Discussions surrounding threat mitigation and risk mitigation are uniformly one sided on HN, and even the most delicate walk down the line of acceptable mitigation is shunned.
The more interesting point is the inverse position of the community in regards to network and systems security, in which all measures of threat mitigation are encouraged or "required".
Discussions of threat mitigation are irrelevant so long as the threats and their countermeasures remain undisclosed. There can be no productive debate when one side knows everything and tells the other side nothing.
It doesn't matter if surveillance is used only for good (evidence suggests otherwise, though); if the surveillance organizations have all the power to operate in secrecy and distort the truth when questioned by the legislature, their "trust us" assurances are wholly untrustworthy.
It's naive to the point of absurdity. It's basically saying:
The NSA/CIA/FBI/etc. couldn't even see Ukraine coming! They were on their coffee breaks, those silly spooks! They never get anything right do they? So don't worry about them collecting information on you! They couldn't even find Osama! Those slackers. Don't worry be happy!"
The stupidest assumption one can make about a powerful organization is that it's incompetent and thus benign. Crack open a history book to see how benign power really can be.
Observing everyone isn't about targeting everyone, it's about targeting anyone. So even if they really did miss Ukraine, that doesn't mean we shouldn't care about them recording everything else.
The parent's comment, even if disagreeable in some regards, is substantial and the discussion is better for it having been made.