the actual (and also initial) claim here is that the myth is true, the author is simply pointing out that there is insufficient evidence to support the myth, and thus we fall back on the null hypothesis, aka the default: that there does not yet exist sufficient evidence to conclude the myth is anything other than false.
> But that doesn't mean we assume the opposite of the claim must be true until they do. It means we assume ignorance.
Regardless of the wording, the gist is the same: we /don't/ assume ignorance, we treat the claim, like Russell's teapot [0], or any other unsupported claim, as false until such evidence arises, since there are an infinite number of unfalsifiable premises, and we neither want to, nor do, in practice, treat them all as maybe true, maybe not, forever.
tl;dr: As Russell's teapot [0] demonstrates, yes, there is a default, and that is that a thing is false unless sufficient evidence exists to believe otherwise. No, we don't treat all unfalsified (and unfalsifiable) hypotheses as unknown and assume ignorance.
It actually does, that's why I cited it so many times! :)
In 1958, Russell elaborated on the analogy:
> "...nobody can prove that there is not between the Earth and Mars a china teapot revolving in an elliptical orbit, but nobody thinks this sufficiently likely to be taken into account in practice..."[0]
Replace 'teapot revolving in orbit' with 'truth to the staircase fighting myth' – hopefully you now see why it's ridiculous to entertain all hypotheses as equally likely without evidence.
> There's a difference between thinking something false and thinking the thing insufficiently likely to be taken into account in practice.
That's just it – there isn't. There isn't any effective difference between "assume false" and "no evidence for it, so we assume false". The reason we assume it's false is tangential to the fact that we assume that both the teapot theory and the fighting staircase theory are false.
> Russell's teapot argument is about so-called unfalsifiable theories, not about all things
The point of Russell's teapot, as Russell explained, and I quoted, is that even though the teapot (like this myth) is neither proven nor disproven, we should, and do, treat it as false, because that is the default state until sufficient evidence arises.
It's an argument against entertaining theories that have no evidence, against ignorant agnosticism towards any arbitrary theory.
Either way, I think the fighting staircase theory, like the teapot theory, is not falsifiable, but anyone is free to show it is, by falsifying it.
Well, the next time I find myself in a melee battle within a castle and am deciding whether I should fight my way up the stairs, I'm going to draw a distinction between: "Is absolutely false", and "We don't know whether it was true or false", and I'm going to let someone else go up the stairs first...
This is your position, but it's not a position presented in the Wikipedia article.
> we should, and do, treat it unproven
Do you mean disproved here, rather than unproven? I think that when we know something has been neither proved nor disproved we should treat it as unproven (because it is unproven), but that does not mean we should assume that it is false.
Also, you forgot the rest of that! It was probably an honest mistake on your part, so I'll include the full context here, including the parts you missed, and hopefully you can address the whole thing now:
> That's just it – there isn't. There isn't any effective difference between "assume false" and "no evidence for it, so we assume false". The reason we assume it's false is tangential to the fact that we assume that both the teapot theory and the fighting staircase theory are false.
> There isn't any effective difference between "assume false" and "no evidence for it, so we assume false".
This is very unclear to me, but if what you mean is something like "There is no practical difference between supposing something to be false and supposing the thing to be so unlikely that it shouldn't be taken into account in one's decisions" I might agree with you - both that it is true and that something like it is present in the Wikipedia article - and we could go on from that point.
>The reason we assume it's false is tangential to the fact that we assume that both the teapot theory and the fighting staircase theory are false.
I'm not sure what the "it" is in the "it's" part of this sentence, so I can't respond to this part of your comment.
