra helping of scorn. No doubt there are plenty of others who are just as bad or worse, but there's no fun in attacking someone that nobody has ever heard of.
But yes, postmodernism is starting to seem rather last-century nowadays. The cutting edge appears to have moved on from "if you disagree with this it's because you're too stupid to understand" to "if you disagree with this it's because you're a racist. Racist!"
Yeah, that makes sense, but somehow Derrida himself doesn't seem the most objectionable to me, at least on philosophical grounds.
I suppose one can legitimately blame him for some of the writing style, though. In particular, although he argued that all language has multiple meanings / shifting references / etc., he seemed to like emphasizing it by using a writing style that added deliberate multiple readings. For example, something like "we need to (re)construct this meaning", leaving it deliberately ambiguous, with a sort of self-aware textual wink, whether he was "constructing" or "reconstructing" things. Also, lots of puns.
I think he actually pulled it off reasonably well in some parts, and is kind of amusing to read, if you like that sort of thing. In the years since, it's become a really annoying habit that a bunch of folks have picked up, though, most of whom don't do it very well, and take it way too seriously. Now I have this instinctive "argh, I hate you" reaction whenever I see some paper or book title with a construction like "(re)engage".
edit: An interesting oddity is that a lot of the writing style traces back to Nietzsche, even though he himself was quite readable (so much so that teenage kids loving Nietzsche are even a sort of stereotype). He initiated some of the general style of writing half philosophy, half literary performance: jumping from subject to subject, making assertions that you run with and don't carefully argue for, making heavy use of puns in arguments, etc. Maybe the problem is just that most people who try to write like that need to realize that they aren't Nietzsche, and can't pull it off.
It's boring and easy, but it's necessary if one wants to get rid of it. I don't feel like fighting the good fight myself (or even watching it happen), but I'm glad somebody out there is. Really, it's the same situation as with religion.
Exactly! While pointing out that the emperor has no clothes may be a trivially simple exercise, so long as people are willing to support the emperor, we need to keep shouting about his choice of apparel. All the more when (at least in the US) our tax dollars are going to fund his "clothes."
I assume it's a reference to profs at public universities--- though most of the profs being attacked in the linked article are at French public universities.
In the U.S. I think humanities profs are actually often net money-earners for their schools rather than net spenders of taxpayer money, though. Humanities students cost much less each to educate than science/engineering students (no labs, no real equipment, no computers, lower faculty salaries), yet pay the same tuition, which often produces a surplus: http://chronicle.com/article/The-Humanities-Really-Do/64740/
In the U.S. I think humanities profs are actually often net money-earners for their schools rather than net spenders of taxpayer money, though.
Earning money for the school and being a net tax dollar sink are not mutually exclusive. Some of the money being earned for the school may be federal student aid.
Regardless of the return on the investment in Post-Modernist Humanities Professors, I still object to the fact that my tax dollars are funding them. I mean, if I can invest in good humanities profs that have roughly the same ROI, at least my tax dollars are going to educate someone rather than fill heads with unintelligible fluff.
At publicly-funded universities in the US, tuition dollars are supplemented by tax dollars (plus endowments, grants, etc) to pay the total cost of education. This includes professor salaries. This is, of course in addition to Federal Student Aid (and loans) which are also backed by taxes.
While Sokal is amusing, it's not the smoking gun everyone loves to dress it up us. That is, unless you're willing to concede the same thing of Physics:
"The Bogdanov Affair is an academic dispute regarding the legitimacy of a series of theoretical physics papers written by French twins Igor and Grichka Bogdanov (alternately spelt Bogdanoff). These papers were published in reputable scientific journals, and were alleged by their authors to culminate in a proposed theory for describing what occurred at the Big Bang. The controversy started in 2002 when rumors spread on Usenet newsgroups that the work was a deliberate hoax intended to target weaknesses in the peer review system employed by the physics community to select papers for publication in academic journals."
Exactly -- the Sokal paper makes the claim that since the paper was obviously nonsense, the incident proves that the 'vaunted academia' is off their rockers. But this is hinged on the assumption that the meaning of the text is derived from the intention of the author, and since the author intended it to be nonsense then the paper must be nonsense. But this is hardly something that we can assert unequivocally. The question of where the meaning of a text comes from is exactly one of the thorny questions that 'postmodernism' aims to address (among other disciplines).
