I do science. When I was younger, I devoured philosophy treatises, law reviews, and political science books. I still find it fun, but I lost the passion for it. However, I disagree strongly with this article in his characterization of philosophers.
I haven't left philosophy because everyone in it is stupid, as this article seems to suggest. I left philosophy because after all my reading, note-taking, class-discussioning, and debate tournamenting, I never felt like I'd made any progress, and that mattered to me personally. At the end of the day, the questions that were hard to answer were still unsolved, and the gray ethical areas were still gray. This is why I don't do philosophy, and I why I found the science bug. Not because philosophy lacks rigor or reasonable investigators.
In philosophy, real answers are difficult to find and prove, but in math and science, even though every answer brings 10 new questions, you can look back and say: I proved that theorem, I empirically verified the acceleration of the earth.
To quote my favorite xkcd T-shirt "Science, it works, bitches!". Most scientists I know that disregard philosophy do so because science gives them a feeling of getting somewhere, while philosophy, even at its most rigorous, just seems to leave them more confused than when they started. It's more of a personal preference for that kind of investigation than any rejection of the intelligence of a large group of people.
I agree with all of the above. Except there are isolated cases of philosophy actually pushing forward the frontiers of knowledge. Arguably Russell & Whitehead did in the Principia Mathematica, which attempted to put the foundation of mathematics in terms of logic. That system is the system where Godel found a paradox, which lead to Godels theorems. I'm sure Turing had it in the back of his mind that the Turing machine was a useful way of reasoning about those propositions which are 'true and provable'. Russell/Whitehead --> Godel --> Turing.
Another area where there have arguably been successes (even through failure), is in the attempts to formalise natural languages into logic (Frege, Russell, Wittgenstein). This is the tradition that informed Chomsky, whose theories of grammar inform modern compiler design.
There are philosophers alive that I believe have advanced the frontier of knowledge, but as with some areas of pure mathematics it's hard to say practically what that means. I have in mind Kripke.
it's more like philosophy is the dumping ground for stuff that we don't understand well enough to formalize and place in its own little box. that means that it changes with time.
so there was a point when foundational issues in maths and logic were philosophy. the importance of frege, and then later peano, russel, etc, is that they were the ones that found a way to attack that set of problems, letting us isolate a chunk of knowledge as logic, set theory, etc.
a similar process is probably happening now with consciousness - we're starting to develop the tools to answer questions that are currently "philosophical".
Exactly. Claiming that Philosophy never answers anything makes one hell of a selection bias. When Philosophy answers something, it ceases to be Philosophy.
"Without mathematics we cannot penetrate deeply into philosophy.
Without philosophy we cannot penetrate deeply into mathematics.
Without both we cannot penetrate deeply into anything." _ Leibniz
There is mathematics in it, but it's not just mathematics; it was originated, and is still used in areas like AI, as an attempt to formalize thought, i.e. a kind of formal philosophy. A good portion of the foundational work was done by philosophers (e.g. Frege, Russell), and a lot of current work (especially in modal logic) is done by philosophers as well.
Usually logic is considered part of mathematics. However, in an important sense, logic precedes mathematics. You can't do mathematics without using logic.
Many have, take the sort of mathematics done in order to understand physics. Logic is the study of formal reasoning. Mathematics is the study of form and structure. It took R&W's Principia Mathematica to attempt to show that the entirety of mathematics was rested on a logical foundation. That's pretty recent on the scene if you think about the history of mathematics! To me, the idea you expressed, seems like a very 20th century thing.
Unless you are a true original in every sphere, then we can make a reasonable guess that the majority of what you believe lies within the known sets of human beliefs. Then from observing your actions and reactions to stimuli, (ie, your interaction on this board), we could extrapolate from there and make a reasonable guess on your beliefs on a wide variety of subjects. It won't be absolutely correct, obviously, but it won't be a complete shot in the dark either.
> I haven't left philosophy because everyone in it is stupid, as this article seems to suggest. I left philosophy because after all my reading, note-taking, class-discussioning, and debate tournamenting, I never felt like I'd made any progress, and that mattered to me personally. At the end of the day, the questions that were hard to answer were still unsolved, and the gray ethical areas were still gray. This is why I don't do philosophy, and I why I found the science bug.
I get your point, but for all intents and purposes that's one of the things that makes philosophy great, i.e. the fact that Heraclitus's sayings are as actual today as they were 2,500 years ago. You'll also have to agree that deciding once and for all (or "proving" by scientific means) what makes as taking "moral" decisions, or if "morals" even exist at all, or what makes us not kill each other once we've stopped believing in gods etc., is better left "unresolved", because this "philosophical quest" is what makes us humans.
Asking a fundamental question is simple. It's the answers that are hard, just like in science. Go back to the pre-Socratics and you can find questions that are clear precursors to modern questions in science about things like causality, block time, the nature of matter or consciousness. We're still trying to find out. We've gotten unbelievably better and we still don't have firm answers. Philosophers throughout history posed questions that at the time science didn't have the capability to answer, but was able to narrow down the possibilities simply by carefully analyzing the question, producing thought experiments, etc. This cut the workload down for science tremendously by eliminating red herrings and logical impossibilities, and in turn science answered questions through testing of the physical world that philosophy could not, thereby narrowing the workload of philosophy. (I see this very prominently in the theory of Mind.) Science and Philosophy are often complementary practices.
