In the 1950s and 60s, American capital markets produced conglomerates. These conglomerates offered an unsophisticated investing public pre-packaged diversification. They were also able to leverage their mass to reliably tap the capital markets. Through the 1970s and 80s, the American finance matured. Investors found portfolios better vehicles of diversification than conglomerates. New capital markets negated size as a pre-requisite to financing. The inefficiencies of having unrelated businesses under one roof became a greater liability than any prior advantages. The LBO tigers dismantled the titans.
A similar story seems to be playing out in tech. The dot com bubble scarred a generation of management. These firms hoard cash, disdain debt and covet the reliability size brings. This is not irrational–the technology capital markets are notoriously capricious. LBOs don't work on an equity-rich capital structure where management holds all the voting rights. Perhaps this will bring an alternative to the acid pens of activist investors.
The liquidation value of a company only serves as a floor for the value of the company if there's actually a chance that the company will be liquidated (or sold).
Yahoo's board and management have shown that they take a long view on Yahoo and will not liquidate or sell the company. So it's completely logical that the market price of Yahoo be less than the sum of its parts, so long as you think that the value of their businesses will continue to decline.
The liquidation value in this case is $13 billion greater than the market cap. They would absolutely be acquired if their market cap weren't $37 billion. There are only a handful of potential acquirers that have that kind of cash/equity, and to them the extra $13 billion - that could vanish in a few bad market days - isn't worth the risk and negative perception that buying Yahoo would likely bring.
In any event, it appears that Yahoo's investment decisions are the the only thing that have saved the company. They should shut down all non-profitable parts of the core company, liquidate most of their of their Alibaba/Yahoo Japan stake, and use the newly empty offices and $50 billion war chest for a private equity/venture firm/hedge fund. They could reassign some of their brightest engineers to write trading algorithms. With $50 billion to play with, and some smart people, they could be throwing off $5-$7+ billion in profits for their shareholders per year.
They've lost the battle for web supremacy. They should recognize their strengths and capitalize on them.
They've lost the battle for web supremacy. They should recognize their strengths and capitalize on them.
I've already raised this in the previous Yahoo thread, but I don't understand where this perception is coming from. Yahoo is absolutely massive, and their sites now have more unique desktop users than any other web company is the US — Google and Facebook included. If anything, they have won the battle for web supremacy.
They're not that popular in the tech bubble – but there are hundreds of millions of other people in the US who are clearly using Yahoo. Seriously, they've something like 800m monthly active users globally, which isn't that far off of Facebook.
I do think that Yahoo should indeed cut out non-profitable parts of the company, but they I hardly think that's a minority opinion. But they're still consistently profitable as it is, and they have oodles of cash.
They've languished somewhat over the years, and grown a bit fat and lazy. But that's nothing that some refocusing, trimming, restructuring and good management can't fix.
There is an explanation for why their market cap does not reflect the numbers you cite:
In the current environment, value = mobile devices + ecosystem
Yahoo is missing two things:
1) An alliance to provide a mobile ecosystem
2) All the parts needed for a mobile ecosystem
Apple, Google, and Amazon are winning at this kind of value creation. Facebook is doing well enough, especially in developing markets. Microsoft owns both factors but can't make them add up.
If I was running Yahoo, I'd be looking to more-quickly mature Aliyun in Asian markets and then expand out of that region, maybe to a developing market first, but eventually to the US and Europe. I would use the ecosystem requirements to drive emphasis on online properties.
> Yahoo is absolutely massive, and their sites now have more unique desktop users than any other web company is the US
Yeah, but having more unique desktop users shows dominance in the modern online world in way similar to how having the most equine-propelled vehicle sales does in the modern world of personal transport.
> Seriously, they've something like 800m monthly active users globally, which isn't that far off of Facebook.
Facebook has over 1 billion active monthly on mobile, 1.3 billion total. So, yeah, I'd say that's pretty far off
Many people use desktop at work, and this will likely continue for a while. Desktop is also often preferred for more complex tasks. Though mobile use is growing, no evidence that desktop will go way of horse-and-buggy.
Yeah, but having more unique desktop users shows dominance in the modern online world in way similar to how having the most equine-propelled vehicle sales does in the modern world of personal transport.