One could claim that having read enough post-modernist work to be able to successfully emulate it, he had in fact become able to coherently express ideas which he could then also look at and proclaim to be nonsense.
Alternatively, given Sokal's own description of the paper as "a pastiche of left-wing cant, fawning references, grandiose quotations, and outright nonsense . . . structured around the silliest quotations [by postmodernist academics he] could find about mathematics and physics", one could argue that Sokal was merely repeating back ideas which post-modernists had already espoused, which leaves their resulting publication of his "nonsense" rather unsurprising.
It's interesting to read the heaps (and heaps and heaps!) of scorn here upon postmodern philosophy, which I'm only passingly familiar with -- all while living and participating in a society where "postmodern" is far and away the best single-word description of huge swaths of our culture.
But don't the postmodernists claim only to be 'playing games'? Isn't it the whole point of their philosophy that anything goes, there is no absolute truth, anything written has the same status as anything else, no point of view is privileged?
And in one paragraph Dawkins shows that he has no understanding of postmodernism what so ever.
The point of postmodernism is not that everything goes, but that we have no absolute frame of reference to judge the trueness of a statement on.
It's not "hey you can do everything you want" but "hey just know that whatever we find out, ultimately we don't know if that is the correct conclusion, as we have no absolute metrics to judge it by.
And in one paragraph Dawkins shows that he has no understanding of postmodernism what so ever.
So far as I'm concerned, no-one -- including everyone who's ever called themselves a postmodernist -- has any understanding of it. There's no "there" there, only a few trite remarks about absolutes and a race to see who can out-jargon, out-pigeonhole and out-frame whom.
(all of which makes me incredibly glad that I earned my degree from a program which leaned heavily toward the analytic tradition; analytic philosophy has certainly had its big screwups, but A) it tends to be much more honest about itself and B) it still manages to occasionally produce useful results in spite of that)
It sort of makes sense to me within the domain of literary fiction. Mordernism was all about showing the cracks of the modern world - disintegration of institutions like religion, the damage done by WW1, differing-perspectives/unreliable-narrators, proliferation of media, abandoning rural life, etc. Modernist literature strained to show/express these cracks. Post-Modernist literature simply accepts them and works from there.
But yeah 'what is Post-Modernism?' is one of those 'ahhh, ummm...' questions.
I'd like to back your applause of analytic philosophy but would like to defend continental philosophy against postmodernism for a moment, as well.
I think the prototypical example of dense prose in continental philosophy would be Heidegger, but at the same time I don't think that people would say that Sein und Zeit is gibberish. Now, many analytic philosophers (including myself) would probably agree that Sein und Zeit probably falls to the same psychoanalytic-assumption-as-truth that is categorical of existentialism but I definitely didn't have a problem seeing an argument from Heidegger.
Simply, I just wanted to note that simply because a work appears dense or confusing doesn't mean that it is gibberish. Now, in the case of postmodernism, most of it happens to be both dense and gibberish.
What's funny is that is (in a way) exactly what post-modernism is talking about. There's no "there" there anywhere. "There" is a shifting frame of reference, gone before you finished contemplating it.
I think that’s a misreading. “We have no absolute metrics to judge [our findings] by” to me seems to imply that no statement is better than any other statement, that the concept of “truth” is useless; i.e. anything goes (as long as statements about the universe are concerned).
And that’s all Dawkins says, not “you can do everything you want”. Rather “you can say everything you want, everything is equally true because nothing is true”.
That, to me, is obviously rubbish and rightly attacked. There surly is no such thing as absolute certainty or absolute truth but we can get damn close and find out what’s more likely and what’s less likely.
I don’t think I’m attacking a straw man here but I might, so correct me. “Anything goes (as long as statements about the world are concerned)” seems like a fair characterization to me, though.
It varies a lot depending on who you ask, and most postmodernists probably don't really have a theory of truth. Some really don't believe it's a meaningful concept, or even if they do, think it's epistemologically never accessible, so not worth bothering with.
Some are open to coherence theories of truth, though, more or less that you can't decide whether something is "really" true, but you can decide if sets of beliefs are coherent with each other, within a particular culture's conception of coherence. That's actually not too different from coherence theories of truth that a lot of logicians hold, which is that "truth" is consistency relative to a formal system. Whether that turns into anything-goes seems to depend on just how arbitrary the choice of formal system is.
