This essay is pretty dense, but the language is plain and the arguments straightforward.
I'm going to have to think about the assumptions (which are fairly plainly laid out), claims, and conclusions, but on the whole the essay seems to be highly nutritious "food for thought".
One comment I have is that there is a (stated, but rather tangentially) assumption that one "good" human goal (or rather, a precondition to ideally allocate effort among all goods) is to be (or become) a "fully rational agent" without subjecting that axiom (as well as others) to the same sort of tradeoffs among goods. Some infusion of the concept of "bounded rationality" from game theory (and it's close cognates in evolutionary psychology, behavioral economics, etc.), might be helpful here (which actually strengthens the argument being made by implication in the latter part of the essay that moral philosophy as currently practiced is woefully uninformed by other fields of endeavor, and consequently suffers from large-scale epistemic closure).
"Full" (or as game theory would have it, "optimal" or "unbounded") rationality is often prohibitively expensive (in energy, space, or time), especially in any environment where agents (or cooperating groups of such) are contending for resources as well as their capacity to allocate them well.
I'm going to have to think about the assumptions (which are fairly plainly laid out), claims, and conclusions, but on the whole the essay seems to be highly nutritious "food for thought".
One comment I have is that there is a (stated, but rather tangentially) assumption that one "good" human goal (or rather, a precondition to ideally allocate effort among all goods) is to be (or become) a "fully rational agent" without subjecting that axiom (as well as others) to the same sort of tradeoffs among goods. Some infusion of the concept of "bounded rationality" from game theory (and it's close cognates in evolutionary psychology, behavioral economics, etc.), might be helpful here (which actually strengthens the argument being made by implication in the latter part of the essay that moral philosophy as currently practiced is woefully uninformed by other fields of endeavor, and consequently suffers from large-scale epistemic closure).
"Full" (or as game theory would have it, "optimal" or "unbounded") rationality is often prohibitively expensive (in energy, space, or time), especially in any environment where agents (or cooperating groups of such) are contending for resources as well as their capacity to allocate them well.