> > There isn't any effective difference between "assume false" and "no evidence for it, so we assume false"
> This is very unclear to me, but if what you mean is something like "There is no practical difference between supposing something to be false and supposing the thing to be so unlikely that it shouldn't be taken into account in one's decisions" I might agree with you
Not sure what part of that is unclear to you, but feel free to ask clarifying questions. I did indeed phrase what I said correctly. Your phrasing is also correct. To tie the two together, it is as likely, with our currently-zero affirmative evidence, that the teapot exists, as it is, with our currently-zero affirmative evidence, that the fighting staircase theory is true. Thus, if you effectively treat the teapot's existence as false, you should also effectively treat the fighting staircase theory as false.
> > The reason we assume it's false is tangential to the fact that we assume that both the teapot theory and the fighting staircase theory are false.
> I'm not sure what the "it" is in the "it's" part of this sentence, so I can't respond to this part of your comment.
Again, you're always free to ask me questions if you don't understand something! In this case, "it" refers to the teapot theory and the fighting staircase theory, since the two are analogous here.
but instead that by default it is effectively untrue? And by that you mean that we can act in practical matters act as if it is untrue, even though we do not actually know whether that is the case?
I meant what I said, and also what you said is correct, too.
Indeed, effectively untrue means untrue for all intents and purposes (including even seriously discussing), and both the teapot and the fighting staircase theory are equally: untrue, effectively untrue, practically untrue, and any other semantic game you wish to play around the word untrue, for the same reason as each other. They have an equal amount of evidence of their truth, after all.
I think the answer to that is made clear by the following passage, which I'll reformat and expand to include your latest desired semantics:
> Indeed, effectively untrue means untrue for all intents and purposes (including even seriously discussing), and both the teapot and the fighting staircase theory are equally:
> - untrue,
> - effectively untrue,
> - practically untrue,
> - something we assume to be untrue,
> - and any other semantic game you wish to play around the word untrue,
> for the same reason as each other. They have an equal amount of evidence of their truth, after all :)
At this point, you seem to be coming up with new ways of wording that the teapot and fighting staircase theories are untrue, so if you come up with more, simply add them to the above 5 item list!
And just to be clear, I'm not claiming anything myself, merely examining and judging the claims of those who lend any credence to the totally unsupported teapot or fighting staircase theories, and pointing out that the results of that examination and judgement don't look good for 'em.
I think perhaps you misunderstand: because each theory has zero evidence, each has zero truth to it (however you want to word "truth", maybe pick from the above list).
Because they both have zero truth, they are equally untrue, meaning an equal amount of untrue: zero in both cases.
Turns out there's no contradiction, and no truth to either!
> OK, that's what I had thought you meant! But that position isn't found anywhere in the Wikipedia article.
It actually is! I even quoted it a couple times up in this thread :) Maybe you're confused over effectively true vs practically true vs true vs. etc, but that's just semantics, they all mean the same thing!
> Also, what if two contradictory propositions each have zero evidence, are they then both untrue?
It depends, can you give details (what are the specific propositions)? For example, Russell's teapot explains when the "contradiction" is between the teapot existing without evidence vs. not existing
Practically untrue and untrue don't mean the same thing.
You could argue that they could be treated as if they mean the same thing (in some limited scope), but that is different to them meaning the same thing, and, since such an argument is not presented in the Wikipedia page (rather, a contrary position is presented by Russell in the second quotation on that page[0]) you would have to make that argument yourself.
[0] He makes an explicit distinction between what he ought to call himself if being purely logical and what he practically is (an agnostic and an atheist, respectively).
> But that doesn't mean we assume the opposite of the claim must be true until they do. It means we assume ignorance.
Regardless of the wording, the gist is the same: we /don't/ assume ignorance, we treat the claim, like Russell's teapot [0], or any other unsupported claim, as false until such evidence arises, since there are an infinite number of unfalsifiable premises, and we neither want to, nor do, in practice, treat them all as maybe true, maybe not, forever.
tl;dr: As Russell's teapot [0] demonstrates, yes, there is a default, and that is that a thing is false unless sufficient evidence exists to believe otherwise. No, we don't treat all unfalsified (and unfalsifiable) hypotheses as unknown and assume ignorance.
[0]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russell%27s_teapot