They really like to take it all the way, don’t they? They take two undeniably true (ahem) statements like “absolute certainty and hence absolute truth don’t exist” and “culture influences truth finding processes and the status quo within cultures makes changes in certain directions easier or harder” and carry it to excess. They turn mere problems with how humans can generate true statements into central pillars of their doctrine.
What’s the big deal? There are certain statements which allow us to make useful predictions. (I would call them true statements but I won’t insist on that.) We have to be vary of our biases, we have to be ever vigilant in our search for useful (true?) statements and it’s a damn hard process. But it’s not impossible.
On that I definitely agree. I think in terms of their interests and biases, most people in the broad "postmodernist" camp want to find any variety of certainty impossible, whereas I'd come from the perspective of agreeing that there are a whole lot of problems and complications with certainty, but I actively want to work towards it rather than being happy that there are so many bumps in the road.
"That, to me, is obviously rubbish and rightly attacked."
Let me get this straight -- faced with the proposition that "we have no absolute metrics to judge [our findings] by", you made up your own metric and used it to denounce the statement in question?
...Which is of course precisely what the statement is addressing. Rather than acknowledge that we're all standing in quicksand, we prefer to gather up our quicksand into a small lump, stand on it, and announce that we are on a mountain. All the mountains are quicksand, buddy.
Watch out, I might only be playing games with words like "true" and "obvious" ;-)
Since we can make many useful statements about this universe the quicksand we are all standing in (if we indeed are) must be very slow indeed. So what if there are no absolute metrics. That doesn’t seem to matter all that much.
If I count my sheep on their way out of the pen and if I count them again on their way back into the pen I can be reasonably sure that if those numbers match, there are no more sheep on the pasture. I don’t have to look for missing sheep. This seems like a useful statement. I would call it true.
Sure, sometimes it doesn’t work. Tests with other people have shown that I sometimes tend to overlook a sheep. Further tests have shown that I sometimes misremember the number by the time the sheep are coming back. But other than that it seems very robust.
Why not call that statement true? Do postmodernists expect that this would only work here but not in other cultures? And if that were the case couldn’t you just test that, no need to throw your hands up in the air and give up? Do they expect that it might work on Earth but maybe not on Mars or Alpha Centauri? Testing that would also be no problem. It’s at least not impossible, no reason to give up.
I'm not sure post-modernism advocates any kind of 'giving up' -- otherwise no one would bother with all that effort of writing laboriously long and dauntingly opaque essays on why we should all just give up.
Why not call the statement true? Go ahead. The issue is whether we (can) classify truth as an essential quality of a statement, or as a description of a statement from a particular perspective.
To make an analogy that dawkins would surely crucify me for, it's like the difference between the notion of absolute time, and time as described by Einstein's relativity. From a post-modernist view, time/truth is relative, but being relative doesn't mean it doesn't matter, and just as with physical time, there are narrow frames of reference (day to day life on Earth) where the relativity of time/text/truth is... irrelevant.
God, it really is impossible to advocate for post-modernism without writing in that multiple meaning style.
How could perspective even begin to change whether or not counting sheep works?
I have no trouble imagining universes in which, for various reasons, counting sheep doesn’t work. But that’s not what you seem to allude to. In my imagined universes counting sheep wouldn’t work because of properties of those universes (different arithmetic, different physics, different results of natural selection).
Postmodernism seems to suggest that a mere change in brain state (i.e. change in perspective) can have an impact as to whether counting sheep works or not. That seems … unlikely to me.
Consider the similar task of counting humans. The American constitution originally considered Native Americans as equivalent to 3/5 of a person. We now count them as a full person. What changed other than perspective/brain state?
Even with sheep, consider the possibility that out of say 10 of the sheep you counted, one or all of those sheep are pregnant. Not only that, but you don't know which are or may be pregnant, or how many sheep they may be pregnant with. Does an unborn sheep even count as a full sheep? And yet you counted 10 sheep, and if counting sheep works without changing perspective, then there are 10 sheep regardless. I'm not sure I would agree with that.
If you change your definitions you will very likely end up with different results.