No it's not. Lots of users are on mobile, no doubt, but Yahoo's presence is also there.
Facebook has over 1 billion active monthly on mobile, 1.3 billion total. So, yeah, I'd say that's pretty far off
That's not far off at all. At best, that puts Yahoo at like 0.6x the MAU of Facebook. That's huge.
You sound like Michael Dell in the 90s saying Apple should be liquidated. I'm not saying Yahoo has a second act coming or anything like that, but rather that your armchair analysis ignores the reality of Yahoo's DNA as a company.
Apple got turned around because Jobs came back and took it over using people from NeXT. Apple's success is built on different people, different products, and a different OS than were present before the Jobs/NeXT merger.
The valley is a very competitive hiring environment, so anybody good who wanted to leave Yahoo has presumably left. And Yahoo has been in sad shape for a very long time. I'm not saying there isn't some valuable DNA left, but I wonder where you think it might be.
DNA defines an organism, it doesn't leave. My point is that Yahoo! has a lot of operations and revenues that are based on a history. You can't just liquidate most of it and use the rest to create a hedge fund, that kind of thinking only makes sense long enough to write a pithy comment. The reality is that large corporations don't "pivot", they turn very slowly and they can only make a big turn with a long and concerted effort.
History doesn't build software. That takes people using a process and embedded in a culture. If there's some sort of long-lasting Yahoo-ness, it's embodied in that.
I think the other guy's plan is crazy. But Yahoo has spent a lot of years being a has-been coasting on the strengths of former glory. I think reasonable people can say that the enormous inertia you describe is too much to overcome, and that you might as well not bother trying to turn it. That would involve just letting it coast slowly to wherever it's going, squeezing out profits as long as you can.
Yahoo probably won't do that on its own, but that's exactly what a sufficiently large corporate raider might do with it.
A few years ago, EMC was in a similar situation, where it's stake in VMWare was (and may still be) nominally worth more that the EMC enterprise as a whole. From an investment POV, it means that Yahoo is probably undervalued, and good management can increase the value of the enterprise substantially.
Awesome article by Mr. Levine. I still assume that they're betting that current management will piss away some of the windfall from the 2 stakes that they hold.
The idea that market cap (current marginal stock price × total outstanding shares) is valuation is, well, convenient to get an easy way to calculate a number and call it the overall valuation, but doesn't really hold up.
All this article does is point out that if you use that (flawed) method to value Yahoo, and then use the same method to value Yahoo Japan, and then use even less-reliable means to value the non-public Alibaba, and then subtract the last two from the first, you get an unexpected number.
And even if the assumptions underlying the "negative" valuation of the core business were inassailable, its quite easy to have a business to have a negative $10 billion value. Suppose a business has $11 billion in total liabilities, and $1 billion is total assets. Voila, Owner's Equity is -$10 billion.
And this can still be a profitable company. Obviously, making profits means that profit stream has a value (the current value of the stream of future income), but that doesn't mean that you don't have liabilities that exceed that (and the valuation of that stream is not just based on current profit, but expectation of its future continuation. A company can be profitable but the market can lack confidence that it will continue to be profitable.)
FYI, valuation is defined as enterprise value, not market cap. And in general, things like liquidity discounts and control premia also mean market cap is a poor proxy for acual or fungible value, even for the equity. The reason is that the marginal price of the equity is not the average price (in terms of market depth). simply multiplying a market that is 1-2% deep @ p=X x 100% of shares outstanding is flawed from the perspective of suplly and demand. these comments are made by others in the thread elsewhere, but worth repeating.
Enterprise value is an M&A metric. As an equity holder, equity value is the valuation of concern. Market cap is generally the best estimator of equity value.
Takeover value, equity value in the event someone wants to own all (or a controlling part of) the equity, is a different beast. It includes the strategic optionality that comes with owning a company. Having to take what management doles out thus produces a different equity value than takeover value. Market cap is the best estimate of this passive investor's equity value.
No, market cap = # of shares * last traded price. It's what the last bozo believed the value was, which varies widely depending on the bozo. Then you have the bozos who are trying to guess what the other bozos will do. At some point the market cap will be right, but only for an instant.
That might technically be what the word means, but the implication is that this is what the company as a whole is worth, and that's not necessarily true.
