Uh, didn't he criticise scientific epistemologies in relation to so-called scientism? I read briefly about some of his remarks on the matter, and he just seemed like most of his fellow sociologists: ignorant of the relevance of science to sanity, probably caused by not having been trained in physico-mathematical rigour.
He made a distinction between describing something well enough to correctly predict its behavior and understanding the common mechanisms leading to those behaviors. He then critiqued science for focusing exclusively on correct predictions, without also searching for insight into the underlying order.
The problem with science focused exclusively on correct predictions is that it encodes implicit assumptions, and if the surrounding conditions change the previous evidence is no longer valid. It also has a tendency to lead people to think they are observing some final and universal Truth, when really they are just observing a system that is in a relatively stable equilibrium.
For the second paragraph: Imagine a man warped out of the past somewhere into the future. His clothes look funny and any interaction he makes with people draws an odd response. Some give him money, some people say "no thank you" for some reason, and so on. He can test this, he can see that nearly everyone behaves this way. So he assumes this is simply how people here behave.
Later on, something happens that forces him to wear clothes like everyone else is wearing. And how people react to him changes completely. All his testing proved that people react one certain way, but he didn't understand why so he didn't realize what his testing had showed was actually just a small subset of the actual behavior and was actually an extremely rare case.
I really like your comment, and I really wish to reply with a video with a Louie CK stand-up comedy piece about a lion and a giraffe. But I'm not sure if I can post the link here.
The second paragraph was me trying to, very briefly, sum up the consequences of positivist epistomology. The alternative that Chomsky proposes is that observational knowledge can only describe the things that are true given the process that generates the interactive behaviors we observe. This applies to everything from humanities and linguistics to physical interactions (which is why people have such difficulty explaining quantum physics). Consider, for example, the idea that computers think in zeros and ones: it is usually plenty accurate, even though it is really an abstraction of high/low voltage signal. But if we encounter random bit flips it may be helpful to know that actually we are working with high/low signal and so a cosmic ray interacting with our RAM could produce a flip. Equally, we write programs in higher level languages without worrying that loops aren't an inherent property of the computer. "Loops" aren't a lie, but they also aren't a fact: they are useful knowledge.
Most knowledge falls into this area, of being the product of current, generative interactions. In this world it is possible to say that some statement isn't supported by evidence, so we can still have science based on falsifiablity. We can even fully describe the observed behavior of some system under a set of conditions. That knowledge is likely to be useful, even. But it is incomplete, and shouldn't be elevated to a place of infallible "fact" lest we miss the additional capabilities we might acquire by manipulating those assumptions.
Thanks. Your summary was eloquent, but I'll have to read the article as well to make sure I understand correctly. What strikes me is that Alfred Korzybski spoke about those same issues (and much more) in his 1933 book called "Science and Sanity" (well worth a read, although bare in mind it took me several years to finish it). So when Chomsky wrote his stuff, Korzybski had already addressed this very comprehensively.
That might win the prize for most ignorant comment ever on HN. While you can level a number of criticisms at Chomsky, lack of mathematical rigor is not one of them. I would assume people here were If anything, Chomsky is guilty of over-reliance on mathematical formalism in his linguistics.
well, there is absolutely nothing wrong with conjecturing, when one presents it as such.
Thanks for making a case against what I said, I may give Chomsky a second chance.
Edit: by the way, I'm a bit suspicious of your phrasing in "mathematical formalism in his linguistics". Mathematical verbalism does not qualify as sane. I know a case of a person who does speak as a mathematician (very convincing!), even uses mathematics in his expositions, yet he is completely insane and what he says makes no sense whatsoever. I can share a recording of one of his lectures if you wish, but unfortunately he speaks in Romanian.
Your description of this "mathematician" intrigues me. And, since I happen to speak Romanian, I would love to have a link to one of his lectures. Thanks! However, I agree with "mtraven" that you should not be leveling this kind of accusation until you have read Chomsky's work.
Thanks... The video was hilarious but the dude is truly insane. I assure you that, whether you agree or disagree with him, Chomsky has absolutely nothing in common with this guy. Wow! If any other Romanian is reading this, check out that video. After a couple minutes you won't know whether you should laugh or you should cry.
