It's my understanding of that it was Judge Thomas Penfield Jackson's interview(s) with the press (an embargoed activity) while he was still hearing the case that were at issue (as well as some issues about liability for remedies). They did not have issues with his application of the Sherman Antitrust Act or relevant precedent, though.
From Wikipedia: "...the appeals court did not overturn the findings of fact. The D.C. Circuit remanded the case for consideration of a proper remedy under a more limited scope of liability."
...and then Bush replaced Clinton in the White House, after which the DoJ dropped the case.
So I think I still have a good answer for aresant's question.
>They did not have issues with his application of the Sherman Antitrust Act or relevant precedent, though.
I think they did. I'll give you a quote from the actual appellate opinion: "To establish a dangerous probability of success, plaintiffs must as a threshold matter show that the browser market can be monopolized, i.e., that a hypothetical monopolist in that market could enjoy market power. This, in turn, requires plaintiffs (1) to define the relevant market and (2) to demonstrate that substantial barriers to entry protect that market. Because plaintiffs have not carried their burden on either prong, we reverse without remand."
Naturally there is a context to that (and they didn't reverse everything the district court did, but some things) and you're invited to read the entire opinion if you're interested.[1] Incidentally, if there is one thing I've found Wikipedia to be regularly wrong or incomplete about, it's the content of court opinions.
Moreover, findings of fact are a distinct thing from conclusions of law. "Findings of fact" are usually decided by juries, but sometimes by trial judges when there is no jury, and it means deciding what actually happened, not deciding what the law is. For example, a finding of fact might be whether Microsoft did actually pressure OEMs not to bundle Netscape, but not whether or not having done that would be a violation of the antitrust laws, which would be a conclusion of law rather than a finding of fact.
(I should point out that we're having a nice theoretical discussion here and that this is not legal advice, and if you need legal advice you should consult an attorney.)
Thank you for posting that link. It made for good reading over my morning coffee.
While I am not a lawyer either, my reading is that you have quoted from a section of the document pertaining to a claimed violation (in the Conclusions of Law) that are with regard to § 2 of the Sherman act (monopoly maintenace), whereas aresant's question is with respect to product tying, which is a § 1 violation, which was merely remanded – and, eventually, dropped.
>While I am not a lawyer either, my reading is that you have quoted from a section of the document pertaining to a claimed violation (in the Conclusions of Law) that are with regard to § 2 of the Sherman act (monopoly maintenace), whereas aresant's question is with respect to product tying, which is a § 1 violation, which was merely remanded – and, eventually, dropped.
OK sure. And "remand" means the trial judge made mistakes and has to try again, not that they did everything right. When they do substantially everything right it will say "affirmed" and then that part of the case is over (or gets appealed to a higher court instead of going back down). And as you already pointed out, the case being settled/dropped probably had a lot more to do with politics and the incoming Bush administration than anything to do with the court system or the law or whether the original district judge was right or wrong.
From Wikipedia: "...the appeals court did not overturn the findings of fact. The D.C. Circuit remanded the case for consideration of a proper remedy under a more limited scope of liability."
...and then Bush replaced Clinton in the White House, after which the DoJ dropped the case.
So I think I still have a good answer for aresant's question.