>I think trusting in our system of checks and balancees
No. A thousand times no. No damn way.
Don't trust, observe, verify. That is the /whole/ point of it. Like really, all of it. Compromising that system is the first hurdle of any person or group seeking more unchecked power. Don't trust, verify.
Without commenting on mk-ultra or any other specific thing. You assess the source. In so far as possible you assess the motives. You see who gains and loses by the release of the info and so on.
CIA says russia blew up its own pipeline. Gonna have to see some pretty good evidence of that to overcome the obvious necessary scepticism. Leaked cia doc says no russia did not. Already more plausible without knowing /anything/ else about it and I am expressing no view here about that incident or the existence of otherwise of documents. Yep both could be completely false. So you move on to corroborating evidence, multiple sources etc.
Moreover citing "the same people" without sourcing is weak as water. There are as many views as there are people to hold them. Inside the cia they will not be of one mind in their thinking.
>>> You trust a system of checks and balances precisely because of this.
>> I think trusting in our system of checks and balances
> No. A thousand times no. No damn way.
Which one is it? I paraphrased you, and you contradicted your own recommendation.
You’re proposing a flawed research methodology which uses an a priori fallacy. If the CIA says A, but an internal memo says B, B is more trustworthy. It’s equally as gullible as believing A, just inverted.
This is a treacherous assumption, especially if it concerns the CIA, which has among its stated missions information and psychological warfare. Propaganda using “accidental” disclosures is normal. By all means, use additional corroboration to update your Bayesian credences, but at that point you’ve advanced beyond the lazy skeptics being discussed.
The difference is between trusting that a system of checks and balances is required and trusting some particular implementation of something calling itself a system, without verifying what is actually happening now. Close your eyes, the system is perfect, I trust the system.
I highly recommend the formal study of history and the analysis of sources in particular for all of us. There is always more to learn.
I mean, I didn't originally want to call out the insane claim that everyone should try to personally verify all truth propositions. I guess you truly are the ultimate skeptic, or you have infinite time to throw away. Fortunately, for all productive people, our institutions are reliable, more often than not!
You didn't want to because nobody made that claim perhaps?
I do it when i want to. So do Dave and Mary. Abby is a professor who takes a professional interest in it as it pertains to X. And so on. It's open, anyone can. Anytime you have a doubt there it is.
In cryptography we never trust secret algos, that's pretty normal. I haven't verified every open one I've used either.
No. A thousand times no. No damn way.
Don't trust, observe, verify. That is the /whole/ point of it. Like really, all of it. Compromising that system is the first hurdle of any person or group seeking more unchecked power. Don't trust, verify.
Without commenting on mk-ultra or any other specific thing. You assess the source. In so far as possible you assess the motives. You see who gains and loses by the release of the info and so on.
CIA says russia blew up its own pipeline. Gonna have to see some pretty good evidence of that to overcome the obvious necessary scepticism. Leaked cia doc says no russia did not. Already more plausible without knowing /anything/ else about it and I am expressing no view here about that incident or the existence of otherwise of documents. Yep both could be completely false. So you move on to corroborating evidence, multiple sources etc.
Moreover citing "the same people" without sourcing is weak as water. There are as many views as there are people to hold them. Inside the cia they will not be of one mind in their thinking.