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Normality isn’t some mask it’s what you get from reasonably typical genetics and reasonably typical environments. Most people have something unusual about them, and the existence of such divination is completely normal because there’s so many different criteria. Similarly, the vast majority of 90 year olds have multiple significant health issues even if there isn’t a specific issue that’s nearly as universal.

It’s therefore normal for people to speak at least one language even if no specific language is universal.

PS: Humans aren’t herd animals, we’re social animals but there’s many kinds of social species. Ants, wolves, gorilla, and prairie dogs all have very distinct social structures from each other while cows, elk, etc have quite a lot in common with each other.




We are back to the ambiguity that affects all conversations about this. In my experience, most of the time when people are referring to what is normal, they are not actually referring to normal distribution, but to how they believe things should be concerning human behavior. Outside of ethicists who might be concerned with specifying norms, this is usually based upon group belief that they have adopted without reflection (i.e., herd behavior, trying to blend in, fit other people's expectations, etc).


I didn't find rayiner's original comment which spawned this tangent about "normality" that ambiguous myself – because I've read enough of his other comments, I have some idea of how he thinks, and I read what he says in light of that understanding. I can see how it could be seen as much more ambiguous by someone who lacks that background.

I read rayiner as, first and foremost, talking about the norms and values to which he subscribes, which he believes to be correct. And to the extent he was talking descriptively, I think his emphasis was on the central tendency of global human society, not the central tendency of the contemporary United States (or West more broadly). And I think that's true – most societies in human history have put enormous emphasis on family ties, and that's still true in the majority of countries worldwide – their recent de-emphasis in the contemporary West is a significant deviation from the (descriptive) norm of human history as a whole.


> they have adopted without reflection

I’ve spoken to many people from many different backgrounds about their beliefs and it’s extremely unusual for people to not reflect on their beliefs.

However it’s easy to miss that frameworks of belief are self reinforcing. By which I mean belief in X increases the likelihood to believe in Y, and believing in Y increases the likelihood of believing in X. Therefore examining individual beliefs doesn’t necessarily accomplish anything and it’s much easier to swap to a new self consistent belief system than to adopt something unique to you yourself.


> Therefore examining individual beliefs doesn’t necessarily accomplish anything

I think some beliefs are more foundational than others. Foundational beliefs include beliefs about the ultimate nature of reality (e.g. materialisms vs dualisms vs idealisms), the nature of logic and rationality, the nature of knowledge (epistemology), metaethics (is ethics objective or subjective? and if objective, how so?), the basic principles of normative ethics (such as consequentialism vs non-consequentialism), etc.

If one changes one's foundational beliefs, very often the rest of one's belief system must change, like falling dominoes. However, a lot of people don't seem very interested in even examining their foundational beliefs, or aware that they even have them – things are so "obvious" to them that they are unaware anyone disagrees, or else they write off disagreement as "backward"/"superstitious"/etc without ever seriously intellectually engaging with it.


I agree people hold foundational beliefs, but they don’t seem to be things like materialism which then impose some logical consequences.

Instead it’s stuff like the fundamental nature of specific organizations/ideas. You can far more easily find an agnostic Catholic than one who believes the Catholic Church is irredeemably evil.

I’d call it tribalism rather than herd behavior because animal herds don’t attack other herds. Meanwhile football fans will fight each other over effectively arbitrary teams.


> Instead it’s stuff like the fundamental nature of specific organizations/ideas. You can far more easily find an agnostic Catholic than one who believes the Catholic Church is irredeemably evil.

I don't think one's opinion on the Catholic Church could be said to be "foundational"–for the vast majority of people.

If someone dislikes or disagrees with Catholicism, likely that is because of some other belief against which they are judging Catholicism – and that belief is more fundamental to them than any of their beliefs about Catholicism.

An atheist disagrees with all religions, Catholicism included – but their atheism (and related views such as anti-supernaturalism and physicalism) is far more foundational than their views on Catholicism specifically, which is just the application of their general principles to one of many specific cases.

A follower of a competing religious tradition – Jewish, Hindu, Muslim, Protestant, etc – disagrees with Catholicism whenever it contradicts the teachings of their own religion. But, once again, their belief in their own religious tradition is more foundational to them than their rejection of Catholicism whenever it contradicts it.

A social progressive disagrees with Catholicism's teachings on abortion, LGBT issues, the role of women, etc – their beliefs on those topics may well be foundational, but their judgement of Catholicism is not foundational, it is just an application of those (more) foundational beliefs.

I think the only people for whom their views on Catholicism would be foundational, would be some devout Catholics. But, even among devout Catholics, I'm not sure if all of them would label their belief in Catholicism as foundational. Some might. Others might argue for Catholicism on the basis of philosophical and historical arguments, in which case those arguments (and the principles which underly them) might be said to be more foundational for them than Catholicism itself is.


> I don't think one's opinion on the Catholic Church could be said to be "foundational"–for the vast majority of people.

> Some might.

I’m not saying these specific beliefs are foundational for everyone that holds them or even that those people would label them as foundational, just that they preform that function for some people. Being American is a huge part of some peoples identity and largely irrelevant to others.

It could their job, politics, culture, hobby, or even taste in music etc. But many people seem to crystalize around some external concept. It’s not as clear as I’m a “vegan” or “Republican” therefore I believe all these things, but identifying as something seems to have knock on effects. Someone thinks of themselves as having made it into an higher economic status and suddenly they have options about wrist watches or whatever. People will not just own a PlayStation/BMW/whatever but reject competing brands and think this then implies other things about themselves.


