That's easy: OpenBSD pioneered OS-wide dragnet code audits, and also an ethos of minimally-invasive, parsimonious OS security features (PID randomization and syscall pinning are two emblematic examples). The rest of the world caught up to OpenBSD on dragnet audits, and then surpassed it; meanwhile, the OpenBSD ethos of minimal, modest security features was probably less effective than the Linux approach of features that bend the whole universe around security challenges or that thread deeply through the operating system.
More than anything else though, it's not so much that OpenBSD is less resilient than Linux (I think a case could be made), and more that OpenBSD isn't materially more secure.
They should have killed the "only N K holes in Z time" tagline a long time ago.
More than anything else though, it's not so much that OpenBSD is less resilient than Linux (I think a case could be made), and more that OpenBSD isn't materially more secure.
They should have killed the "only N K holes in Z time" tagline a long time ago.