>A cruel extermination model is just as rational of a response to bad actors with no choice.
I don't think this can be supported. There is no contradiction in destroying an entity that gets in your way, but presumably there is more at stake when it comes to humans engaging with humans. We recognize that other humans, at least those in good standing in our social community, have interests that should not be interfered with without strong justification, enough to overcome their rights as members of the community. But given a lack of free will/moral responsibility, the interests of the bad actor cannot be completely disregarded. For example, their interest in their life isn't forfeited simply for being a nuisance.
>We recognize that other humans, at least those in good standing in our social community, have interests that should not be interfered with without strong justification, enough to overcome their rights as members of the community
This belief is the one that is impendent of free will. If you believe in minimizing suffering before refuting free will, you will believe it after. If you dont before, you wont after. The question is orthogonal.
The whole premise that free will is a justification for inflicting suffering seems like a strawman from Sapolsky.
I havent seen him or anyone else explain why the existence of free will provides rational support for inflicting suffering. Yet, people somehow claim that refuting free will refutes inflicting unnecessary suffering.
>The whole premise that free will is a justification for inflicting suffering seems like a strawman from Sapolsky.
It's definitely not something Sapolsky came up with. The connection between free will and moral responsibility has been a central focus of the debate about free will since philosophers took up the issue[1]. One then only needs to recognize the connection between moral responsibility, moral indignation, and cruelty towards bad actors to see the relationship go through. You can certainly question whether free will provides genuine rational support for cruelty, but it doesn't take much to notice that people have historically used free will as a rationalization for cruelty, whether legitimately or not.
I do agree that its unlikely any one person will be moved to change their behavior after accepting a lack of free will/moral responsibility. But we are in a much better position to construct society in a way that takes this knowledge into account, for example by greatly improving prison conditions, having a stronger focus on the conditions that give rise to criminal behavior, and so on.
I think I see where you are coming from, and where our differences lie. Putting the cards on the table, I basically agree that multiple future free-will doesnt exist, but dont agree with Sapolsky's conclusions or your optimism.
For one, I dont think there are impactful moral differences between what Sapolsky's determinism, and what is referred to in the OP as Actual-sequence free-will, So I dont think the rational case for compassion is any stronger.
Moreover, I am also a lot less optimistic that this puts society in a better position. I think it is a more dangerous and precarious position full of pitfalls. I think it likely provides less motivation for constructing a more compassionate society, and more for providing a less forgiving one, because our ability to actually change people is quite low. For example, it can bolster the argument for longer sentences or the death penalty, given the lack of rehabilitative capacity. e.g. we simply dont have much capacity to correct deep seated developmental and psychological errors.
From the social perspective, history is all full of determinism and causality being used as rationale for cruelty, ranging from eugenic extermination to Calvinist forsaken. Determinism also lies at the heart of racism and bigotry. It is a short steps from "this person cant help it" to "these people are the problem".
On an individual level, I also think the idea of determinism conflicts with views of self-agency and impact, and can be highly de-motivating.
I don't think this can be supported. There is no contradiction in destroying an entity that gets in your way, but presumably there is more at stake when it comes to humans engaging with humans. We recognize that other humans, at least those in good standing in our social community, have interests that should not be interfered with without strong justification, enough to overcome their rights as members of the community. But given a lack of free will/moral responsibility, the interests of the bad actor cannot be completely disregarded. For example, their interest in their life isn't forfeited simply for being a nuisance.