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I'll concede that DNSSEC is not in a good spot these days, but I don't know if that's really due to its design or lack of adoption (it's in similar territory as IPv6 TBH). DoH is (IMO) a poor workaround instead of "fixing" DNSSEC, but it's unfortunately the best way to get secure resolution today.

Putting aside the DNSSEC issues, IMO, DNS should be authoritative for everything. It's perfectly decentralized, and by purchasing a domain you prove ownership of it and shouldn't then need to work within more centralized services like Lets Encrypt/ACME to get a certificate (which seems to becoming more and more required for a web presence). A domain name and a routable IP should be all you need to host services/prove to users that domain.com is yours, and it's something I think we've lost sight of.

Yes, DANE can create security issues, your webmail example is a perfectly valid one. In those situations, you either accept the risk or use a different domain. Not allowing the behavior because of footguns never ends well with technology, and if you're smart enough to use .internal you should understand the risks of doing so.

Basically, we should let adults be adults on the internet and stop creating more centralization in the name of security, IMO.




It is not in similar territory as IPv6. We live in a mixed IPv4/IPv6 world (with translation). IPv6 usage is steadily and markedly increasing. Without asking to be, I'm IPv6 (on ATT Fiber) right now. DNSSEC usage has actually declined in North America in the preceding 18 months, and its adoption is microscopic to begin with.

IPv6 is going to happen (albeit over a longer time horizon than its advocates hoped). DNSSEC has failed.


> DNSSEC has failed.

This is the customary comment by me that this is far from the prevailing view. From my viewpoint, DNSSEC is steadily increasing, both in demand and in amount of domains signed.


Here's .COM and .NET:

https://www.verisign.com/en_US/company-information/verisign-...

Signed domains are increasing where they're done automatically by registrars; where the market has a say, use is declining --- sharply!


As I usually have to point out to you, registrars can’t add DNSSEC to domains. Only DNS server operators can do that. They often have to have the cooperation of the registrar to do it, but not always; sometimes, if the registry supports CDS/CDNSKEY records, the DNS server operator can add DNSSEC all by themselves. And why would DNS server operators add DNSSEC to their domains, unless the domain owners wanted them to?


I'm really not interested in whatever technicality you're trying to argue here. I'm talking about whatever words you want to use for this phenomenon:

https://www.sidn.nl/en/modern-internet-standards/dnssec

Meanwhile: the graphs I posted in the preceding comment are pretty striking. If you haven't clicked through yet, you should. I've pointed out previous, minor drops in DNSSEC deployment in the US. The current one is not minor.


If you can’t get the technical details right, maybe you should hold your piece; this is a technical discussion. I also think you posted the wrong link.

> The current one is not minor.

Maybe not, but I do not know the cause, and you have not proposed one either. Do you have a theory about what happened in late 2023? We’ll have to see if this trend continues; the graphs you linked do show a slight upward turn right at the end of the graphs.


DANE without DNSSEC isn't a good idea. DoH secures the connection between the user's device and their recursive resolver, but it cannot secure the connection between the recursive resolver and the authoritative name servers. If you're using DANE you need a stronger guarantee that the records are valid.




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