I also think philosophy can help science in areas that do affect us but are probably untestable. I remember reading some work in primitivism that speculates that the introduction of the clock, and its conception of time, to humanity fundamentally changed the nature of consciousness. People literally thought differently before the clock became common. If this is true, it has ramifications for how we understand the past and things that people did in it that affect us today. So maybe philosophy helps us with questions of history in a way that science (at least currently, at least in my conception) cannot.
If the point isn't to "improve" but for each generation of humans to keep asking the same questions and to live with their own answers, what's wrong with not "improving"?
"Of philosophy I will say nothing, except that when I saw that it had been cultivated for many ages by the most distinguished men, and that yet there is not a single matter within its sphere which is not still in dispute,..." (Descartes, 1637)
Philosophy is about posing new questions, not providing answers. It's about imagination more than it's about deduction. Of course, in the same manner that math teachers emphasize deriving proofs rather than crafting new mathematical constructs as the fundamental activity of mathematicians, people who teach philosophy emphasize philosophical argument over opening up new frontiers of discourse as the fundamental activity of philosophers. As a result, students come to perceive philosophy as pointless.
Philosophy is about posing new questions, not providing answers.
I'm increasingly under the impression that philosophy is "about" whatever the individual philosopher or reader or writer wants it to be about, and that a lot of philosophers really like arguing about what philosophy is about. Granted, this comes mostly from sporadic reading in the field and from listening to Philosophy Bites, but the combination has still made me increasingly skeptical of explanations about what philosophy is about.
"Most scientists I know that disregard philosophy do so because science gives them a feeling of getting somewhere, while philosophy, even at its most rigorous, just seems to leave them more confused than when they started."
The things you dislike about philosophy are exactly the things that make it so useful, and the things you like about science are the reasons why most (if not all) of it is ultimately illusory.
Science is downstream from philosophy, and behind any given scientific paradigm there are dozens if not hundreds of philosophical assumptions. This means that if philosophy has taught us essentially nothing, then most likely science has taught us several orders of magnitude less than essentially nothing.
Modern science as it exists today is basically a quasi-religious system that is more or less the next version of alchemy in terms of its intellectual heritage. It's clear to me that in a couple hundred years we'll probably look back on the science of today the same way that most people today look at alchemy. Already research investigating the truth of the spiritual underpinnings of science is one of the hottest areas of research, and you can't go more than a couple weeks without seeing some new finding or treatise. It's only going to be so long before all of these disparate parts get organized into a cohesive whole that's convincing enough to undermine the current establishment.
> Modern science as it exists today is basically a quasi-religious system
No. This is simply wrong on a factual level. Science doesn't have dogma. It isn't religion. See? Your ideas fail because you don't have the facts you need to form good ideas.
> It's clear to me that in a couple hundred years we'll probably look back on the science of today the same way that most people today look at alchemy.
To the extent we do, it will be because of advances in science. Science replaces its own ideas (that is, in fact, the exact opposite of dogma) using evidence and sound mathematical logic, which is why that happens. Trying to use science to prove the weakness of science is a wonderful indication that you haven't the faintest clue what you're talking about.
That's simply false. If you don't believe that science has dogma, open up the first chapter of nearly every biology textbook. Most of them start out by discussing the dogma of science, which is roughly as follows:
- We live in a materialist universe.
- There exists nothing magical or supernatural.
- All phenomena are in principle understandable by humans.
- The scientific method is how we can understand the universe.
There are many other assumptions behind science as well, but these are the ones that most textbooks usually enumerate explicitly. Being assumptions, none of them are provable. And in fact there is good reason to believe that many (or all) of them are wrong, which would essentially make all of scientific knowledge wrong as well. And while specific scientific results are at least in theory subject to being replaced, these general principles are considered sacred and unchallengable.
Science is a religion just like any other. And if you actually look at the principles I listed, they actually look a lot like the four noble truths of buddhism. Different content, but still religious just the same.
I've never seen quotes like that. Which is not to say they're not the opinion of the authors.
But it's not dogma, it's precision. Strong opinions weakly held as they say. Or more like working assumptions.
> Most of them start out by discussing the dogma of science, which is roughly as follows:
They aren't dogma. They can be refuted with sufficient evidence. The failure of the religious to provide such evidence means they haven't yet been refuted. (It also says nasty things about the religious, but propriety forbids me from being more specific.)
> there is good reason to believe that many (or all) of them are wrong
What reasons? Be precise enough and you get a Nobel Prize and eternal adulation.
> they actually look a lot like the four noble truths of buddhism
Only to someone who totally misunderstands both science and Buddhism.
Except for that they can't, because everyone who believes in science just says that the reason they believe that science will be able to explain everything is that it has explained everything so far. This is just begging the question, and it's clear that no matter how much evidence there is that there are some things that science can't explain these will just be written off by those who have 'faith' in science. You can go over to r/science or r/atheism and find literally thousands of examples of this.
>What reasons? Be precise enough and you get a Nobel Prize and eternal adulation.
The obvious one would be that there is absolutely nothing to suggest that consciousness is material in nature. But again, the true believers refute this by listing all the other things that we didn't understand until science came up with some explanation, and saying that therefor science will most likely also be able to explain consciousness one day.
