It is...kind of. But we're talking about severely limiting the ability of insurers to distinguish high risk parties from low risk parties and price accordingly. When the insured parties have limited agency over the risk they present — as with, e.g., health insurance for congenital diseases — this kind of regulation can make sense. But when insured parties can control the risk, such regulation usually makes insurance markets much less efficient. Essentially, it takes away the incentive for insured parties to avoid risky behaviors, creating moral hazard. This is a well-understood mechanism for market failures.
We already have this problem with car insurance in California. In the 1980s, at the tail end of a long series of stupid initiative ballot measures, Californians wrote down that there are only 2 strata of risk: good drivers, and everyone else. "Good Driver" is defined as a person who has had a license for 3 years without killing or injuring anyone. Because of this, California is the only American state where the law requires that a middle-aged person who drives a base model Honda Fit, and a 19-year-old with a Dodge Hellcat who miraculously hasn't killed anyone, yet, that we know of, both get the same "discount". And consequently it is unlawful here to offer those telematics systems that charge less to good drivers and more to bad ones.
I think it needs to also be acknowledged that insurance itself is a moral hazard. Focusing on the "efficiency" and moral hazards of only the insureds is an incomplete analysis.
Insurance is a for-profit enterprise and as an expert told me, "the goal of insurance companies is to not pay claims". It essentially wants to be passive income at the end of the day.
Modern capitalism runs on insurance but should it? Health insurance is a great example: it shouldn't exist, and is unnecessary in single-payer systems. Car insurance is another example, where you can argue that insurance is locked-in to hide the fact that cars are systematically unsafe. Note how you don't need insurance to ride the subway.
The point is, insurance exists to make rich people richer off of risks that could be addressed socially in other ways. When we see that entire states are losing home insurance because of other systematic problems like climate change we should look at the system itself. Maybe making profit off of people's unavoidable risk isn't a great idea.
EDIT: in response to parent, my point is that focusing on the ills of regulators harming efficiency needs to account for the impossible job regulators have in the first place, which is making an unfair system (insurance) fair.
You want to risk pool a specific cohort of people. You want the pool to be as large as possible without masking clear adverse indicators. For instance, from an example downthread: you probably don't want to pool people with trampolines in with everybody else. Most people don't have trampolines. To an insurer, the sole function of a trampoline is to generate lawsuits. If you pool trampoliners together with everybody else, you necessarily raise everybody's rates to subsidize trampoline lawsuits. Better to factor the trampolines out and price them directly.
Risk pooling is fundamental to insurance, but not all pools are the same.
The observation is that if you aren't able to discriminate at all or subdivide the pools, the only response is to up the average rate to cover the aggregate risk as best you can estimate it. This gets tricky if your ability to change rates is constrained, also.
These things are always in fundamental tension, and also in tension with privacy. It's not an easy problem.
In extreme cases forcing too much pooling can cause market failure. The intuition is that the least risky customers decline to purchase (much) insurance, making the average risk higher, increasing prices, making more people decline insurance, in a vicious cycle. It’s fundamentally similar to Akerlof’s market for lemons.
Someone underwriting their own risk might as well not have actual insurance, as they’re just on the hook for actual damages correct?
So if they get sued for $1M, then they are on the hook for $1M (as an individual).
If everyone is sharing the risk, then everyone is on the hook for $1M/number of people.
So the individual that gets sued for $1M in a large state, might only be on the hook for a couple cents for their own lawsuit. Though they’d also be in the hook to the same degree for some other asshole getting sued.
Which is why insurance creates moral hazard (for things someone can control), and reduces catastrophic damage to individuals (for things someone cannot control).
The point is pooling unpredictable risk. You don't know ahead of time if your house is going to flood. You do know ahead of time if your house is on a flood plane. Therefore, people with houses on a flood plane pay more for flood insurance.
The alternative is that low risk customers can't get insurance because they'd have to pay the same as high risk customers and that isn't worth it. Additionally, then people build tons of houses in extremely high risk areas because they can buy insurance for the same price as someone not doing something stupid, which is a moral hazard. Existing regulations have already caused this to happen in many cases.
This is important point about knowledge which I feel leads towards another kind of hazard: Which party is capable of predicting risk and how that information asymmetry may be exploited.
We already spend a lot of time thinking about one direction, where the insured hides a pre-existing condition or their nefarious plan to commit arson, or whatever.
But what about the other direction? What about when the insurer has tools and relationships to determine something but doesn't tell the insured?
That might either be because there's not enough competitive pressure to make them lower the premium, or perhaps they raised the premium to cover the higher risk but refuse to disclose exactly what the risk is or how they determined it.
That is the problem solved by competition. If insurers know that your risk is below average then they'll want your business and therefore want to underbid other insurers in order to get it. But so will the other insurers, until your premium comes down to reflect your risk. This works even if you don't know your own risk because all you have to do is pick the most attractive price.
Of course, if you don't have enough competition that doesn't work, but then your problem is that you don't have enough competition. Which, especially in insurance markets, is generally caused by regulatory barriers.
It is through reinsurance mechanisms and the way you build the portfolio.
If you can’t use predictive attributes, many not allowed in California, you’re not going to get reinsurance interest because you can’t really balance the risk across different risk types for drivers.
So the end result is the customer pays more, despite their driving record being clean, because that’s the only way to manage through the risk.
