> tie them to a vicious deed in 3 hops, and point out that their current path is likely to facilitate more vicious deeds.
Which would be irrelevant to a non-consequentialist. You're morally responsible for the actions you commit, judged by the kind of actions they are, not their consequences.
yeah but Caplan explicitly references Hitler: notable not for killing anyone with his own hand but rather via this same "3 hops removed" type of causal chain. if he was considering only the action -- and none of this larger chain -- then he would have rather assigned moral responsibility to the soldiers in the trenches: right?
Most people would agree working for a company that makes weapons that kill people doesn't make you a murderer. But it's much more of a gray area when you order someone to murder and they do it. A lot of people don't distinguish between those two things.
It might not make someone a murderer but it does mean they've been supporting what the company is doing. They'd at the very least be responsible for their own part in allowing those actions to take place. Charles Manson didn't even order anyone to kill people but he was still found guilty of murder. There's a massive amount of grey area.
Which would be irrelevant to a non-consequentialist. You're morally responsible for the actions you commit, judged by the kind of actions they are, not their consequences.