> This is just begging the question, and it's clear that no matter how much evidence there is that there are some things that science can't explain these will just be written off by those who have 'faith' in science.
You don't have any examples of this in this post, though.
> there is absolutely nothing to suggest that consciousness is material in nature
Wrong. The existence of psychoactive drugs and the effectiveness of fMRI scans disproves this statement.
EDITED TO ADD: What evidence would make you change your mind about this statement in particular?
The question in philosophy is "how does consciousness arise from the physical?" While you can claim it's due to some complex interaction in our brains, and while we have significant evidence that this is the case, I don't think that answers the question. Philosophers want to know the mechanism which produces the experience. Arguing that consciousness (or experience) is physical is a tough thing to do from first principles because of our own intuitive sense of it.
For example, how is it that the electrical signals in our brains produce "us" while electrical signals in other things don't produce conscious things? How are they different? What would it take to make a circuit "conscious"?
I can't give you good definitions for consciousness or experience and I can't even say that the question(s) make(s) sense. I'm just trying to give you give you a picture of what some people think.
I think philosophy is a worthy pursuit for a scientist. It's easy to get a feeling of going somewhere with science, because someone else has done a lot of thinking for you making you comfortable with your result. But if you leave philosophy more confused than when you started, you won't have the mental fortitude to make real progress in science. I think philosophy is ultimately the study of human thought. It's why courses on logic are an important component of undergraduate studies in philosophy. Having a good understanding of human thought, how we come to the decisions we make and how we fool ourselves with lazy thought, is invaluable in making deep scientific discoveries. When you don't come away more confused, but with a deeper understanding, you are better prepared to understand the why, instead of just accepting the how. You would know why science works, instead of making snarky remarks about science and that it works.
If you really think about it, the situation in science, that the questions that were hard to answer were still unsolved, is very similar to the situation in philosophy. Ask anyone what an electric field really is. No one knows.
So, I'm a scientist. And I'm skeptical of the utility of a good portion of philosophy for science. But this is a... really ignorant post. It's not even wrong. Just... incoherent, and clearly unfamiliar with the subject it discusses.
He seems to be attacking something called "philosophy", first of all, but the targets are some kind of randomly thrown set of darts. Some analytic philosophers discussing probability in a way he doesn't like. The famous Sokal hoax, which trolled a French-influenced American social-theory journal (which incidentally lived in literature departments more than philosophy departments, and was intensely disliked by American philosophers). Just some general rambling. Why is this interesting? It feels like something an undergrad would cobble together off Wikipedia, an "understand and then denounce philosophy in 90 minutes" essay.
Does he realize that Alan Sokal, who he seems to like, is actually in favor of philosophy, but is against one particular current in philosophy, which his intervention is intended to diminish? He seems to group Sokal in with both the people Sokal opposes, and the people he supports! How does this make any sense at all? Heck, Sokal likes more philosophers, too: Marx, for example, is on his good list (Sokal is a leftist, fighting something of a civil war in favor of 'Old Left' economics/materialist-focused leftism, against cultural-theory/identity leftism).
Because it's an opportunity to explain, in accessible terms in an accessible forum (that is, as opposed to an article that costs five figures per year and uses words like "hermeneutics" without defining them), what value philosophy brings to science and understanding the real world.
I wouldn't expect philosophy of science to be of much practical value to working scientists. Non-scientists, on the other hand, can benefit a great deal from rigorous analysis of the tools, methods and procedures of the sciences, if for no other reason than to dissolve some of the film of invincibility that attaches to them.
Of course there are as many quacks doing philosophy of science as there are doing science proper, so choice of texts is important. You can't condemn all philosophy of science based on a handful of publications (note the selection bias in the article) any more than you can condemn all science based on, say, the MMR vaccine controversy[1].
1. And while we're on the subject of hoaxes, let's just put the whole Sokal affair to bed, shall we? Social Text was an insignificant and unrefereed journal, but even if Sokal had managed to place something in The Philosophical Review, that wouldn't have, as the author put it, "exposed the astonishing intellectual fraud if [sic] postmodernism." Unless the significant number of even more damaging hoaxes perpetrated on science journals have exposed the astonishing intellectual fraud of science?
I like the general thrust of your comment, but can you demonstrate that Social Text was insignificant? At the time of the hoax I asked some lit and art history grad student pals and I'm pretty sure they thought it was notable in some neck of the academic woods.
The difference with the Sokal Hoax is that it cuts to the core of what philosophers do: Whereas science has practical, tangible results to show, such as the polio vaccine, all philosophy has is thoughts and ideas, which the Sokal Hoax assaults very directly.
Philosophy most certainly does have tangible results to show, for instance: modern democracy, the scientific establishment itself, the various international bodies that enforce civil rights, and the modern field of psychology. If you go far enough back, philosophy gave birth to all intellectual forms of knowledge, which in turn greatly influence all aspects of our society.
This got me thinking: what tangible results have arisen from current philosophy, that is, philosophy we've seen in the last, say, 20 years?
> philosophy gave birth to all intellectual forms of knowledge
I think this is an utterly unsupportable claim unless you're willing to simply define philosophy as encompassing all other forms of intellectual pursuit. Intellectual knowledge (whatever that means) existed long before the Rig Veda and Socrates.
