My background is philosophy of language. The vagaries of definitions are exactly how many get communication backwards. It’s jut important to remember that language is effectively just pointing at things, and that the words we use are effectively arbitrary.
The distinctions in taxonomy should be reflected by the language, and we should very much not try to conform our taxonomy to our existing terms… beyond, say, shorthand.
we should very much not try to conform our taxonomy to our existing terms
I see this stunting imagination everywhere. Economics, science, nature, etc. Humans generally feel they've "captured" knowledge with a brief overview and disdain any messiness that might allow that knowledge "to escape".
Some humans are curious to be exploratory of knowledge that "escapes" these classifications, as you say :) this is, in some definition, the criteria of an artist of sorts. Maybe artistic minds are just scientists of another cloth, investigating the features of linguistic creatures that escape the boundaries that other (more "particular") types of minds create and impose
This is maybe the most beautiful description linking the arts and sciences that I've ever read. A good scientist is one who extends the envelope of our external knowledge; a good artist is one who pushes the boundaries of our inner qualia and interpretations
>It’s just important to remember that language is effectively just pointing at things, and that the words we use are effectively arbitrary.
I think the success of transformer-derived LLMs suggests that Wittgenstein was more correct about contextual “family resemblances” than the “pointing at things” school of language philosophy.
I'm a bit ignorant of the actual math/logic for modern LLMs (I took Andrew Ng's course on machine learning, but that just gets you to basic neural network architecture).
I'm also confused as to why you would put Wittgenstein in opposition to the concept of language as "pointing at things," as I would put him very much in that school. I'm a bit rusty, but I've been through the Philosophical Investigations a couple times, and I'm almost certain he's opposed to platonic forms.
He thinks some words rely on ostensive definitions, colour for example. Otherwise, though, his view of language can roughly be summarized as "meaning is use". You're correct to read him as opposed to platonic forms and ideas; however, he argues that language and meaning has its roots in behaviour, or as he puts it: "a form of life". So for him meaning is relative but not arbitrary. It's a crucial distinction.
I only wish I could have heard him lecture. His two books, while interesting, have always seemed, well, a bit odd in their structure (less so with PI). Beyond that, that people use some random notebooks like his published texts also seems odd.
I completely agree, and wouldn’t suggest otherwise. I’m mainly referring to the concept of platonic ideals, which seem to be at least somewhat instinctual.
The distinctions in taxonomy should be reflected by the language, and we should very much not try to conform our taxonomy to our existing terms… beyond, say, shorthand.