A stock's price is essentially the first derivative (in calculus terms) of the company's value. Market cap is essentially assuming that the entire thing is linear, by taking the derivative and multiplying it by the total size. Stocks don't behave linearly, so this assumption isn't particularly good.
Which, when you read it, I'm sure you can come up with 10 counterexamples (obvious counterexample: ponzi schemes). I guess you could call me a disbeliever.
Value is what the market is willing to pay for it--for anything, not just companies. The EMH says that that value is always discounted perfectly on a risk-adjusted basis of all current knowledge about the company. Therefore if a company exceeds its risk adjusted expected performance in the future, it wouldn't be possible to predict beforehand.
You usually enter bankruptcy when you become insolvent, that is to say when you can't pay your bills (it can be the salaries of your employees, a bill from a supplier, debt interests, rent, utility bills, etc.). You can run a profitable business and go bankruptcy because you are out of cash, and nobody agrees to lend you some.
This is not unlikely when you have to pay your suppliers before you collect payments from your customers. And realistically that's the common case, not the exception. This is why cash flow is so important for any business.
Not necessarily. Generally, firms become insolvent if they can't meet their liabilities as they fall due (things get a bit more complicated for regulated firms such as insurers, which also have to worry about solvency ratios). If a firm's current liabilities exceed its current assets (where 'current' is defined as 'to be received/fall due in the next 12 months') then it's likely to be in trouble. Examples of current assets are cash, stock and trade debtors (i.e. other firms you have supplied to on credit), and current liabilities include trade creditors (firms who have supplied you on credit). These contrast with fixed assets and long-term liabilities, which aren't expected to arise for over 12 months (e.g. a 5 year bank loan).
If firms automatically became insolvent when liabilities exceeded assets, then no one would ever be able to start a firm with a bank loan, because from day one the liabilities (loan + interest) would outstrip the assets (cash).
It's also possible for a firm to have assets which exceed liabilities but still be insolvent, for example a property company with large fixed assets but little cash in the bank to meet its running costs.
> Doesn't a company with less assets than liabilities have to enter bankruptcy even if it's profitable?
No. A company is at risk of being forced into involuntary bankruptcy when it cannot meet its current obligations, which is different than having less assets than liabilities; but even when insolvent it doesn't have to enter bankruptcy, though its creditors can force it to do so (and, if it is profitable and expected to remain so, its creditors might not want to force it into bankruptcy, because they may expect the liabilities to be more fully paid, if delayed, if the firm remains in operation vs. bankruptcy.)
You can read about this in Securities Analysis (1940). Basically you don't trust management, so companies can trade for less than liquidation value [edit: and investors don't trust / overlook that a negative subsidiary can be unwound, although that's not technically true in yahoos case if all subs are profitable].
It's really amazing how nothing changes in finance; it's just that memories are short.
From what I can tell, Apple's low post Steve Jobs return was $12.72 on April 2003. I believe that was the month the iTunes Store launched. Sort of shocking that was their low point after the success of the iMac and the iPod. Investors must have thought the store would go bust like all the other music store attempts before, but man it just goes to show how clueless market analysts (or maybe everyone) are when it comes to tech.
I think you're missing one stock split -- the April 2003 price would be $6.36 for current AAPL stock.
Technically the low point after Jobs's return would be Dec 1997, when AAPL was around $3.30... But maybe that doesn't count since the iMac hadn't been introduced yet.
There's likely a bunch of liabilities and break-up fees involved in such liquidation.
Real estate, data center space is likely to be under long-term leases with penalties for early termination.
Personnel layoffs are not a trivial thing either - there are severance costs which in case of upper management can run into tens of millions - http://sacramento.cbslocal.com/2014/04/17/fired-yahoo-coo-ge... And that's just US - Yahoo! has a network of European offices which likely have more protective labor laws.
Rather than liquidating the entire company, Yahoo could sell its Yahoo Japan and Alibaba shares, pay a one-time dividend, and keep its core business intact. The now-isolated core business would have positive value.
But it might be difficult to acquire a controlling interest in Yahoo without driving up the price.
> Rather than liquidating the entire company, Yahoo could sell its Yahoo Japan and Alibaba shares, pay a one-time dividend, and keep its core business intact.