I, as someone who hates arguing about definitions, will be the first to agree with you that there exists no “true” definition of sheep or, for that matter, humans. Definitions are just lists of properties and conditional statements to which we assign certain words. There is nothing true and nothing magic about them. They help us communicating and that’s that.
My statement about sheep is useful (true?) only if all the concepts I use in my statement are properly defined. I can’t just start to count pregnant sheep differently because then my statement isn’t useful (true?) anymore. Counting pregnant sheep differently wouldn’t help me tell whether or not all sheep are back in the pen at the end of the day and that’s the whole point of the statement. I’m not making a moral statement about whether or not unborn sheep count. That has got nothing to do with my statement and is very much beside the point.
It’s not that surprising, actually. If you change a statement which has proven to make good predictions by redefining one of its concepts, you will likely break the statement. It won’t make good predictions any more.
Counting pregnant sheep differently wouldn’t help me tell whether or not all sheep are back in the pen at the end of the day and that’s the whole point of the statement. I’m not making a moral statement about whether or not unborn sheep count. That has got nothing to do with my statement and is very much beside the point.
Whether it's beside the point depends on your perspective :). I spent a few days working on an actual sheep farm in New Zealand, and whether or not your sheep are pregnant is actually a highly relevant fact. Whether or not a sheep that starts out pregnant is still pregnant at the end of the day is also highly relevant. I wasn't trying to say that unborn sheep have anything to do with 'morality', but they are very much not beside the point.
It’s not that surprising, actually. If you change a statement which has proven to make good predictions by redefining one of its concepts, you will likely break the statement. It won’t make good predictions any more.
This is actually one of the salient points of post-modernist thought, with the caveat that post-modernism argues that all statements are always changing, 'definitions' of concepts are always changing. Take our sheep debate for example -- you make statements that are useful to you, and then I respond by interpreting the statements so that they are useful to me, and vice versa.
Modernism believes in absolute truth. Postmodernism is not the nullification of all truth, but rather it's truth in context. Even in the absence of absolute metrics, it's still possible to create local meaning.
EC [Epistemic Contextualism], in the sense in which it concerns us here, is a relatively recent development. Nevertheless, in the latter half of the 20th century, several at-times overlapping strands emerged which, in one way or another, made ‘contextual’ factors of central importance to certain epistemological questions, thereby setting the stage for EC in its contemporary form.
We might have difficulty with truth, but we can evaluate the falsity of a statement about the world. To the degree that statements cannot be falsified, they are arguably without meaning.
For sure, but I don't think you can go beyond truth as correspondence. In so far as our brains are physical, and changes are wired up through physical causality with our senses, you can't break through to some notional Platonic ideal, where Truths are Relations on Forms in a mathematical way, and still have those truths apply directly to the way things "really are".
Truths about e.g. mathematics, on the other hand, I would say are analytic in the Kantian sense. They are a different kind of truth, and in many ways are like self-contained games. Useful as formalisms for theories about the world, etc.
I'll raise you one: Russell on the 19th century forebears of postmodernism:
"Hitherto the people attracted to philosophy have been mostly those who loved the big generalizations, which were all wrong, so that few people with exact minds have taken up the subject."
On the other hand, Russell came badly unstuck when he attempted to extrapolate all math from first principles with Principia Mathematica. Soon after, Kurt Godel demonstrated that in any given formal system, consistency and completeness were mutually exclusive.
It seems to me that this had the same devastating impact on philosophy as Einstein's relativistic theorems did on classical mechanics and the popular acceptance of scientific determinism (please note I am not positing any scientific relationship between Godel's theorem and Einstein's work on relativity). Einstein apparently found quantum mechanics an equally alarming intellectual innovation.
So between incompleteness, relativity and QM, 20th century intellectuals were hit with a kind of triple whammy showing that our beliefs about logic, observation and causality were all inherently limited and that in many respects The Truth is fundamentally unknowable. Prior to this one could argue that philosophy as an intellectual pursuit was the foundation which underpinned all other kinds of academic endeavor, even if one felt privately disappointed about the prospects of finding any sort of ultimate truth or philosophical 'theory of everything'.
For every philosopher who could accept this with a shrug and move on to examining the limitations of critical thinking itself, there are probably 9 others that can't bring themselves to stand up and say plainly that there's not really anywhere else to go from here, and that their legacy is likely to be no more than another footnote to Plato.