An easy example is modern activist tactics, i.e. Seattle and Occupy Wall Street. Another hackneyed example is Israeli military tactics, which have been said to have been influenced by writings of Gilles Deleuze.
Above and beyond specific examples, it's important to note that world affairs are influenced considerably by people in positions of power. Such people tend to be well educated, which often means they've been exposed to and influenced by contemporary philosophy. For instance there is a large body of work on international politics. I don't think it's too much to assume that policy-makers at that level have some knowledge of current discourse in the field. For instance the debate about whether a world government would be a good thing.
It depends on what you mean by tangible. You're meaning here seems to be something like "having a direct impact on the physical sciences", a very limited question considering the breadth of the topics covered by philosophy but certainly the answer even in this limited context is more than zero tangible results. Much research in artificial intelligence and machine learning is directly inspired by philosophy and has been since the beginning, so that would be a great area to start in. There has also been much work in the philosophy of language, science, mathematics, ontology and other branches of metaphysics, politics, aesthetics if you're willing to broaden your criteria for tangibility.
I'm defining philosophy very broadly as written, systematic knowledge in the West. All major branches of knowledge where once subsumed by the title "philosophy". For instance, what we know of as science was previously called "natural philosophy". What we now know as "political theory" was once indistinguishable from "philosophy". And political science is a combination of the latter forms of the two. It began with this: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trivium_(education)
Meh. By that definition, what we now know know as philosophy is not what used to be philosophy. By the same tack, I could define "hot dogs" as all written, systematic knowledge in the West, and thus claim that hot dogs predated all intellectual pursuits.
Seeking tangible results shouldn't be the goal of philosophy. Philosophy is not about tangible results. At its core, it's about thinking clearly.
It's my opinion that if scientists today had a better grasp of philosophy, then the string theorists and researchers studying dark matter would have come up with tangible results already, either by changing their models to actually make predictions, or dumping their models altogether and study alternatives. They would have tangible results instead of always being surprised that we can't find dark matter or surprised that new particles weren't produced at a given collider. Instead of demanding that larger and larger colliders be built, they would reflect on the models they have and attack the weaknesses. Instead of making increasingly sensitive instruments to find interactions between detectors and dark matter that might not even be there, they would give more serious considerations to alternate theories of gravity.
Philosophy of Science is an extremely broad field. And like any academic field it's easy enough to find crazy stuff at the edges.
I do think far more scientists would benefit from a bit more of a look at some of the more established philosophers of the last century. It seems that most gained some knowledge of Popper but nowhere near enough people are really familiar with Kuhn's work(http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/thomas-kuhn/). Taking the time to think critically about what you're doing and what it would really take to change your views is critical to actually being open to broad possibilities.
I do think there's a bit of a glass-house problem: finding scientists doing not-great philosophy is not hard. (It's perfectly fine, of course, for one to be ignorant of the other if they aren't trying to do the other one; nobody can do everything.)
Theoretical physicists are particularly prone to lapsing, in later career, into armchair philosophy without bothering to actually read anything in philosophy of the past 100 years. That tends, unfortunately, to result in them producing philosophy that has flashes of insight mixed with stuff that could be a lot better if only they had read some of the existing literature, and addressed the obvious problems with some of the standard positions (which too often they reinvent).
Of course, philosophers could understand more science too, but I actually think there is more effort being made in that direction: philosophy of science programs are increasingly requiring substantial amounts of technical coursework, and it's a huge plus, for advancement, if you publish at least a few articles in technical journals, too. But in the other direction, there might actually be less philosophy instruction in science programs than there was 100 years ago now (surface-level understandings of Popperian falsificationism seem to be about as far as anyone gets, including my own formal education it must be said). This seems like a recent affliction, too: the early-20th-c scientists (Einstein, Bohr, etc.) were actually quite well-read in the relevant parts of philosophy. Heck, folks like Alan Turing published in peer-reviewed philosophy journals.
There is a meme going around groups aligned with the rationality movement, asserting that there's a hierarchy of worth in academic disciplines. Basically, the hard sciences are worth more, and the harder the science, the more it's worth.
Philosophy is near the bottom of this hierarchy, though some of the products of philosophy are deemed to be valuable. (Basically it's an evaluation of Signal to Noise ratios, more than a declaration of absolute worth across the discipline.)
By what mechanism did you conclude that random controlled trials are more trustworthy than observational studies? Does that mechanism more closely resemble an observational study or a random controlled trial?
There is a lot of extra rigor in a random controlled study than an observational study because it is harder to "cook up data" to support the scientists own beliefs. This may even happen unconsciously.
I believe the point was a meta one: when arguing in favor of studies with randomized controls, do you make the argument by setting up a randomized controlled study to test the superiority of randomized controlled studies? If the only things worth paying attention to are the results of randomized controlled studies, then that's the only possible way you could consistently argue in favor of them.
Instead, it seems more common to establish the "ground rules" of science by some other means, such as arguments about the pros/cons of various scientific methodologies, or even what counts as "scientific methodology" at all (and at this point, you're doing philosophy of science).