Except there is not a lot of reason to believe that either:
1. Yahoo could dump its holding of Yahoo Japan shares at current market prices (current share price is a good rough estimate of realizable value if you aren't trading enough to move the market, but selling off around a third of Yahoo Japan isn't that small of a block...)
2. Yahoo could actually find a buyer for its Alibaba holdings (a non-public firm) at the analyst estimate of its value used in the article.
> The now-isolated core business would have positive value.
The article doesn't really make the case for that. It says the core business is profitable, but current profitability doesn't mean positive value; it could be in debt, profitable, and not expected by the market to remain profitable long enough to get out of debt -- that would give it negative market value.
Really, all the facts in the article tell you is that at least one of the following is false:
1) The author's implicit assumptions about the market value of Yahoo's core business, or
2) The estimated value of privately-held Alibaba, or
3) The assumption that realizing the value of its holdings in YJ and Alibaba would be transaction-cost free for Yahoo (and thus that those holdings should be undiscounted when aggregate to determine Yahoo's worth), or
4) The efficient market hypothesis.
I have no problem believing that all four are false, and misleading in this case.
> > The now-isolated core business would have positive value.
> The article doesn't really make the case for that. It says the core business is profitable, but current profitability doesn't mean positive value; it could be in debt, profitable, and not expected by the market to remain profitable long enough to get out of debt -- that would give it negative market value.
Stock can't have negative value. If a company becomes insolvent, its stockholders aren't forced to pay its debts.
The article agrees: "Unless the probability of that outcome is 100 percent -- a rare thing in this life -- then Core Yahoo should have some positive value."
A component of a business can. Ignoring the problems that make marginal stock prices problematic for overall valuation, and transaction costs, etc., the stock price of a corporation should be max(0,sum(value of all components of the business)). The fact that this value should never be less than zero doesn't mean that no component of the business has a negative contribution.
I think we're in agreement. I agree that "Core Yahoo" might presently have negative value, because it could lose money in the future and eat into the company's other assets.
I'm just saying that if Yahoo sold its major stock assets and transferred most of its cash to shareholders, the remainder of the company (consisting of "Core Yahoo" and not much else) would have positive value.
Yeah, it has long been a point among activist investors. With Alibaba IPO the liquidity is there, the question is whether Yahoo! will get the best return now or in the future - they were somewhat criticized for divesting of their Google shares at $82-83 a share http://blogs.wsj.com/overheard/2012/02/28/yahoo-buys-low-sel...
Also, $100 chunk of Alibaba shares is not $100 distributed to you if you're a Yahoo! shareholder - first there's US corporate tax on that income, and then a dividend tax on top of that, which could be qualified or non-qualified depending on your shareholder status.
The answer is really simple: nobody with billions actually thinks Alibaba and YHJ is worth as much as their share price, and not many common people know about Alibaba and YHJ.
It's the same reason you don't see high flying stocks like FB, LNKD, YELP, etc. actually getting buyout or tender offers for their shares.
In the event of having to sell a large block of shares, all of the share prices will crater, Alibaba included. Prices are set at the margins, so until there is a stampede the stock price will go with the flavor of the month.
Stock price != company value. Nobody will enter a position they can't get out of easily unless there is real worth in holding.
It's not publicly traded ATM, but the article hints that it soon will be. But Yahoo has a stake in it, and thus it has "shares" and those shares are worth something, hence it DOES have a "share price".
EDIT: I can see that your parent does not realize (apparently) that Ali baba is not publicly traded
> Stock price != company value. Nobody will enter a position they can't get out of easily unless there is real worth in holding.
This says it all. The price of a stock does not equal the value of the underlying company. Value investors like Warren Buffett make their money by exploiting that difference.
> The answer is really simple: nobody with billions actually thinks Alibaba and YHJ is worth as much as their share price, and not many common people know about Alibaba and YHJ.
Are you saying that Yahoo Inc.'s share price is heavily determined by billionaires, but Alibaba's and YHJ's share prices are not?
No, prices are set by buyers and sellers obviously. Except in this case, most people are negative on Yahoo but don't know about Alibaba, nor do billionaires who could move the stock believe Yahoo could dispose of Alibaba at reported levels. In fact, Yahoo's stake is bigger than the initial amount of stock the IPO will offer.
