eIDAS in fact forces browser vendors to do that, but there are two problems with what you're suggesting:
1. Good luck teaching 99% of people to be wary when they see the blue address bar. People generally do not understand address bars, which is a large part of why browsers removed the EV indicator.
2. There is a strong possibility that a future version of eIDAS will force businesses in the EU to get certificates from an eIDAS CA. At that point, people in the EU will be seeing the blue address bar constantly, and most of the time the certificate will in fact be legit.
Teaching users is of course the tricky part, and I'm not trying to excuse the insane draft regulation here. That said, eIDAS doesn't force browser vendors to visually distinguish Article 45-forced CA certificates from traditional CAB CA certificates, and I doubt they considered the possibility. So re-adding the distinction is a valid band-aid. Your second point can be addressed relatively easily by businesses getting multiple certificates. Then, the browser can show 'trusted' only if one of the certificates is not from a Article 45-forced CA.
I thought the blue address bar would have a person's name and country in it. That person has a good lawsuit case against the government if it's faked. Or, are we worried the DE government will make up a fake Larry Ellision and MITM oracle.com with it? Larry Ellision would easily win that lawsuit.
1. Good luck teaching 99% of people to be wary when they see the blue address bar. People generally do not understand address bars, which is a large part of why browsers removed the EV indicator.
2. There is a strong possibility that a future version of eIDAS will force businesses in the EU to get certificates from an eIDAS CA. At that point, people in the EU will be seeing the blue address bar constantly, and most of the time the certificate will in fact be legit.