A classic philosophical question is "why is there something rather nothing?" The follow up question "why is there something but not everything?" is the domain of physics. If the universe is computable, then there is a program in any model of computation that reproduces our observed physics. Why is one model of computation (Wolfram's) considered deeper or more fundamental than another (Turing machine)? Is it more useful because it is easier or more natural to encode the known laws of symmetry in the "program"? There seems to be a lot of theories of everything that have the issue of predicting a lot more than we can possibly observe, where everything we consider real physics is a small point in a massive parameter space. Be its string theory with its landscape of vacua, or flavors of inflation, or many worlds. Our universe in the theory is underdetermined. Somewhere in the parameter space is our observed universe but also a lot of dream worlds sitting side-by-side inaccessible to us. Some take it as deep and profound insight but I am skeptical that it is in the spirit of physics. I think deeper principles await to rule out this embarrassment of ontology
