On: Sony Reveals an Even Bigger Attack on the Internet...

[wyager]

>We don't like this, but the implementations to secure DNS (DANE, etc.)

DANE is just another half-assed semi-solution that shifts the trust problem around a bit.

A really good solution requires huge infrastructure change. The only currently viable solution to Zooko's Triangle is Namecoin (or a similar technology).

It is not possible to forcibly change a Namecoin entry via legal channels.

[sarciszewski → wyager]

I'm actually working on a toy project specification that involves:

    - Tor Hidden Services
    - Onionimbus (basically tor2web + DNS)
    - Namecoin
    - node-webkit

All to make an anonymous desktop publishing suite to encourage diversity in the darknet, and to encourage anonymous and decentralized publishing in general.

[roywiggins → wyager]

Can't you just order the owner of the namecoin entry to transfer it? You can't seize it, but you can seize the -owner-, if you can find them.

If I have control of "microsoft.bit" I assume Microsoft would be within their rights to sue me for trademark infringement. This is better than the FBI's (apparently legal?) ability to seize .com domains en masse, but still.

[wyager → roywiggins]

Of course. There's no defense against "rubber hose cryptanalysis".

However, it's trivial to hide ownership of namecoin domains, or to share ownership among geographically disparate parties.

[wolfgke → wyager]

> The only currently viable solution to Zooko's Triangle is Namecoin (or a similar technology).

Quoting http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zooko%27s_triangle:

"Following Namecoin, other platforms were developed which defy Zooko's conjecture, such as Twister.".