But the LHC can't kill you is because if it does, it would be unimportant since I wouldn't be around to observe such a reality right? So all realities I observe are those which I am conscious in right?
So if I jump of the Empire State Building, I die. However that reality no longer matters because my consciousness no longer exists in it. But another reality where I didn't jump off, I'm still conscious, therefore it's all I remember.
It depends. The problem with the many worlds theory (which I don't subscribe to) is there are many variations. One would be that there are variations of reality only specific to you. Another is that variations of reality exist but continue their course regardless of your interaction with them. The article is funny because it mixes a silly concept with a proven one, that of observation having a bearing on reality.
Many-worlds isn't really a silly concept. It's one of several interpretations that are equally consistent with current experimental results, and it does have nice properties such as avoiding nondeterminism and nonlocality. It's also (in a way) a conceptually simpler theory, in that many-worlds is roughly what you'd have if you got rid of wave function collapse and naively applied the rest of quantum mechanics. If memory serves me, a substantial percentage of physicists consider many-worlds to be plausible, or even likely.
Also, be careful when talking about "observation having a bearing on reality"--the quantum mechanical sense of "observing" state has little to do with the conventional meaning of the word, and absolutely nothing to do with the presence of a conscious observer. On the other hand, an "observer" in the anthropic sense, in the quantum suicide experiment, is generally assumed to be a conscious being (though this isn't strictly required).
many-worlds is roughly what you'd have if you got rid of wave function collapse and naively applied the rest of quantum mechanics
Okay, but that suggests wave function collapse is erroneous whereas many-worlds is more likely. Based on that alone you can see why I'd consider many-worlds silly. Also, I'd say anyone entertaining it as plausible or even likely is probably reasoning from a purely mathematical vantage point, which is simply not accurate enough to draw such conclusions from. I can't see how else they'd arrive at its feasibility. I don't believe Shrodinger or Einstein would ever propose it.
Also, be careful when talking about "observation having a bearing on reality"--the quantum mechanical sense of "observing" state has little to do with the conventional meaning of the word, and absolutely nothing to do with the presence of a conscious observer
Hmm, here I won't argue directly against that statement, but instead offer this: If a tree falls in the forest when no one is around does it make a sound? I'm pretty sure you know the answer is 'No', and that's more of where my conscious observation of reality statement came from.
Okay, but that suggests wave function collapse is erroneous whereas many-worlds is more likely. Based on that alone you can see why I'd consider many-worlds silly. Also, I'd say anyone entertaining it as plausible or even likely is probably reasoning from a purely mathematical vantage point, which is simply not accurate enough to draw such conclusions from. I can't see how else they'd arrive at its feasibility. I don't believe Shrodinger or Einstein would ever propose it.
Wave function collapse wouldn't be so much erroneous as an illusion; it would still describe the way in which other quantum states would decohere and become inaccessible from the perspective of an observer. Remember, these interpretations are equally supported by experiment at this point. Far from being silly, that's exactly why many physicists consider many-worlds to be more likely--wave function collapse seems to be an unnecessary addition that complicates the theory for no benefit (see also: Occam's Razor).
Furthermore, reasoning from a purely mathematical perspective is generally better, in this case. Our intuitions about reality are so shaped by the size and energy levels we experience that thinking about quantum mechanical or relativistic phenomena in terms of "physical reality" instead of mathematical structure is likely to lead to misunderstandings and mistakes. Some physicists would argue, actually, that wave function collapse is exactly that sort of mistake.
There are a few well-known physicists in favor of many-worlds--Hawking and Feynman, for instance, the latter of whom won a Nobel Prize for his work relating to quantum mechanics. As for Einstein, you may recall his unhappiness at quantum mechanics being nonlocal ("spooky action at a distance") and nondeterministic ("god playing dice with the universe")--whereas the many-worlds interpretation restores both locality and determinism.
In the end, I'm no expert, and can't really make any statements about what is or isn't likely, but calling many-worlds "silly" is almost certainly incorrect. It's no sillier than quantum mechanics as a whole.
Hmm, here I won't argue directly against that statement, but instead offer this: If a tree falls in the forest when no one is around does it make a sound? I'm pretty sure you know the answer is 'No', and that's more of where my conscious observation of reality statement came from.
That question depends on the definition of "sound", actually. Does it mean "longitudinal pressure waves in a physical medium" or does it mean "the subjective experience a human has when perceiving pressure waves in air at certain frequencies"? The answer to the question is completely obvious, and different, in both cases.
Wave function collapse wouldn't be so much erroneous as an illusion;
[grin] I don't have time to respond to this adequately.
Furthermore, reasoning from a purely mathematical perspective is generally better, in this case. Our intuitions about reality are so shaped by the size ...
I'd agree if the math looked sensible at that level, but I don't think it ever can, because quantum strangeness is simply built in. I didn't know Hawking favored many worlds. Interesting. As for Einstein's unhappiness with quantum entanglement, I think he would look for any other solution before considering many-worlds. I will admit to being biased with my "silly" pronouncement because of my own theoretical musings, and concede that others without such bias could be more open to it. Regarding the "sound" I agree with you, so let me rephrase the question: If a tree falls in a forest when no one is around, did it really fall? This gets more to the point I was getting at - that of the perceived universe being different, or actually, to be more specific the only universe. If the tree in question fell, but for all eternity no one ever received any information about it, then it did not fall.
It's a pleasure to discuss such things with other intellectuals, although I hadn't planned on ramping up the brainwaves beyond the work I need to attend to today. Cheers. :)
There is a rather more dramatic test than the one outlined above for people prepared to put their lives on the line: use a machine which kills them if a random quantum decay happens. If MWI is true, they will still be alive in the world where the decay didn't happen and would feel no interruption in their stream of consciousness. By repeating this process a number of times, their continued consciousness would be arbitrarily unlikely unless MWI was true, when they would be alive in all the worlds where the random decay was on their side. From their viewpoint they would be immune to this death process. Clearly, if MWI does not hold, they would be dead in the one world. Other people would generally just see them die and would not be able to benefit from the result of this experiment.
So it seems that the MWI assumes that all possible realities exist simultaneously? If this is true, then trying to commit suicide would make logical sense. You can do crazy stunts and not die, and if you don't die, you'd become famous.
What I meant by variations only specific to you would be like The Truman Show, where everything is staged for the main character. This would mean that you only think everything else exists, but it's really only you that exists, and with many worlds there would be different realities you experienced. In that way, you couldn't die because you are the only one doing the observing.
There is a flaw with that wikipedia example (which is based on Schrodinger's cat): the next time you walk into the machine the decay event is different. You could only walk through and find your fate a maximum of one time, win or lose, as the next attempt, if you were around, would be a different decay event.
So if I jump of the Empire State Building, I die. However that reality no longer matters because my consciousness no longer exists in it. But another reality where I didn't jump off, I'm still conscious, therefore it's all I remember.
Am I getting this right guys?