That was a well written article. I think my favorite thing about it, is how it showcases the power of long term thinking over short term thinking. It also showcases an organization that was not using hope as a strategy.
I think the focus on "blameless" is incorrect. It is a culture of responsibility that results in better outcomes and it starts with engaged responsible leaders. Blame is in many ways the opposite of taking responsibility, but you can have a blameless culture without having a culture of responsibility. A culture of blame is always a culture of irresponsibility.
Blamelessness was a function of a leader actively choosing to take responsibility for the problem. They said "it is our organization that is responsible for this tragedy, not the individual." "We caused this through institutional negligence, not the ATCer."
Boeing still has problems because Boeing leadership has not taken responsibility. Boeing leaders have not said "I have created a system of incentives and punishments that have resulted in unsafe airplanes," which is why they are still having safety problems.
The paradox of leadership is that "while a leader is responsible for the actions of the organization, the actions occur from the individual decisions of those who follow."
If the air traffic controller was not consciously making an error, it is a clear problem for leadership to solve. Leadership has a responsibility to make a change. Blame would have prevented that change.
Admiral Rickover brought this culture, a culture of responsibility, to the nuclear navy which has quite a good record of safety. This article echos a good amount of what I have read about Americas Naval engineerng tradition. These are quick short reads to give a taste of Admiral Rickover:
I am very confident that the author would enjoy reading about Admiral Rickover and his philosophy if they have not already.
I also think anyone who enjoyed this article would also enjoy reading Extreme Ownership, which is a much much much better book than the cover and subtitle implies and is applicable to every job in silicon valley.
I also just wanted to highlight two things. Not only did he create a highly safety conscious organization but an incredibly technologically innovative one that was born despite huge resistance from the US Navy. Think about trying not only to build a small nuclear reactor, something that had never been done before, but one that could be put on a submarine. Not an easy technical goal. And on top of that, aiming to complete this task in the face of resistance from the highest levels of the organization he made his life, including efforts to get rid of him entirely. He wasn't perfect but what he achieved quite alot. Definitely worth reading more up on particularly if you work more in the mechanical engineering world.
Second set of Rickover Rules:
Rule 1: You must have a rising standard of quality over time, and well beyond what is required by any minimum standard.
Rule 2: People running complex systems should be highly capable.
Rule 3: Supervisors have to face bad news when it comes and take problems to a level high enough to fix those problems.
Rule 4: You must have a healthy respect for the dangers and risks of your particular job.
Rule 5: Training must be constant and rigorous.
Rule 6: All the functions of repair, quality control, and technical support must fit together.
Rule 7: The organization and members thereof must have the ability and willingness to learn from mistakes of the past.
I think the focus on "blameless" is incorrect. It is a culture of responsibility that results in better outcomes and it starts with engaged responsible leaders. Blame is in many ways the opposite of taking responsibility, but you can have a blameless culture without having a culture of responsibility. A culture of blame is always a culture of irresponsibility.
Blamelessness was a function of a leader actively choosing to take responsibility for the problem. They said "it is our organization that is responsible for this tragedy, not the individual." "We caused this through institutional negligence, not the ATCer."
Boeing still has problems because Boeing leadership has not taken responsibility. Boeing leaders have not said "I have created a system of incentives and punishments that have resulted in unsafe airplanes," which is why they are still having safety problems.
The paradox of leadership is that "while a leader is responsible for the actions of the organization, the actions occur from the individual decisions of those who follow."
If the air traffic controller was not consciously making an error, it is a clear problem for leadership to solve. Leadership has a responsibility to make a change. Blame would have prevented that change.
Admiral Rickover brought this culture, a culture of responsibility, to the nuclear navy which has quite a good record of safety. This article echos a good amount of what I have read about Americas Naval engineerng tradition. These are quick short reads to give a taste of Admiral Rickover:
https://www.ans.org/news/article-1592/caught-in-the-leadersh... https://govleaders.org/rickover.htm
I am very confident that the author would enjoy reading about Admiral Rickover and his philosophy if they have not already.
I also think anyone who enjoyed this article would also enjoy reading Extreme Ownership, which is a much much much better book than the cover and subtitle implies and is applicable to every job in silicon valley.