The number of hours billed is very dependent on the structure of the law. One of the goals of courts is to streamline the law so that cases that don't have merit can be dismissed quickly and easily. If you follow litigations in the popular press, you'll see that a lot of lawsuits get dismissed on "technicalities" (i.e. procedural rules). E.g. the EFF's NSA litigation is in danger of getting dismissed for a lack of standing (i.e. dismissal because the plaintiff can't show actual injury). Courts create these procedural barriers because getting to the merits (i.e. looking at the facts) of litigation is time-consuming and expensive. Courts also create other barriers. For example, in a shareholder suit, there is something called the business judgment rule: i.e. in the absence of a conflict of interest or something like that, a court will defer to management's superior business judgment. Rules like that allow shareholder suits to be evaluated and dismissed based on facts that are easy to prove without having to reach facts that are expensive to investigate and prove.
In patent litigation, there is precious little of that. Patent litigations very quickly become a very fact-intensive process of interpreting a complex and voluminous patent, getting expert witness testimony about exactly how the defendants product works, etc. Once a lawyer is sitting down with an engineer looking over code, the clock really gets going.
The Supreme Court has been very reluctant to create categorical rules in terms of patentability, and that's largely because the Patent Act is written in a way that makes such categorical rules inconsistent with the intent of the law. But the fact is that categorical rules (e.g. no software patents, deference to business judgment) make litigation cheaper, and that's an important consideration too.
>>The Supreme Court has been very reluctant to create categorical rules in terms of patentability<<
I wouldn't say very reluctant. There were four votes for a rule putting software and business methods outside patentability in Diehr (450 U.S. 175 (1981)) and again in Bilsky (561 U.S. ? (2010)). If Obama gets a chance to replace one of the pro-software patent justices (Roberts, Alito, Kennedy, Thomas, Scalia), the result could be different next time.
Note that in both those cases, the justices that were skeptical of software patents were those typically classified as the "left"-wing justices. I have no idea why that happens. Dr. Lessig had a theory in Eldred v. Ashcroft that he could win over "right"-wing justices for textual literalist copyright reform but it was only the "left" justices that finally agreed with reason in that case; even then it was only the most avid patent reformers he won over: Stevens and Breyer.
> One of the goals of courts is to streamline the law
And one of the goals of (relatively) rich plaintiffs who sue (relatively) poor defendants is to drag out the case as much as possible to impose costs and inconveniences on the defendant.
As a practical matter, that's not a situation the federal courts encounter very often. It's usually poor plaintiffs suing rich defendants, or rich plaintiffs suing other rich plaintiffs.
The number of hours billed is very dependent on the structure of the law. One of the goals of courts is to streamline the law so that cases that don't have merit can be dismissed quickly and easily. If you follow litigations in the popular press, you'll see that a lot of lawsuits get dismissed on "technicalities" (i.e. procedural rules). E.g. the EFF's NSA litigation is in danger of getting dismissed for a lack of standing (i.e. dismissal because the plaintiff can't show actual injury). Courts create these procedural barriers because getting to the merits (i.e. looking at the facts) of litigation is time-consuming and expensive. Courts also create other barriers. For example, in a shareholder suit, there is something called the business judgment rule: i.e. in the absence of a conflict of interest or something like that, a court will defer to management's superior business judgment. Rules like that allow shareholder suits to be evaluated and dismissed based on facts that are easy to prove without having to reach facts that are expensive to investigate and prove.
In patent litigation, there is precious little of that. Patent litigations very quickly become a very fact-intensive process of interpreting a complex and voluminous patent, getting expert witness testimony about exactly how the defendants product works, etc. Once a lawyer is sitting down with an engineer looking over code, the clock really gets going.
The Supreme Court has been very reluctant to create categorical rules in terms of patentability, and that's largely because the Patent Act is written in a way that makes such categorical rules inconsistent with the intent of the law. But the fact is that categorical rules (e.g. no software patents, deference to business judgment) make litigation cheaper, and that's an important consideration too.