How does "hyper-determinism" differ from "determinism"?
I find that when people use adjectives like "hyper" or "ultra" for some theoretical view (like people who talk about 'ultra-darwinism') they are trying to make something appear "extreme" without making any real argument for that position.
> You end up going into hyper-determinism, which is almost all about negating free will.
That phrasing implies that people come up with, or want, "hyper-deterministic" views because they want to negate the idea of free will. Is that what you mean? If not, what are you trying to say?
Sorry, this might be the wrong term for a higher level concept based on determinism.
If everything is deterministic, then our actions can theoretically be pre-determined. I've seen discussion around pilot wave theory that goes into details about this thought process.
This is fine and good. But if I publish "A solution to the double slit experiment" and the contents are "everything is deterministic, therefore all the protons go where they go" (hidden behind a pilot wave and initial values), that's not really the right genre of paper is it?
It's not that I'm demeaning it, but that I don't feel like it's in the same realm of discussion os the Copenhagen's rather pragmatic "stuff happens behind the curtain, but here's how to work with it" approach.
> It's not that I'm demeaning it, but that I don't feel like it's in the same realm of discussion os the Copenhagen's rather pragmatic "stuff happens behind the curtain, but here's how to work with it" approach.
I don't get the distinction you're trying to make. The maths are all the same, so the interpretation has almost no bearing on how to work with it.
Furthermore, pilot waves produce a deterministic theory because of non-locality, but it sounds like you're criticizing superdeterminism. They're not the same. 't Hooft is working on a superdeterministic theory based on cellular automata.
In any case, how are pilot waves any different than any other classical theory in this regard? It's about describing the system as accurately as one can, which entails inferring the initial conditions based on how we know the system evolves, ie. this cannon ball fell here because it was launched with force X at angle Y from height Z.
>How does "hyper-determinism" differ from "determinism"?
It's the difference between a trajectory that looks like Brownian motion consisting of a preprogrammed constant function, versus actually being sampled from a Wiener Process.
In the former case, if you know the function, you can predict the trajectory with total certainty. In the latter case, if you use the Wiener Process as a model, you can predict the trajectory probabilistically.
I'm not familiar with those concepts (like Wiener Process), but I don't think notions of predictability should be mixed up with notions of determinism. Whether something is predictable or not does not change how deterministic it is.
I think what I have to say, then, is welcome to quantum mechanics. Or, in fact, welcome to probability theory. Mathematically, there's no difference between a process which can only be predicted probabilistically, and a process which really is random; no difference between incomplete knowledge in your head and stochasticity in the world.
An interesting question is: how could a fully deterministic ontology give rise to beings capable of having probabilistic beliefs? Worse, how can a fully deterministic ontology give rise to truly random mathematical entities like Chaitin's Omega? In fact, in such a universe, where do the bits for atomic random-number generators come from? After all, if they're not really random, there should be some deterministic model capable of predicting them, and yet, quantum mechanics tells us precisely that such a thing is impossible.
You can try to have a Bayesian epistemology with a nonstochastic ontology, but it doesn't really make sense. Just let your ontology be stochastic: then and only then you can physically account for both physical randomness and probabilistic belief.
> I think what I have to say, then, is welcome to quantum mechanics. Or, in fact, welcome to probability theory. Mathematically, there's no difference between a process which can only be predicted probabilistically, and a process which really is random; no difference between incomplete knowledge in your head and stochasticity in the world.
I'm not talking about randomness. I'm talking about determinism, and as far as I can see what you're saying says nothing about determinism or differing degrees of determinism.
> An interesting question is: how could a fully deterministic ontology give rise to beings capable of having probabilistic beliefs?
I don't see that as a problem at all. It fits completely fine with the idea that probability is a matter of lack of knowledge.
> Worse, how can a fully deterministic ontology give rise to truly random mathematical entities like Chaitin's Omega? In fact, in such a universe, where do the bits for atomic random-number generators come from? After all, if they're not really random, there should be some deterministic model capable of predicting them, and yet, quantum mechanics tells us precisely that such a thing is impossible.
You're talking like it's already a settled matter as to whether reality is fundamentally deterministic or not. Are you saying that there's definitive proof that deterministic accounts of QM are incorrect?
The person I was replying to said "Mathematically, there's no difference between a process which can only be predicted probabilistically, and a process which really is random; no difference between incomplete knowledge in your head and stochasticity in the world."
This is because randomness can be seen as a matter of incomplete knowledge. Determinism is independent of our knowledge.
Now, perhaps there is randomness that is independent of our knowledge. But I was talking about randomness/determinism in the context of the quoted statement, which was a matter of knowledge.
> This is because randomness can be seen as a matter of incomplete knowledge. Determinism is independent of our knowledge.
I'm not sure there's a meaningful difference. "Determinism" as you're describing it is an interpretation with no practical implications.
You can imagine a god controlling every "random" event in our universe by selecting the outcome from "the big book of outcomes" and claim that everything is deterministic. You can also imagine the god consulting a D20 instead, and claim that everything is non-deterministic. The former makes randomness a function of our lack of knowledge and the latter makes it truly random. These two scenarios are equivalent and neither is falsifiable, though, making the distinction meaningless. From your perspective, random events are still non-deterministic.
You're just making up scenarios that fit your point of view, without arguing that these correspond to the actual options.
Are you arguing that there cannot be any distinction between determinism and non-determinism?
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The scenarios are ones involving a god choosing and performing actions, and the supposed randomness of their dice. What are they meant to translate to?
> I'm arguing that your "deterministic randomness" is indistinguishable from "nondeterministic randomness". You're trying to define a class of "randomness" to be "deterministic but unknown
> You're just making up scenarios that fit your point of view, without arguing that these correspond to the actual options.
No, I gave scenarios that demonstrate why your distinction is not meaningful. If you have a scenario that changes this, can you please explain it?
> Are you arguing that there cannot be any distinction between determinism and non-determinism?
No, I'm arguing that your "deterministic randomness" is indistinguishable from "nondeterministic randomness". You're trying to define a class of "randomness" to be "deterministic but unknown". Near as I can tell, this is a distinction without a difference.
How does "hyper-determinism" differ from "determinism"?
I find that when people use adjectives like "hyper" or "ultra" for some theoretical view (like people who talk about 'ultra-darwinism') they are trying to make something appear "extreme" without making any real argument for that position.
> You end up going into hyper-determinism, which is almost all about negating free will.
That phrasing implies that people come up with, or want, "hyper-deterministic" views because they want to negate the idea of free will. Is that what you mean? If not, what are you trying to say?