I think Alibaba is private, and its "valuation" is just an analyst's estimate. That estimate could be an old figure, so the article is using inconsistent data.
The article explores a few theories and none really make sense. The only theory that can explain why Yahoo can be worth $13 billion less than two of its three components is that the market believes that its management is so bad that they are going train wreck the group - the hp effect.
The discount is presumably also due to the fact that no one in management - least of all Marissa Mayer - has any interest in making Yahoo smaller. Although this would likely be the right thing for the shareholders, it would make their domain (and thus their perceived importance) smaller.
The article explains that the whole is less than the sum of its parts because the businesses can potentially leech off each other when they are packaged together as a conglomerate ("the conglomerate discount").
To me this idea conflicts with the fact that they are minority shareholders in the two international components. I'm not sure exactly what the management structure is, but if Alibaba really thought it might be run into the ground by Yahoo it seems that they could do something to kick Yahoo out.
The argument is not that Yahoo! will burn Alibaba to the ground. It's that their asset holding in Alibaba will have to be liquidated to make up for losses by Core Yahoo!
That is, they might burn their stake in Alibaba to the ground.
Yes, support of the free market is non-scientific in the sense that Mainland China, Russia, Cuba, North Korea and similarly non-'free market' countries are much wealthier than historically pro-market countries like Switzerland, Singapore and Hong Kong. /s
Being richer doesn't mean the free market did it (as the other commenter here noted). If you don't bother checking other factors at play (like a history of having undemocratic regimes and having started from far poorer conditions), then so much for using science /s
Not to mention that you can be filthy rich and not by using a "scientific system" in any sense. A king is not richer from a peasant because he is more scientific -- just because he has the power, and a family heritage.
If you look at all world's countries in terms of GDP per capita[1] and economic freedom[2], the countries with higher GDPs per capita have higher degrees of economic freedom, and conversely the countries with the lowest degrees of economic freedom have lower GDPs per capita. This is obviously not perfectly scientific, but I don't have the time to describe the whole theory of developmental economics in a HN post.
'Filthy rich' in the sense that a king is rich is different from a nation being rich in an economic sense. The wealth of a country, measured by GDP, is a measure of productivity. A king has the ability to purchase many things, but he's not rich in the sense of economic productivity, in fact his economic productivity may well be zero.
>If you look at all world's countries in terms of GDP per capita[1] and economic freedom[2], the countries with higher GDPs per capita have higher degrees of economic freedom, and conversely the countries with the lowest degrees of economic freedom have lower GDPs per capita.
Actually, in the top 20 list we can see Qatar, Brunei and Kuweit(basically rich due to oil), Singapore (where the state owns most infrastructure, from telcos to the "media company", cars are heavily taxed, as in $100,000 for a 10 year licence to drive one, and the state subsidies the citizen's housing), Norway, Denmark and Sweden (which, by Us standards are "socialist"), and other not quite the role models of a "free market".
Also, in the index for "economic freedom", the US is 18th and 12th (in the two different rankings), below Bahrain and Chile -- seems that "economic freedom" is shortcode for "rich corporations are allowed to do whatever they like, including corrupting local power elites".
In any case, they hardly make the case for the "free market".
Qatar and Kuwait are still within the top 20 in the economic freedom list, as is Singapore (at number 2) and Denmark, while Norway and Sweden are still in the top 30. Economic freedom is multi-faceted: while Singapore may be 'socialist' in in the ways you describe, for instance, it also has extremely low personal and corporate taxes, no capital gains tax, and fewer regulations, which contributes to its high economic freedom ranking.
The US scores below Bahrain and Chile because there are some ways in which the US market is quite unfree. For instance, bank bailouts of large corporations, massive agriculture subsidies and tariffs, and incredibly onerous regulations in some industries. Even Sweden has a freer market than the US in some ways, for instance via its voucher system: parents are able to choose to which public school they'd like to send their children, rather than having it determined by where they live like in the US.
Surely it's not a coincidence that the top 20 countries in terms of GDP per capita are almost all within the list of top 30 countries in terms of economic freedom.
