Fair enough. I was just pointing out your use of the word ["sciences"] to describe the same thing as the author's "non-scientific knowledge". Whatever form this knowledge is supposed to take, "science" as a term for it is explicitly rejected.
On a more substantive point:
You acknowledge the difficulties faced by "soft sciences". Does that mean you accept that there are whole categories of real-world phenomena of which it would be extremely difficult if not impossible to systematise whatever "knowledge" we do have? I don't think that position is incompatible with respect for science.
Yes, of course non- or soft-scientific phenomena exist. But until a soft science finds some way to quantify its data, it makes little or no progress.
Take psychology as an example. The history of psychology until c. 1950 consists of different gurus with different opinions, and since few theories offered testable predictions, no one could be proven* wrong. Psychology has since learned to do controlled experiments and has been more successful. Computational neuroscience and cognitive science are more successful still. Literary criticism, OTOH, is still caught in this trap.
Ultimately, my issue with the author is that he strongly channels Thomas Kuhn. Yes, the political and social contexts of science are important. But they are nowhere near as important as the actual data and arguments made within the scientific framework.
* With all due qualifications about the impossibility of true falsification
On a more substantive point: You acknowledge the difficulties faced by "soft sciences". Does that mean you accept that there are whole categories of real-world phenomena of which it would be extremely difficult if not impossible to systematise whatever "knowledge" we do have? I don't think that position is incompatible with respect for science.