> Case in point is the current conflict against the Houthis, there's no use of the US Navy's very expensive radars when trying to counter-act some guys launching cheap drones from 30-40 nautical miles out (i.e. from the Yemeni shore).
There's no evidence of that. The US is not attacking the Houthi bases, period. It's not a matter of technical capabilities, it's political reasons. If the US wanted to end Houthi attacks on shipping tomorrow, then there's a couple of carrier groups in range that would stop that pretty quickly. Now, why those political limits are in place is a very good question that I would like to know the answer to as well
How are some sea-based airplanes meant to take out the entire operational base of Houthis on the ground? Because I guess that’s what you mean by mentioning those carrier groups, i.e. US air-attacks. I agree though, it is partly a political decision because, for once, the US leaders are aware that they won’t be able to neutralize the Houthis based on sea power alone and that they (the Americans) will need men on the ground, and this is indeed a very big political no-no in this current climate.
Which brings me to one of the main subjects ignored by the article and by almost all the people commenting in here, i.e. the coordination between sea power and land power, meaning becoming aware that in order to neutralize your enemy it’s very counter-productive to rely on very independent military groups (the Navy, the Army etc), each of them with their (grand) strategy and with different procurement focuses, you need to take several steps back and to “strategize” it all together. Granted, this has always been a big problem for big industrial armies and especially for the US (since the WW2, in the Americans’ case), not sure there’s an easy fix to it. But fact is you won’t be able to defeat Houthi-like troops in choke-points like Aden or Malacca without a combination between land and sea power, i.e. actually controlling those choke-points on the ground like the Brits used to do in their emperial heyday.
> ...you need to take several steps back and to “strategize” it all together.
That was the purpose of the Goldwater-Nichols Act in 1986. The US invasion of Grenada showed clearly that the Army, Navy, and Air Force were not working well together. Its most significant reform was that operational command bypasses the service chiefs and instead the chain of command goes from the president, through the secretary of defense, to the regional combat commanders. The services are responsible for recruitment and procurement. In Central Command (CENTCOM) which covers the middle east, all Army soldiers, Navy sailors, Marines, and Air Force airmen report to the combatant commander. At the higher levels, the service chiefs have the joint chiefs of staff to coordinate their higher-level strategies. This system has been extremely effective since the 80s. The problem in Yemen is not that the Army doesn't want to go in so it's leaving it to the Navy to fix the problem, it's that there's political issues at higher levels that prevent the Army from going in. I'm sure CENTCOM has a plan right now for sending in troops that would integrate the Army and Navy together, and is ready to execute that if ordered.
You're right, and it's a fundamental aspect of the US military. It's fine that the GP doesn't understand, but it's not fine to speak as if they do. Jointness is decades old now.
Politically, it's seems very unlikley that the US desires to send ground troops (which seem more likely to be Marines or special forces than regular Army) into Yemen. Yemen is tied up with Iran, Saudi Arabia, and a Mideast that's on a hair trigger. The US wants to de-escalate, not inflame the situation. Biden is very cautious about confrontation and military involvement anyway, but I can't imagine any president doing that. At worst, some local ally would do it with our help.
More likely would be airstrikes. The US has air bases all over the region, and can fly from anywhere due to refueuling capability; they don't need a carrier to do it. If the US did conduct airstrikes, I expect they would not publicize it to avoid escalation with Iran, in Yemen, in the Mideast generally, and pulling in Saudi Arabia too. That's exactly what Hamas and possibly Iran would like to see.
But the Houthi missiles aren't that big a problem, so far.
You are talking nonsense. There are no 'Houthi bases' to attack because it's a guerilla force. If the US could destroy Houthi rebels it would have done it already. You think the US somehow 'allowed' the Houthis to totally block commercial route trough the Red Sea instead of the actual reality that the US Navy and the allies were simply unable to prevent Houthis from doing it? Seems you are unaware that the Yemeni civil war has been going on for years now and the US Navy has been actively involved in it from the very beginning doing naval blockade of the Yemeni coast.
Houthi drones, missiles, and speedboats don't appear out of the ether. The Navy is taking a passive approach right now, only responding to threats rather than going in and attacking. At the least, if an antiship ballistic missile is fired, since it flies on a ballistic trajectory it's relatively easy to figure out where it came from and send a cruise missile back. Or if you want to be preemptive you could use tactics honed in Afghanistan to surveil and watch for the launch sites. Of course you can't eliminate guerilla forces using just airstrikes; but you can remove launching facilities. There weren't any major drone strikes or ballistic missile attacks in Afghanistan. Technically it's relatively not very difficult to have a surveillance plane orbit overhead watching for where ballistic missiles are coming from, then have orbiting fighters or bombers strike that before the launcher and its crew have had time to displace. The reason it hasn't been done is purely up to political decisions.
Yeah, right, the US left Afghanistan for 'purely political reasons', too. Not because they couldn't win the war even though they had 20 years to do it. Soviets left Afghanistan also because of purely political reasons, not because it was unwinnable war for them. Get a grip of reality, dude.
Yes, the US left Afghanistan because of political reasons, not technical reasons. The US lost the war in Afghanistan. All wars are waged, won, and lost for political reasons. The war in Afghanistan was unwinnable because there was no path to a viable democratic government in Afghanistan. That doesn't have any bearing on the effectiveness of tactical and technical measures.
So tell me what are these political reasons preventing the US from attacking Yemen? Saudi Arabia has been waging war with Yemen rebels for years now, and the US has been helping the Saudis. What exactly is preventing the US from getting even more involved? I'll tell you what: nothing, apart from the fact that the US knows that it will be a losing battle, another Afghanistan, never ending war that would cost the US trillions and would have nothing to show for all that wasted money. And why would it be never-ending? Because just like in Afghanistan the US can't fight guerillas for shit, especially now when the Houthis have powerful allies in the region. So it's all not because of some bullshit 'purely political' reasons but for very practical ones: the US military is simply not capable of decisively winning such a conflict. And that's why they are carefully treading now
There's no evidence of that. The US is not attacking the Houthi bases, period. It's not a matter of technical capabilities, it's political reasons. If the US wanted to end Houthi attacks on shipping tomorrow, then there's a couple of carrier groups in range that would stop that pretty quickly. Now, why those political limits are in place is a very good question that I would like to know the answer to as well