Early U.S. and Nato intelligence on Russia's intent and mobilisations leading up to the 2022 invasion of Ukraine made clear the overwhelming effectiveness of these capabilities. I've commented on this previously: <https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=31480538>
The flat-footedness of Russia's response to the nearly two-week-long incursion of Ukrainian forces into the Kursk region of Russia speaks to exceedingly poor capabilities or utilisation of remote-sensing, signals, and human intelligence by Russia.
From a discussion elsewhere, apparently Russia's surveillance satellite resources are limited and highly aged, which may explain at least part of its poor showing here.
Whatever the quantity and quality of Russia's satellite surveillance systems - most of their worst intelligence failures in this war suggest that their chain of command is very high-impedance for transmitting unwelcome intelligence up to the top.
That is a very common problem in well-entrenched autocracies, especially in closed and censorious societies.
(Also, here in late 2024, I suspect that most of "Russia's" satellite intel capability is actually "friendly Chinese" satellite intel capability. Which has its own set of issues - starting with China's wanting to avoid an actual Russian victory, and ending with Putin's emotions about dependence on China's self-serving charity.)
The flat-footedness of Russia's response to the nearly two-week-long incursion of Ukrainian forces into the Kursk region of Russia speaks to exceedingly poor capabilities or utilisation of remote-sensing, signals, and human intelligence by Russia.
From a discussion elsewhere, apparently Russia's surveillance satellite resources are limited and highly aged, which may explain at least part of its poor showing here.