Many who choose to use Sokal to highlight their point seem to be unaware that Science has had it's own reverse-Sokal with the Bogdanov affair: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bogdanov_Affair
So basically, he dismissed philosophy as irrelevant, then happened across some obscure papers by cranks at the margins of philosophic thought, and concluded that he was right all along. Unenlightening.
"It may be asked why it is even worth spending time on these remnants of the utterly discredited postmodernist movement."
This is just so ignorant and backward that I have a hard time taking the author of this article seriously. There is no "postmodernist movement". The term refers to a hopelessly large field of practices. Most great so-called "postmodernist" theorists typically have not referred to themselves as such.
If you want to discredit theorists who have been critical of scientific practices, you need to put down the Sokal and actually engage with specific works. You might be surprised to find that many of these "postmodernists" are either trained scientists or actually know what they're talking about. Just a few suggestions if you want to dip your toes in the water:
– Gilles Deleuze wrote powerfully on metaphysics, integrating many incites from mathematics in the 60's and 70's: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deleuze#Metaphysics Check out "Difference and Repetition".
– Bruno Latour in a the domain of Science and Technology Studies has written voluminously about scientific and technological practices from a more anthropological point of view: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bruno_Latour#Biography
– Isabelle Stengers has written something more along the lines of what's critiqued in this article, a critique of the authority of science in society: http://www.amazon.com/Cosmopolitics-I-Posthumanities-Isabell... – works like this question whether the privileging of science over all other forms of knowledge is good for society. This particular work argues that it is not.
A general note about so-called "postmodernism". The Wikipedia definition includes the following:
"Postmodernism is largely a reaction to the assumed certainty of scientific or objective efforts to explain reality. In essence, it is based on the position that reality is not mirrored in human understanding of it, but is rather constructed as the mind tries to understand its own personal reality."
It's important to understand that "postmodernism" isn't critiquing the effectiveness of science. It is merely claiming that, as it says, reality is not mirrored in human understanding. The models we create to explain observed phenomena are not direct reflections of reality, they are simply characteristically human, linguistic models that correspond to our observations. As Niels Bohr wrote:
"There is no quantum world. There is only an abstract physical description. It is wrong to think that the task of physics is to find out how nature is. Physics concerns what we can say about nature..."
The question is whether our habit of elevating scientific explanation to the 'one true truth' is (1) right and (2) a good thing. Most "postmodernists" argue that other forms of knowledge are perfectly legitimate (for instance, indigenous people who still live tribally lead perfectly happy lives without science) and that the privileging of science over other forms of knowledge is not a unilaterally good thing (for instance, it is reasonable to say there's a decent change that we will extinguish ourselves as a species in the next hundred years thanks to the exploits of scientifically advanced societies).
You may notice that both of those examples are anthropological. This hints at something very important about "postmodernism". When people talk about "postmodernism", they're often talking about "post-structuralism", which is another hopelessly broad category referring to theory that in some way extends "structuralism", which is in turn closely connected to the theories of Claude Lévi-Strauss, the "father of modern anthropology". "Postmodernism" can be seen in this sense to be a kind of anthropologically informed philosophy. Rather than creating theoretically sound abstract models, they look at how those models actually play out "in the field" and draw conclusions. Hence the critique of science: despite the power of scientific explanation, it may not necessarily result in a better society and indeed the evidence shows that it does not.
And one final point, the author is totally wrong to claim that scientists have not been concerned with the philosophy of science. Many early twentieth century scientists – the ones who create the theory of relatively and quantum physics especially – even wrote books on the philosophy of science as well as its role in society. Some examples:
– Herman Weyl ("His overall approach in physics was based on the phenomenological philosophy of Edmund Husserl, specifically Husserl's 1913 Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie. Erstes Buch: Allgemeine Einführung in die reine Phänomenologie"): http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hermann_Weyl
Thanks for your defence of recent works around the philosophy of science, I am genuinely surprised to find one on HN. One small book I liked that I would add is "predire n'est pas expliquer" from Rene Thom.
I don't get the mistrust of philosophy from many scientifically-inclined people. I find it especially sad that most people stopped at the falsifiability concept and don't go beyond.
Oh, I forgot to add that probably my favorite "post-structuralist" author is Manuel DeLanda, who actually quit his job as a hacker to become a philosopher. He does a great job of making Deleuze's work more clear and his own work is fascinating: http://www.amazon.com/s/ref=nb_sb_noss_1?url=search-alias%3D...
"A Thousand Years of Nonlinear History" looks at the past thousand years in terms of the kinds of material processes that occurred (at all levels from geological to political) with reference to theories from dynamics. DeLanda generally continues the project that Deleuze started of taking insight from modern science and applying it to philosophical problems.
If you want to discredit theorists who have been critical of scientific practices, you need to put down the Sokal and actually engage with specific works.
NB: I'm completely ignorant in this realm.
I thought one of the key points of "Impostures Intellectuelles" was that it defined the group of criticized "postmodernists" and referenced specific essays and papers?
I've read at least an article that they wrote and all they did was take some quotes out of context and show how they were scientifically inaccurate when they seemed to me to be metaphorical from the start. I can't speak for the book, however.
Exactly. If scientist were not concerned with the philosophy of science, they would not come up with different interpretations of quantum mechanics. There would just be quantum mechanics, and there wouldn't be the Copenhagen Interpretation, many worlds, pilot waves, etc.
