On: Tesla Employees Using Vehicle Cameras to Spy on 'P...

[radicalbyte]

It should be encrypted and the owner of the vehicle should be in control of the keys.

[coppsilgold → radicalbyte]

You can decouple the encryption and decryption keys such that the private key would never be present in any Tesla system at any point in time[1]. And you can introduce a ratchet such that compromising the Tesla car at time t0 would not enable the attacker to decrypt any encrypted data at t[n < 0].

[1] Asymmetric crypto KEM + ephemeral symmetric key + encrypted block. eg. <https://libsodium.gitbook.io/doc/public-key_cryptography/sea...>

[thfuran → radicalbyte]

That works right up until the user loses the key and demand access anyways. Or they sell the car and keep a copy of the key.

[klyrs → thfuran]

Updating a car with a new key would fix both problems. Old recordings would be lost, of course, but customers hearing "I can't unlock that without your old key" may be necessary to re-establish trust.

[radicalbyte → thfuran]

Absolutely and that is why you can't use an HSM. Thankfully generating keys on device and storing them on the cloud account encrypted by a passcode works. As the keys are a predictable size you can encrypt them multiple times with different passcodes.