It makes the implicit claim that people interacting freely will lead to worse outcomes under some metric then people interacting under the constraint that actions contravening some centrally determined directives result in punishment via violence or the threat thereof.
No, you make that implicit claim. But if you want me to make MY claims explicit, here we go:
The so-called "free market" is a buzzword. There haven't been any such thing observed in actual life.
From the US to Germany to Hong Kong and Brunei (all on the top 20 of "economic freedom"), markets thrive on heavy subsidies, tons of protections, and heavy military and diplomatic action to win favorable deals for exports and secure cheap resources.
All available means are used under this system, from corrupting politicians to pass favorable laws to direct imposing of "banana republics" in development countries for commercial benefit. Heck, even patent laws and copyright is a kind of state protectionism against competition. In all, existing economies have very little to do with "free agents" competing freely in a fair unskewed marketplace. (I didn't even have to mention things such as the $1 trillion bailout and the Detroit bailout here).
Free market economics are based on made-up ideal notions that go against what actual human societies do, not just in regard to how real markets function, but also in their fundamental laws and models, like "supply and demand". Of course in more refined academic economic research you can find criticisms against such naivety, but at the level of "free market" proponents and policy advisors, even at the highest circles, all that is forgotten.
While no 'true free market' has existed in real life, it nevertheless exists as a fairly clearly specified theoretical construct against which actual markets can be compared. Those countries in the top 20 economic freedom list all have markets closer in various ways to this theoretical 'true free market' than other countries.
They also generally have higher levels of economic development, hence the suggestion of a correlation between market freedom and economic development.
I think that that's the OP's point; he's saying that bad CEOs may be both men and women.
I still don't like his comment because it's bringing gender into something that really has nothing to do with gender, but a literal, factual reading of his comment makes exactly the point you do.
Yahoo's different parts cannot be traded and thus have no liquidity. There's a huge liquidity discount associated with that.
If Yahoo were to sell the pieces of Y!Japan, Alibaba, etc. on the open market, it would have to do it a structured and delayed process or else it would flood the market, dropping the respective stocks. More discount.
Basically, the Yahoo valuation builds in some expectation that it will sell its shares in Alibaba and Yahoo Japan, but instead of returning the proceeds to shareholders (fully realizing its value), they will attempt to reinvest in Yahoo and destroy some of the value
The cash value of the Alibaba etc. holdings is always going to be discounted some % (often a significant %). The supposed puzzle implies that those assets are valued at max value inside the market cap of Yahoo. They are not, and historically, cash, cash equivalents, or future expected cash value, is always hit with a discount as far as the market cap is concerned. You can see this in action across every type of public company (from Apple to Berkshire).
Investors simply do not put a full value on cash holdings. They prize earnings and growth drastically more than cash on a balance sheet.
Yahoo would need to pay taxes on it's gains on the other companies stock before it could return that money to it's shareholders so effectively that stock is worth less than it's stated value. Also, Alibaba is not a public company so there is a fair amount of uncertainty in it's value.
Actually, it doesn't have to. They could do a stock swap with present Yahoo shareholders. They can spin the shares into a separate company, and given those shares to the current share holders. There are plenty of tax advantaged games they could play.
Besides that, taxes are only a problem when you sell. If you look at the Yahoo Japan and Alibaba investments in terms of lookthrough earnings with all earnings held by the companies, the tax hit doesn't matter in the short term.
To qualify as a tax-free spinoff, the parent company must own a controlling stake in the company to be spun. Yahoo does not own a controlling stake in either Y! Japan or Alibaba.
However, there is a tax maneuver being considered, called a "cash rich split off" [0]. Yahoo would do a tax-free swap of its Alibaba shares for a 5-year historic business owned by Alibaba. This historic business can have as much as two-thirds of its assets consisting of cash. Warren Buffett did something similar with his shares in GHC.
One question is why did Yahoo not pursue a cash-rich split off in its 2012 transaction with Ali? I would argue that it's most likely for political reasons. As unfair as it may be, the optics of Jerry Yang and Jack Ma teaming up to deprive the US Treasury of tax revenue is very different from the optics of Warren Buffett and Don Graham doing the exact same thing. I think they might still pursue it, just because that's a lot of money to leave on the table.