I don't think of this as an attack of Postmodernism as much as analytic philosophy in general. You cannot construct a proof of a philosophical statement by referencing chunks of math and physics. Analytic philosophy is science for those who do not understand science and better left to the field of science. The real philosophy is moral and ethical philosophy, because everyone uses it to decide on every conscious prescriptive actions they undertake, yet they cannot be derived from science and are arbitrarily agreed on by societies. Pure science is purely descriptive and observational, it does not provide a proof for correct future action. Individuals often reference science as post-facto justification for their actions, for example I would reference my knowledge of natural selection as justification for pursuing a job, whereas the Nazis also used natural selection as justification for undertaking the Holocaust. Moral and ethical philosophy are the most important area of philosphy, it is a discussion that guides every action we take yet one with no completely "correct" answers.
I was trained in analytic philosophy, and I'm not convinced you know what analytic philosophy is. Postmodernism isn't analytic philosophy--it's close to the exact opposite. In fact, analytic philosophy originated as a response to continental philosophy, the intellectual cesspool of Hegel and friends from which postmodernism is spawned.
Some analytic philosophers you may have heard of include: Bertrand Russell, Karl Popper, Ludwig Wittgenstein, G.E. Moore, R.M. Hare, A.J. Ayer, Saul Kripke, David Lewis, Edmund Gettier, John Rawls, Robert Nozick, and Nick Bostrom. Many of these philosophers discussed morality and justice a great deal. Others discussed the logical underpinnings of science and mathematics--Popper in particular is highly esteemed by many scientists I've known, and Russell needs no introduction.
EDIT: There are of course many great analytic philosophers I forgot, but I found it worth editing this post to include W.V.O. Quine, in honor of whom we write programs which print their own source code.
If you reread the original link you'll see the main source of Dawkin's frustration comes from the misappropriation and misuse of mathematical logic and scientific fact with disregard for the preserving precise meaning.
This is a large problem not just in Postmodernism but in many areas of modern analytic philosophy as well, especially Philosophy of Mind.
It's not a universal view, but there's a decent number of scholars on both sides of the Atlantic who see Derrida and the later Wittgenstein as actually getting at pretty similar ideas. Both are fundamentally concerned with the indeterminacy of language, language as a kind of game, etc.
Let's be clear, though. Heidegger was an existentialist (in the continental tradition). He was dense, but understandable. Postmodernism is just gibberish.
I've read several books by Deleuze and Guattari, but haven't had any formal instruction on postmodernism. They're hilariously opaque, but also pretty interesting if you have the patience.
At one point in A Thousand Plateaus, the authors say that vaginas are just penises travelling faster than the speed of light. Does anyone think this is meant to be analyzed scientifically? To say that there's no scientific rigor in this statement misses the point; scientific rigor has almost no impact on how people live their lives.
For someone analyzing human beings, the truth of science is much less interesting than how scientific concepts can be misunderstood, and the authority of science misapplied. The co-opting of a precise scientific term can be frustrating to someone who has spent their entire life studying it, but that doesn't mean it's all hot air and empty words.
"At one point in A Thousand Plateaus, the authors say that vaginas are just penises travelling faster than the speed of light. Does anyone think this is meant to be analyzed scientifically?"
Does anyone think that's actually a coherent statement?
Sure, the proposition that "penises are vaginas travelling faster than the speed of light" is perfectly coherent. Vaginas and penises are perfectly well-defined, and the notion of a penis travelling faster than the speed of light is, while not considered possible by any existing physical models, is entirely logically sensible.
It remains to determine whether vaginas are, in fact, penises travelling faster than the speed of light. The short answer is no, since anything travelling faster than the speed of light would be travelling faster than the speed of light, and vaginas typically travel subluminally. Thus, we have proven this well-formed statement false.
I realize that we're all programmers here, and that we live and die by unambiguous semantics. But human languages are awash in ambiguity and borderline nonsense, and the only thing holding it all together are some shared concepts and idioms. The disjoint between the clarity of science and the ambiguity of human communication is really interesting, and by that token something can be both incoherent and rich with meaning (though obviously this isn't always the case).
I'll be among the first to stand up and defend whatever Richard Dawkins has to say (because he provides a much-needed service: skepticism). However, I do appreciate postmodernism for its (accidental?) beauty. This is truly poetic stuff, collages made out of the well-wrought output of the highly educated.