The Niels Bohr quote drives this point home. Physics (and science in general) concerns itself with descriptions of nature. When scientists start to ask why, start to make interpretations of quantum mechanics, start to ask what came before the big bang, start to ask why there is something rather than nothing, that is when philosophy becomes central.
Multiple interpretations can also be useful purely as a pedagogical tool though. Using a range of metaphors to tell stories around some formal concept can make it easier to communicate and understand.
That's not to say you should assume every mathematician who communicates their ideas as though the objects 'exist' in some objective sense is a platonist, or that any scientist who talks implicitly about truth when communicating about their work, is committed to a strong philosophical stance on the matter. It can be just a habit one gets into when trying to communicate.
No doubt some philosophical remarks could be made about this too, not that I'm qualified...
> The question is whether our habit of elevating scientific explanation to the 'one true truth'
This is a complete strawman and nobody who understands science could take this idea seriously. In fact, I dare you to ask a working scientist whether they're after 'Truth'.
If you think there are no scientists who believe they are getting closer and closer to outlining what nature fundamentally, truly looks like, then you are sadly mistaking. Philosophy-savvy scientists may even deny doing so, but their day-to-day conversation and casual remarks tell another story. Most scientists definitely believe there is a single absolute unshifting reality below it all and they are outlining it.
Edit: and I should add that most non-scientists also believe the same thing. In fact, I often catch myself depending on that hypothesis, even though I thoroughly believe it is wrong.
> Philosophy-savvy scientists may even deny doing so, but their day-to-day conversation and casual remarks tell another story. Most scientists definitely believe there is a single absolute unshifting reality below it all and they are outlining it.
> It is then unnecessary to investigate whether there be beyond the heaven Space, Void or Time. For there is a single general space, a single vast immensity which we may freely call Void; in it are innumerable globes like this one on which we live and grow. This space we declare to be infinite, since neither reason, convenience, possibility, sense-perception nor nature assign to it a limit. In it are an infinity of worlds of the same kind as our own.
I think we can easily extrapolate an "infinity of worlds" to an "infinity of Universes/realities", or at least we can think about extrapolating, that's what philosophy was the first to do. Actually, I think Giordano Bruno would be seen as a lunatic by most of today's scientists, which I find it even more sad.
It's not a straw man, it's hyperbole. What I mean to suggest is not that people actually believe that any other form of knowledge is completely untrue. It's a matter of the relative importance of science compared to other ways of knowing. Scientific medicine vs. other traditions is a great example. Many people seem to have that attitude that if something has not be scientifically shown to be effective, then it cannot be effective, thus implying that scientific medicine is "the one truth" about healing.
A strawman of who exactly? Of the Christian scientists that believe in one true world as created by God? Of the Platonist scientists that believe in the one true essence of things? Of the reductionist scientists, that believe everything is reducible to the fundamental properties of the fundamental particles? Or of the small minority of scientists that do without a belief in one true underlying reality?
Do you actually know any scientists, as you so pointedly asked someone else?
Modern philosophy is largely ignored by science and scientists because it has nothing to offer but endless questions and debates, unresolveable paradoxes and pointless inquiry into the modern day equivalent of how many angels can dance on the head of a pin. Who needs it?
Unfortunately, science needs a rational philosophy now more than ever. Under the influence of Kant and his derivatives like Popper that dominate the modern universities, the fundamentals of science such as identity, causality, knowledge, logic and proof are being undercut and destroyed by the very sciences that use and need these concepts. Tragically, the scientists are distainful of modern philosophy (for good reason) but make the mistake of reject all philosophy, and are thus throwing the baby out with the bath water.
For anyone with a serious interest in these issues I recommend that you read Ayn Rand's "Philosophy: Who Needs It" and her "Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology". In the former book, her answer is that everyone needs a philosophy because it is the science of fundamentals that apply to everyone and all sciences.
For myself, I can't really say. What I can say was that reading The Fountainhead was a truly dreadful experience. I hope that I never live in a world where people live their lives like Howard Roark does.
There are at least a few cases where philosophy influenced science in a major way, so while I understand some of the reasons scientists might get tired of philosophy, I don't think it's valid to dismiss its contributions entirely. For an example, here is Einstein in a letter on his discovery of relativity (http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/2149/):
Your exposition is also quite right that positivism suggested relativity theory, without requiring it. Also you have correctly seen that this line of thought was of great influence on my efforts and indeed E. Mach and still much more Hume, whose treatise on understanding I studied with eagerness and admiration shortly before finding relativity theory.
Not really sure a guy whose exposure to "philosophy" apparently consists of awareness of a single writer is prepared to weigh in on the legitimacy of a field as old as civilization. But admittedly I haven't done a RCT to confirm this.
Can we have a variation that is something like: you have read even a modest amount on it? I'm not a philosopher, and my philosophical knowledge amounts to having taken 3 courses in undergrad (as electives while getting a CS degree), one in grad school (same), and reading a scattered set of books and blogs that interest me. I wouldn't consider myself qualified to opine on Philosophy In General. Yet, this blog post seems to be by someone who knows less about philosophy than I do, yet is more confident in his opinion to give a sweeping judgment of it. That's sort of impressive, but doesn't give me a lot of confidence that I'm receiving well-informed opinions.
