> this would make crypto/rand basically indistinguishable from math/rand, in which case, sure, why not. :-)
It's closer to the other way around. crypto/rand was not modified in any way, its purpose is to expose the OS's randomness source, and it does that just fine.
math/rand was modified to be harder to confuse with crypto/rand (and thus used inappropriately), as well as to provide a stronger, safer randomness source by default (the default RNG source has much larger state and should be practically impossible to predict from a sample in adversarial contexts).
> I was worried about exhausting the system's entropy pool for no good reason
No good reason indeed: there's no such thing as "exhausting the system's entropy pool", it's a linux myth which even the linux kernel developers have finally abandoned.
It's closer to the other way around. crypto/rand was not modified in any way, its purpose is to expose the OS's randomness source, and it does that just fine.
math/rand was modified to be harder to confuse with crypto/rand (and thus used inappropriately), as well as to provide a stronger, safer randomness source by default (the default RNG source has much larger state and should be practically impossible to predict from a sample in adversarial contexts).
> I was worried about exhausting the system's entropy pool for no good reason
No good reason indeed: there's no such thing as "exhausting the system's entropy pool", it's a linux myth which even the linux kernel developers have finally abandoned.