It wasn't "the Japanese" that didn't do it safely at Fukushima. It was GE
Was GE responsible for the siting of the backup diesel generators and switchgear behind a seawall that was overcome by the tsunami? That was the root cause of all the problems; it wasn't anything to do with the reactor design itself, other than the fact that it needed active cooling after shutdown (which PWR designs from the same time period also did).
(That said, I agree the BWR design is outdated and modern designs with passive safety features are much, much better.)
But the backup generators could be moved (and were in similar US installations). Raising the backup generators to protect them against inundation was recommended, but the delay there is pure sclerotic TEPCO.
I still don't understand why Chinooks weren't in the air toward Fukushima within 30 minutes of the tsunami with some generators sling-loaded under them (and refueling, etc.). Either from the JSDF or US Military.
As I understand it, the issue was that not just the generators but the switchgear connecting them to the plant's power grid was behind the seawall that was overcome by the tsunami. So bringing in other generators wouldn't have helped, because there was no way to plug them into the grid.
You can usually get portable switchgear, and it was mainly pumps, which should be fairly tolerant even with an emergency cabling job. I'd really consider this a contingency plants should be ready for; if I operated at tepco scale I would probably have actual helicopters under contract (or priority with the military) and strategic equipment in hardened shelters at my plants, just to be able to move it to other plants.
From what I've read there was a leadership vacuum for the initial crisis at tepco. I'm actually going to try to visit as close as I can get to the plant tomorrow or Saturday (in Sendai right now)
Was GE responsible for the siting of the backup diesel generators and switchgear behind a seawall that was overcome by the tsunami? That was the root cause of all the problems; it wasn't anything to do with the reactor design itself, other than the fact that it needed active cooling after shutdown (which PWR designs from the same time period also did).
(That said, I agree the BWR design is outdated and modern designs with passive safety features are much, much better.)