> These devices don't send audio over the network unless a shooting-like noise is detected.
How does this jibe with the fact that the police can apparently request a ShotSpotter operator review of audio recordings for up to 30 days if a known shooting is missed by the system? How does this jibe with the fact that the system has apparently at least twice recorded voice conversations that were used (and thrown out in one case due to violating wiretap laws) in court cases?
Edit and even if we trust ShotSpotter to do the right thing, how do we know their systems are secure enough to keep those recordings away from less-honorable actors?
The website says the audio buffer on the sensor holds the last 30 hours before overwriting. So police have less than 30 hours to flag a missed shooting so shotspotter staff can check sensors for audio around the shooting time.
Regarding the court cases, I literally included the entire linked info for one of those Court cases in the post you're responding to. For both of the cases, the verbal exchange was at the same time as the shooting. In the other case, the victim verbally identifies the person about to murder them just before they were murdered. The argument that shotspotter is a wiretap falls apart under the slightest bit of scrutiny and there's no way the legislature meant to protect the right of people to be free from audio recording while shooting someone in public.
It seems plainly to be a wiretap under the laws of my state (MA): anything “capable of transmitting, receiving, amplifying or recording a wire or oral communication.”
With some additional carve outs, none of which appear to apply to ShotSpotter.
I’m not arguing that properly scoped and protected ShotSpotter couldn’t be allowed by MA legislators, but it sure doesn’t fall apart under scrutiny by my reading of the law.
The court seems to agree in the text you copied in your upthread quote:
> However, the court found that the exchange was an “oral communication” and that the recording was a prohibited “interception” under the Massachusetts Wiretap Act because the defendant had no knowledge that the exchange was being recorded.
Which I think is the proper interpretation of the written law.
I’d also like to enjoy being free from audio recording while near loud noises. And the argument that it is a wiretap has apparently not fallen apart in at least one court of law.
And regarding your last question, the first of the two court cases where verbal communications were captured (because they were at the same time as the shooting), was in 2007. So shotspotter has been around for a while.
Have there been any breaches where less-honorable actors have managed to hack into sensors and exfiltrate data? Have there been any breaches of the actual recordings of shootings?
How does this jibe with the fact that the police can apparently request a ShotSpotter operator review of audio recordings for up to 30 days if a known shooting is missed by the system? How does this jibe with the fact that the system has apparently at least twice recorded voice conversations that were used (and thrown out in one case due to violating wiretap laws) in court cases?
Edit and even if we trust ShotSpotter to do the right thing, how do we know their systems are secure enough to keep those recordings away from less-honorable actors?