You do have to suspend some of your higher-thinkng to appreciate postmodernism. But you have to do the same to enjoy Neuromancer, which could be seen as a postmodern conference-dump posing as a science fiction story.
So I say: Mr. Dawkins, don't be such a wet blanket.
> So I say: Mr. Dawkins, don't be such a wet blanket.
I think he is a wet blanket because he realizes that many of these post-modernists suck public money with their tenure and wield quite a bit of power over up and coming academics.
In other words, nobody minds the insane person as long as they are safely locked away in an asylum. However the same insane person becomes very dangerous once they have control and authority over people's careers, sit on academic committees, there are thousands hours spent by students who are told to "read and interpret" these crazy writings with the insinuation that these are the great philosophers of the 20th and 21st centuries.
Power will corrupt any interesting intellectual movement. Still, postmodernism cannot be discredited just because it does not make sense to people outside of its paradigm. It must have been quite irritating for the old art establishment when Abby Rockefeller put together the Museum of Modern Art... one among many cases of funding chasing what appears to be insane.
Lastly, I'd argue if people do not want to deal with what is "funded", they can rebel and create a new movement. This is how humanity moves forward.
> Still, postmodernism cannot be discredited just because it does not make sense to people outside of its paradigm.
The idea that outsiders do not understand pomo is handled well in the article. The physicists, specifically focused on mathematical and physics jargon in the writings. They concluded that it was complete gibberish. Stuff like 1 = sqrt(-1) and so on.
The claim that there are some for whom this stuff does make sense is a little scary, as that implies some kind of secret coded language that makes sense, but has to be decoded, or the fact that they are just as crazy as the author.
Poetry and fiction don't masquerade as serious philosophy. As long as this stuff dominates academic humanities and soaks up precious grant money I'll take all the wet blankets I can get.
Title incorrectly credits Dawkins with said disrobing -- he's only reviewing a book by two other authors who should be getting the actual credit (assuming credit is due, a different debate).
John Locke said it best: "Vague and insignificant forms of speech, and abuse of language, have so long passed for mysteries of science; and hard or misapplied words with little or no meaning have, by prescription, such a right to be mistaken for deep learning and height of speculation, that it will not be easy to persuade either those who speak or those who hear them, they are but covers of ignorance and hindrance of true knowledge."
I tagged along to a lecture on 'Phenomenology' recently. I cannot for the life of me tell you what was said. Something about 'Being' in 'historical context.' It was almost completely unintelligible.
This sort of thing is an assault on the mind. I wouldn't say it's harmless either, it's potentially depressing.
This sort of thing is an assault on the mind. I wouldn't say it's harmless either, it's potentially depressing.
It might be -- or you might lack the background to digest how writers and scholars are using technical phrases with long histories behind them. The idea of "being" and its cousin ontology go back at least, most notably, to Hegel (consider Oxford's "Very Short Introduction" series if you're interested), and various philosophers have been dealing with the idea ever since: Sartre's Being and Nothingness being one example a century and a half after Hegel.
In any event, "this sort of thing" might still be "an assault on the mind," but it's hard to judge it as such unless you have the context to do the judging.
Well the thought crossed my mind, but this article reminded me of all the linguistic obfuscation that was going on. The lecturer would seldom make a statement without several tangential subclauses/digressions getting in the way. I started to wonder why this professor was deliberately making a complex matter harder to understand...
Having read a non-trivial amount of postmodernist work, the generator is pretty funny at first, but isn't actually all that good at creating convincing post-modernist text. There's no there there.
I don't think it's a good simulator of the actual content, but it does capture enough of a particular kind of writing style to be funny. For whatever reason, people in this area really do seem to over-use a lot of the grammatical constructions that it parodies. Maybe it'll have some positive benefit if it convinces people to avoid those constructions, now that they've been sort of called out as cliche.
While I don't much like the "school of thought" as a school of thought, I've been somewhat confused by why Derrida in particular seems to anger everyone. As far as I can tell, he's mostly working through some pretty narrow problems in linguistics and literary theory about the difficulty of resolving webs of mutual references into logically consistent, stable frames, not making some sort of general claim about reality (and he rarely mentions science at all). The "Derrideans" may be another story, as often is the case with disciples.