Maybe we are using "foundational" somewhat differently?

You start talking about "foundational beliefs", and I immediately think https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foundationalism – maybe that's a consequence of having studied philosophy at university

I doubt many people derive their beliefs from a hobby or taste in music. You can find people who share the same hobby or like the same music, even while their views on politics / religion / social issues / etc are at complete opposite ends of the spectrum.


Foundationalusm assumes an internal logic to people’s belief systems that simply doesn’t hold up in practice.

People don’t decide the big questions to build up a belief system from the ground up. Instead they work from the middle of a web of beliefs. Arguably the true foundations of belief are things like object permanence which we discover as infants. Ie: Closing my eyes doesn’t make something go away.

Older kids ask questions like “what’s the point of life?” and get culturally appropriate responses from parents, religious leaders, TV or whatever. They don’t ask about things like materialisms vs dualisms vs idealisms until they are even older and have built up a complex web of interlocking beliefs.


> Older kids ask questions like “what’s the point of life?” and get culturally appropriate responses from parents, religious leaders, TV or whatever. They don’t ask about things like materialisms vs dualisms vs idealisms until they are even older and have built up a complex web of interlocking beliefs.

Sure, few people will hear about “materialism” or “dualism” or “idealism” as philosophical theories until adulthood, if that. But that doesn’t mean they aren’t presumed by a lot of things ordinary people say, and which children and adolescents end up hearing.

Someone who says “there is no afterlife: there is no scientific evidence for it” is effectively presuming materialism, even if they don’t know what “materialism” is. (Many people only know “materialism” as “excessive emphasis on material goods”, not the philosophy of mind sense.)


I agree, my point is that predisposition.

Though I can’t help but adding… You can have a non material world without having an afterlife (telekinesis or spells working) and you can have an afterlife in a material world (via active intervention and time travel).

So rather than materialism being foundational it can be thought of as a category that arises from more foundational beliefs.


> I agree, my point is that predisposition.

Well, I'd agree a lot of people choose ideas because of what they associate them with – as in, "religious people are boring and bigoted, science produces all these cool amazing new technologies, materialism is the science option and dualism/idealism are the religious options, so I'm picking materialism". From a strictly philosophical point of view, there are lots of holes in that argument – even if a non-materialist philosophy of mind is true, that does not in itself entail the truth of any particular religion, and (arguably) there are non-materialist philosophies of mind which are just as consistent with the results of contemporary science as materialism is – but, many people can't see those holes, so that kind of argument convinces them.

> Though I can’t help but adding… You can have a non material world without having an afterlife (telekinesis or spells working) and you can have an afterlife in a material world (via active intervention and time travel).

Telekinesis or spells could work in a perfectly material world. Imagine there was a swarm of nanobots which could read our minds, and are programmed to obey certain verbal commands – in such a world, telekinesis and spells would be completely real, but those facts would not in themselves make the world non-material. Furthermore, ideas such as Boltzmann brains and Poincaré recurrence suggest the possibility that an afterlife may be inevitable even in a purely material universe (although whether they actually do entail one gets into all kinds of complicated debates which I myself lack the competence to confidently decide.)

However, in another sense, my point stands. If materialism is true, it makes sense to identify the mind with the functioning brain, and hence to identify (presumably) irreversible brain death with the permanent cessation of the mind's existence; if materialism is false, that identification is a lot more open to question. With materialism, an afterlife is implausible, unless we rely on some highly speculative ideas (Boltzmann brains, Poincaré recurrence, simulation theory, etc). With idealism or dualism, an afterlife is much more probable, even without considering those kinds of ideas – if the mind does not necessarily depend on the brain for its existence, we have no strong reason to assume that the cessation of the latter must entail the cessation of the former.


> there are lots of holes in that argument

There’s holes in all kinds of things people believe. If you’re talking about actual belief systems then you can’t assume rational actors and logical thinking. Philosophy really doesn’t have the tools to explain what’s going on. We’re in the realm of psychology / neuroscience.

> to assume that cessation of the latter must entail the cessation of the former

Mind uploading blurs the line between life and afterlife because it wasn’t conceived of when those ideas were created.

IMO the conceptual framework that created the idea of a material world is really a delineation between magic rituals / religion and what people actually observed. The wacky nature of the observable universe is really orthogonal to the initial differentiation to the point where I think people would still talk about the material world in terms of things like fate and reincarnation even if spells worked.


> There’s holes in all kinds of things people believe. If you’re talking about actual belief systems then you can’t assume rational actors and logical thinking. Philosophy really doesn’t have the tools to explain what’s going on. We’re in the realm of psychology / neuroscience.

No doubt the average person's beliefs are full of holes, but education in philosophy and logic can make one aware of those holes, aware of one's hidden assumptions, the heretofore unconsidered alternatives to one's positions. I question whether psychology or neuroscience can offer us the same things.

> Mind uploading blurs the line between life and afterlife because it wasn’t conceived of when those ideas were created.

Nobody knows whether mind uploading is really possible. It is a purely speculative technology, its development could be centuries or millennia away, if it ever is developed at all. I also think its philosophical significance is overrated, since in principle it is just as compatible with idealism or dualism as it is with materialism.

> IMO the conceptual framework that created the idea of a material world is really a delineation between magic rituals / religion and what people actually observed.

I disagree. Most non-materialist arguments have as their starting point epistemology, not anything to do with magic, rituals or religion. Should our ontology straightforwardly mirror our epistemology (i.e. a first-person perspective is epistemologically fundamental and hence should also be ontologically fundamentally)–or invert it?




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