If some employers think people in protected classes are more likely to sue when let go (even if the employer did nothing wrong), they might be less likely to hire them in the first place.
This doesn't help fix discrimination at all, it makes it worse.
> If some employers think people in protected classes are more likely to sue when let go (even if the employer did nothing wrong), they might be less likely to hire them in the first place.
If they are more likely to sue when they receive an adverse employment outcome (firing) why wouldn't they be more likely to sue when they receive an adverse employment outcome (not being hired), and, if the employer is actually discriminating, as you suggest, in hiring (but would be doing "nothing wrong" in firing), wouldn't the hiring discrimination pose a bigger risk than not discriminating, since they face the lawsuit risk with either adverse action, but a greater risk of losing the lawsuit in the situation where the facts will actually bear out that they are discriminating based on legally-prohibited criteria?