I am almost positive that does not work, though if you can provide precedent I am all ears. And again, yahoo would be taxed on those earnings before they could return the money to their shareholders.
As many have said, this happens often in the stock market. And in other markets. All of these numbers are just numbers on paper, not actual cash in someone's pocket. This is one of the ways Mitt made so much money - buying companies for less than what he could make by selling the pieces or repackaging the whole.
As far as I can tell it's now a network of content sites (Tumblr, Flickr, Yahoo Finance, Yahoo Weather, a long site of Yahoo {{content_type}} sites, etc), monetized through targeted advertising.
Their demographics are typically older than average, and therefore easily monetizable through display ads. They seem to be doing quite well.
From watching a few of Marissa's interviews, it seems Yahoo is (or trying to become) a network providing services that people use daily, with a focus on mobile moving forward.
Weather, news, sports, stocks, email, social networking (Tumblr/Flickr). They are also appear to be trying to get into video and search.
Thanks guys for clarifying. So am I right to think that they don't have any "identity" that makes them "yahoo" anymore and they just collect rent from a bunch of properties they acquired? In my mind, google is google (identified primarily by search) microsoft is Microsoft( primarily identified by windows and office) yahoo is? ... Is it like if Facebook abandoned social media altogether and became a simple owner of "stuff"?
In the absence of a direct way of arbitraging between YHOO, Alibaba and Yahoo Japan, is it not surprising that the respective valuations of these entities will become disconnected.
The market value of a company does not represent its actual worth. Yahoo is not worth negative 13B.
> Market cap isn't the value of a company, but rather the value investors place on the shares times outstanding shares.
What's the difference? (honest question)
My understanding is that, theoretically, share price is intended to reflect expected value of future payouts (dividends) assuming the company lasts forever. In practice, I would think share price is more likely to reflect expected value of future payouts over some fixed time period plus expected time-adjusted price appreciation over that same interval, which seems to be at least as reasonable a method.
What is the (monetary) value of a company other than return to owners?
it is certainly one valuation but there are other measures too. To give an example of one problem with that measure it would imply that when the stock market is volatile that the company value is too when there may be no news or changes in the company prospects so for me it is hard to regard the market cap as a measure of true value (although it does give a quick estimate).
On the not so unrelated topic: does anyone know where you could learn 'basic business'? Something like programming languages first-steps tutorials to be able to understand what they actually are talking about.
I use Treehouse for learning web dev and they have a course on business fundamentals e.g. what type of company to incorporate, accounting fundamentals. Haven't tried it yet myself, but their programming stuff has been good so I reckon it would be worth a try. You can get a 2-week free trial to check it out.
Read Warren Buffet's biography "The Snowball" first. You could just read business textbooks but if you are starting from zero it will be like reading through an index.
For most companies, the value hits zero when the share price hits zero. When a stock drops from $10 to $5, investors see this as "halfway to zero" and adjust. For yahoo, given its valuable holdings, the zero line happens to be somewhere above actual zero (let's just say $10). However, when yahoo drops from $20 to $15 investors are not switching to "halfway to zero" mode.
As simple as it sounds, I think the elevated numbers have allowed the market to go too low. The whole thing is very psychologically driven after all.
Meaning that Yahoo's actual business -- Yglesias calls it "Tumblr and Flickr and the iOS weather app that I love and all the news sites and the mail and the fantasy sports stuff" -- is worth a negative amount of money
Poor Yahoo! Let me have them for $0 which is a lot more than negative billions.
Of course, Y! Japan and Alibaba cannot be sold without incurring taxes or lowering the price. And they are worth this much, right now. Tomorrow their stock might drop
Yahoo has a pretty bad history with investors, at least with me. I had a ton of options ready for if they sold to Microsoft at the price point Microsoft offered, it was a huge win for share holders, but they didn't do it. I don't think I'll ever trust them to do what is right for the share holders ever again...
A similar story seems to be playing out in tech. The dot com bubble scarred a generation of management. These firms hoard cash, disdain debt and covet the reliability size brings. This is not irrational–the technology capital markets are notoriously capricious. LBOs don't work on an equity-rich capital structure where management holds all the voting rights. Perhaps this will bring an alternative to the acid pens of activist investors.