Actually, that seems like a logical critique in any field. If someone who clearly had read only a handful of things about quantum physics holds forth on why quantum physics is bullshit, it would be a good heuristic to assume that they probably don't know enough to make that judgment, and maybe they should learn some quantum physics first.
If you're going to condemn a whole field, I think you have to be able to demonstrate that you have a reasonably broad understanding of the field.
If somebody says they hate vegetables but their experience is limited to one attempt to eat creamed spinach in 1985, it's not a fallacy to say they don't know what they're talking about.
I know where you are going, but your example isn't particularly useful. If someone says that they hate vegetables, then they hate vegetables, regardless of whether their vegetable-eating experience is limited.
Not quite. They hate their idea of vegetables. They don't have any idea whether they actually hate actually eating actual vegetables, because they've never really done it.
Similarly, this guy is welcome to hate his impoverished notion of philosophy, but it shouldn't be mistaken for somebody actually hating philosophy.
Hate is a subjective term and describes a feeling, not an objective fact. You are correct in that the author is wrong in that scientists should ignore philosophy based on his limited and ignorant article, but you are incorrect that his feelings towards philosophy is not one of hatred.
Put it this way: I can hate that which I have never experienced. I've never been raped, but I definitely hate it!
The feeling is indeed subjective. I'm not denying the hatred. I'm saying that they misunderstand the object of their hatred, confusing their cartoon notion of vegetables with the actual world of experiences that you have eating vegetables.
The may be speaking the truth when they say "I hate vegetables", but the implication that they won't like eating them doesn't logically follow because they don't actually know.
Spend time around small children and you see this pattern all the time. "I hate it!" "You haven't tried it. Here, try this." "That's good! Can I have more?"
I have two small children of my own, so I know the behaviour :-) None of what you say negates the fact that at the point in time that the child says that they hate the thing they hate, they really do. As I say, hatred is a subjective emotion not necessarily informed by objective reason.
I'm not denying the emotion or the words. I'm just saying they're wrong about what they hate, because what they hate isn't what they're saying.
If I say I hate you and your lying ways, the hate is real whether or not you've lied. But if you've never lied, then I'm not actually hating anything real, just my false idea of a real thing. I literally don't know what I'm talking about.
And now I think we've demonstrated why people hate philosophers.
Sure, they can be wrong about that, but up till that point their feeling is that they hate them. Hatred is not necessarily a permanent state.
Incidentally, I neither bungled anything, nor am I playing word games, nor have I been "trained in philosophy". I thought most people knew that hatred is an emotion, that emotions can be based on subjective perception and that perceptions can change over time.
"I hate vegetables" doesn't mean "I am seething mad at vegetables right now." As for my other comment, it was a cheap shot but I couldn't resist. Sorry :).
Indeed, "Hatred" doesn't meaning seething mad. It means "a feeling of intense dislike; enmity"; if you "hate" vegetables it doesn't mean you are angry at them but rather at that point in time you have an intense dislike of them. Note that at a later date this can change to enmity's polar opposite, love.
The point being, is that hate is a subjective emotion, often based on perceptions that are not fully informed. To hate something you don't need to fully understand or know everything about the subject of the hatred. Witness Hitler and the Jews (I feel that this is an appropriate metaphor to allow someone to invoke Godwin's law so I can stop talking hatred towards innocent vegetables!)
The point is that to me, there is a difference between "I hate my boss" and "I hate vegetables." If I go out drinking with my boss and determine he's not that bad, I might express that as "I don't hate him anymore." If I try several new kinds of vegetables and determine that I like them, I wouldn't say "I no longer hate them" but rather "I was wrong - there are some I like."
This is because "I hate vegetables" doesn't mean I'm feeling something in the same way "I hate my boss" does. Again, what it really means is "if I eat a vegetable, I will not enjoy it."
The argument is that science largely ignores philosophy. He almost solely quotes postmoderism for his argument (though he does mention Popper). Yet philosophy is so much large than just postmodernism. Ergo, solely judging philosophy from the tenants and postulations of postmodernism is not a sound argument.
Are we to regard Ethics as irrelevant? Logic? Aesthetics? Epistemology? Metaphysics? These are the five branches of philosophy.
I majored in Computer Science and have a minor in Philosophy. I consider philosophy the most important element of my life, and the lives of everyone else, often unknowingly. I see philosophy all the time on Hacker News and elsewhere. What do you call debates over law, for instance? Are those scientific? No, those are philosophy. So much of what humans do is philosophy that to suggest they do not participate in it because they aren't talking in "academic" terms is simply inaccurate.
So he says at the start he dismissed the best philosopher in the field, Karl Popper, without reading him.
Maybe most scientists ignore Popper's philosophy of science (the only worthwhile one) because they are ignorant and judge which philosophy to read by inaccurate reputation rather than merit.
Though bear in mind, quite a few scientists, big and small, did not ignore Popper and actually liked his ideas and found them helpful. E.g. Richard Feynman, David Deutsch, and Albert Einstein.
Popper's great. Your reference to Feynman, however, reminded me of this classic qip:
“Philosophy of science is about as useful to scientists as ornithology is to birds.” ― Richard P. Feynman
I'm aware of that Feynman quote. But he apparently had in mind typical philosophers as he did read and understand Popper.
