It's a good point as i'm sure what she was saying is she belives consciousness requires specific neural properties. I am aware of the the ideas around neural chauvanists, but that paper is now almost 40 years old. We know a lot more about the brain since it was written. The idea that the homunculi can perfectly replicate the relevant causal powers of neurons is... questionable at best. It would says distinctive biochemical properties of neurons enable consciousness, which homunculi would lack, and then homunculized, I also don't like the idea that we must attribute consciousness to the homunculized brain unless we accept an implausible cut-off point? Consciousness could be requiring a critical mass of neurons, which could be reached later without each replacement causing incremental fading. The implausibility of a single neuron replacement eliminating consciousness is not a good reason to consider it conscious. imo It's probably still more likley that experiences like an LSD trip require specifically neural underpinnings.
