> Employees are often required to install local certs (or applications/scripts that do that) - that doesn't mean the host is entirely compromised.
If they are forced to install those certs, then the computers they use belong to their employers, and those computers are obeying their proper owners. I fail to see the problem.
Don't use your work computer for things you don't want your work to be able to detect, intercept & modify.
> with that logic, don't get mail sent to the office because your employer has every right to open and reseal the envelope.
I don't have things sent to the office unless they comply with my employer's policies (e.g. I'd never have a weapon mailed here), and unless I'm happy with my employer having information about my packages.
I'm curious what line of reasoning would justify me doing such a thing and expecting privacy.
> You know who also has that right? Prisons.
You know who also has that right? You, on any network and hardware you own. My employer owns my laptop and the network it's connected to: of course it has every right to inspect its own property.
> * My employer owns my laptop and the network it's connected to: of course it has every right to inspect its own property.*
Careful there: there's a difference between capability and right. Many legislations forbid employers to put surveillance cameras in the bathroom for instance. There is a level of privacy employees can legally expect.
E-mail is similar: if your employer intercepts your e-mail just because you read it at work, it is likely a breach of correspondence secrecy (in France it would be). This likely applies even if you're at fault for using the company's resources on personal matters.
While "don't trust your employer's network" is elementary operational security everyone should be taught at school, 90% of the population don't know what computers can do, let alone how they work. Because of that, their expectations are social, not technical.
The law says that if employers own the computers they provide to employees, then employers have broad latitude to monitor how those computers are used.
A different law says that only the recipient of a US Postal letter may open it. If you receive a personal letter at your office via US Postal Service, your employer cannot legally open it.
I'm not up to date on what the law says about FedEx or UPS.
That's employment for you. Employees are not treated as autonomous agents. More like untrustworthy children.
For my last gig, I worked at some company on behalf of another. This workplace was quite explicit about intercepting and monitoring everything. I pondered for a second whether I should use this place's computers to log to my employer's webmail. I gave up and did it, because I wasn't going to read or write work emails outside of office hours.
That's… murky. I live in France, where your correspondence is supposed to stay secret. It obviously applies to personal snail mail, and arguably personal e-mail. It should apply to every personal IP packet (they're structurally closer to snail mail than an e-mail is), but I don't know if it does.
Work stuff… When you use the work computer to do stuff on behalf of your employer, it's not really private, and could arguably be monitored. (There are work regulations that limit how you can use that data however. Benchmarking for instance is forbidden in France.)
The problem is, since proxy servers cannot automatically distinguish work related activities from personal errands, they tend to cast a wide net. The implied distrust kinda disgusts me, but I reckon this puts big companies in a delicate situation: one does not simply trust thousands of people —too many single points of failure.
That's fine, but that doesn't justify doing it silently - if you're going to claim the right to detect, intercept and modify you should have no problems with being completely transparent about doing so.
Employees are often required to install local certs (or applications/scripts that do that) - that doesn't mean the host is entirely compromised.