Then I don't understand the point you're trying to make.
You have argued that people should always use /dev/urandom, as opposed to the common understanding that /dev/random is safer to use if you need high quality randomness, due to the cold-start issues with urandom.
You said that "Not using urandom has caused way, way, way more real-world security problems than any bizarro embedded systems cold start entropy problem ever has.".
I asked you for an example of security problems caused by using /dev/random instead of /dev/urandom. You provided a link with no such examples.
The common understanding about /dev/random is incorrect.
I'm still not reading anything about "long lived keys" in your clarification here.
If you are concerned about cold-start entropy on first-ever boot, then seed urandom from random explicitly at boot. There is no reason ever to use /dev/random in crypto code, and you will find that the best crypto code doesn't.
I think I'll end my part in this discussion right here.