Here's a quote from David Deutsch (correcting someone who claimed that Feynman had never heard of Popper):
> For what it's worth, I happened to mention Popper in the one conversation I had with Feynman, sometime in the 80s, and he did not say "who's that?" but replied meaningfully to the point.
I know Deutsch and have heard the full story. Feynman showed substantial understanding of Popper. Plus avoided all the usual epistemological errors.
Feynman may have been introduced to Popper by Wheeler. Here is Deutsch on Wheeler:
> Wheeler ... (my boss and Feynman's thesis advisor and subsequently his collaborator), knew a lot about Popper and was honoured and delighted when Popper quoted one of Wheeler's aphorisms as a chapter epigraph. Wheeler and I discussed Popper in detail on several occasions and I tried to persuade him to become a Popperian -- ultimately without success, because he preferred Polanyi (!). Nevertheless there were specific aspects of Popperian philosophy of science that he very much agreed with, especially that scientific theories are not derived from anywhere, that they are conjectural and full of errors, and that science makes progress by correcting these errors.
What an incredibly uninformed comments thread. Firstly to the main post, of course philosophy isn't ignored by science. Science is an offshoot of philosophy and happily so. It's a ridiculous premise not born out by the article itself.
Secondly, it sounds like several commenters have studied little or no philosophy in an academic setting, and as a result are posting garbage comments based on straw men of their own creation.
Is it hard to take on modern philosophers on their own ground? Is the language they use sometimes confusing to the layman? Is that sometimes frustrating? Sure it is. But that's because they have to shortcut a few thousand years of philosophical reasoning to make the points so that we don't end up in the weeds with every discussion. It's no different (as a trained Physicist myself) to the manner modern Physicists talk about our discipline in ways which are confusing to the layman, because we use cutting edge math to short cut a few thousand years of philosophical reasoning to make their point.
Study any subject to the edge of current thinking and you get to incredible levels of specialism because we've been at academia, as a global civilization, for an awfully long time. Not everything can be boiled down to an elevator pitch.
It may be hot to say people don't need to go to university, and further education is meaningless in the context of startups, but it's not meaningless if you actually want to understand the most advanced thought in areas of academic interest. It might not be the best avenue for most people for most career paths, but if you want to discuss philosophy and science (or as it used to be called Natural Philosophy) then it's probably best done with some kind of solid education in those fields.
I doubt being well versed in philosophy is relevant to most scientists nowadays, at least from a practical standpoint.
As I heard Michel Serres put it a couple years ago : « Today's society produces ignorant technicians and cultivated [put any word describing someone that can't count up to two] » (roughly translated from the original French). And they do fine by it, apparently.
But it is damageable to ignore some fundamentals, from Pythagoras to Descartes (regarding science).
As I think about it, it comes to me that whether philosophy is or isn't necessary isn't relevant.
Empirical necessity doesn't sums up human aspirations, and music or poetry play in the same field.
Philosophy is a way or structuring certain angles of thinking, and that's pretty cool.
As a developer I have absolutely no use of Heidegger or saint Thomas in my activity, but I'm glad they exist.
A lot of people must read Hacker News. My hit rate went up ten-fold and most seem to have come from here, so thanks derleth
I certainly didn't want to offend philosophers. I was merely pointing out that most scientists don't find their ideas very useful in practice. The piece arose as a postscript to a piece "In praise of randomisation". It was in the course of writing that that I discovered the a small (I hope) number of philosophers denied this idea. That does active harm.
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A twitter user, @shanemuk, sent this today. Sums it up nicely.
"What you need to know about #Science, #Philosophy and #Sausages @david_colquhoun - answersingenes.blogspot.co.uk/2011/06/show-m…
This thread made me think of this New Yorker article on the "Decline Effect" which is describes a tendency for the results of scientific experiments (in particular those based on statistical methods) to weaken as experiments are repeated.
As a person with a generally skeptical/pro science bent it truly shocked me.
It highlights the need for understanding the sociology of science, which has huge impacts on its effectiveness.
From the introduction to The Grand Design by Stephen Hawking & Leonard Mlodinow: "Traditionally these are questions for philosophy, but philosophy is dead. Philosophy has not kept up with modern developments in science, particularly physics. Scientists have become the bearers of the torch of discovery in our quest for knowledge"
I haven't left philosophy because everyone in it is stupid, as this article seems to suggest. I left philosophy because after all my reading, note-taking, class-discussioning, and debate tournamenting, I never felt like I'd made any progress, and that mattered to me personally. At the end of the day, the questions that were hard to answer were still unsolved, and the gray ethical areas were still gray. This is why I don't do philosophy, and I why I found the science bug. Not because philosophy lacks rigor or reasonable investigators.
In philosophy, real answers are difficult to find and prove, but in math and science, even though every answer brings 10 new questions, you can look back and say: I proved that theorem, I empirically verified the acceleration of the earth.
To quote my favorite xkcd T-shirt "Science, it works, bitches!". Most scientists I know that disregard philosophy do so because science gives them a feeling of getting somewhere, while philosophy, even at its most rigorous, just seems to leave them more confused than when they started. It's more of a personal preference for that kind of investigation than any rejection of the intelligence of a large group of people.