From what I read, there was seperate decision channel to decide what had to be documebted how at Boeing, which is a big problem in itself.
The whistelblower account actually rracks, depending on which kind of documentation you talk about. You now, the lazy rethoric trick of providing a technically correct answer, what Boeing did, while still lying through obmission of the general point. If so, don't worry, the NTSB and FAA will find out.
I assumed the regulatory body define what kinds of documentation needs to recorded, not Boing. And noncompliance (including not being able to produce that documentation on request) with that might be a (criminal) offense.
And you are absolutely right. To some details, for anyone interested (from an EASA point of view, working in Europe I never had to bother directly with the FAA):
- regulators provide general rules to be followed
- companies define theirbway of complying with those rules, the Means-of-compliance, and relevant processes and tools
- regulators audit those, sign of on them and audit the final product, hardware, software and documentation (!) to make sure compabies have their shit in order
- deviations are documented and recorded on work order level, e.g. one has to remove a door plug even this isn't part of the work instructions; in this case, either some non-standard instructions exist to be pulled up or an ad-hoc obe is written, both have to signe off by quality before the work is done, then said work is duly documented on work order level and again signed off and checked by quality (this is the most common way to handle those individual non-conformities I came across in my career, there sure are others)
- the above has to be defined in a dedicated process description, which itself is subject to regulatory approval
- not following the above, even worse trying to mislead regulators and auditors about it, does amount to a criminal offense for the senior execs responsible / accountable, depending on circumstances (from what little I know, Boeing is extremely close to this, if line workers cheat there isbnothing obe can do besides firing them, at Boeing the issues are far more serious, deeper and far reaching than some individual worker cutting corners so, it seems).
This is exactly right, except that whenever there is a deviation there is a side channel conversation of "How can we fix this without needing to do all this paperwork, while still complying with the regulations?" between the factory floor, quality, and the engineers.
For example perhaps a rule says "you need to do an inspection when a panel is removed" so the engineers and quality will get together and say "what if we just have the technician remove a couple screws on the panel and peek under it, then the panel hasn't technically been removed so we don't need to do the inspection". And then it turns out they remove all but one screw and twist the panel completely away so it's basically open but not "removed". And, it's all there in the work instructions, exactly what they did, but if anyone asks they can say "oh no, we didn't REMOVE the panel". And of course, the actual work instructions are only viewable in some 1970s green screen terminal or an all-caps printout thereof that comes in a multi-binder acceptance packet.
> You now, the lazy rethoric trick of providing a technically correct answer, what Boeing did, while still lying through obmission of the general point.
Sounds exactly like MCAS.. That omission. I thought that was just to preserve the same type certificate without retraining but it seems like a more systemic problem then.
The whistelblower account actually rracks, depending on which kind of documentation you talk about. You now, the lazy rethoric trick of providing a technically correct answer, what Boeing did, while still lying through obmission of the general point. If so, don't worry, the NTSB and FAA will find out.