Agreed. I believe requiring a service provider to turn over their private SSL key, exposing their entire user base to privacy breaches, to be an unreasonable search.
And that's not even really my point. I object on a higher level. If the government goes to a service and says, "I have a warrant to wiretap this user", and the service says, "sorry, we don't have the ability to give you access to a particular user's activity", then I believe the Feds should have two options:
1. Ask if there is a way for the service to be modified to make it possible, and if so, pay for the modifications. And the service provider must be allowed to advertise that they are now subject to law enforcement wiretaps (let's say one of their previous marketing points might have been that they are immune to such things). I'm debating also suggesting that the service provider should be allowed to refuse that request, regardless of payment, but I'm not quite sure how I feel about that.
2. Walk away and find another means of gathering evidence.
To take #1 a step further, if the service actually enables perfect secrecy, and there actually is no way that it could be modified to meet the Feds' request, I think that's fine too, and a service like that should be completely lawful.
> Agreed. I believe requiring a service provider to turn over their private SSL key, exposing their entire user base to privacy breaches, to be an unreasonable search.
Requiring someone to turn something over is a seizure, not a search; if it is the only way to effect an otherwise-reasonable search, its probably also a reasonable seizure. If the recipient of the seizure order has deliberately engineered it to be the only way to effect potential searches of more limited scope, and it has broader impacts, there's really no one to blame but the recipient of the order.
> let's say one of their previous marketing points might have been that they are immune to such things
As, if such an order is legally possible, this advertising was false, I'm not sure why it should be allowed to provide them with a benefit.
And that's not even really my point. I object on a higher level. If the government goes to a service and says, "I have a warrant to wiretap this user", and the service says, "sorry, we don't have the ability to give you access to a particular user's activity", then I believe the Feds should have two options:
1. Ask if there is a way for the service to be modified to make it possible, and if so, pay for the modifications. And the service provider must be allowed to advertise that they are now subject to law enforcement wiretaps (let's say one of their previous marketing points might have been that they are immune to such things). I'm debating also suggesting that the service provider should be allowed to refuse that request, regardless of payment, but I'm not quite sure how I feel about that.
2. Walk away and find another means of gathering evidence.
To take #1 a step further, if the service actually enables perfect secrecy, and there actually is no way that it could be modified to meet the Feds' request, I think that's fine too, and a service like that should be completely lawful.