We can't really say for certain much at the moment, but what I stated makes the most sense based on the evidence we have.
> the non-self-aware impulse-to-live would still be enough for me to find it morally significant.
That non-self-aware impulse-to-live is morally equivalent to a plant seeking sunlight IMO.
> It would feel morally significant to me euthanizing a human neonate with a lethal condition that would otherwise prevent it from ever getting to a self-aware stage of life.
The difference is humans have an innate potential for self-awareness that the animals we eat for food do not.
> That non-self-aware impulse-to-live is morally equivalent to a plant seeking sunlight IMO.
Do you find the practice of raising meat in factory farms to be acceptable?
> The difference is humans have an innate potential for self-awareness that the animals we eat for food do not.
There are lots of differences. This is one. But what specifically about human self awareness lessens the value of animal life?
If we were not self aware, we’d kill and eat meat without considering the morality. So what is it about self awareness that somehow becomes a deciding factor here?
I’m not trying to catch you in some kind of “gotcha” but trying to understand your reasoning. If the moral implications of killing animals are roughly the same as killing plants, do you also believe agriculture needs reform for similar reasons? And if not, wouldn’t that indicate some higher moral obligation towards animals?
> Without self-awareness, there is no 'someone' to reflect on experiences. No personhood.
Why is reflection on experience the bar and not experience itself? Animals demonstrate learned behaviors, e.g. recognizing humans from memory and resuming friendly behavior based on that recognition. Similarly, avoidance of situations that are known to cause pain.
Our not-so-distant primate ancestors had a similar kind of experiential existence before gaining the ability to reflect on that experience.
The underlying experiences that this reflection reveals are the same experiences that predate our ability to self reflect and are the parts of us that are most common to us and other animals.
I guess what I’m fundamentally not understanding in your argument is the basis for the idea that a species gaining self reflection somehow becomes the point at which it becomes immoral to kill or harm that species.
Furthermore, moral behavior can be found all throughout the animal world, with clear indications of love/protection, companionship, sharing/cooperation, reciprocity, memory of transgressors, etc. Obviously the subjective experience of these behaviors will differ across species, but the more important point is that it seems problematic to attribute the existence of moral behavior to self awareness. Self awareness helps us improve our understanding of moral behavior through rational thought, but the logic of such inquiry ultimately still relies on those underlying subjective experiential states. The fact that through introspection we can identify and label these concepts is unique to humans, but what I conclude about this is quite a bit different than your claim.
I’d argue that gaining the ability to self reflect is the very thing that increases our moral obligations. Only through self reflection can we realize that as a species, we’re no longer bound to our evolutionary defaults, and no longer required to kill other animals to survive. What arguably started as natural selection of traits that are adaptive (but imperfect) for the survival of a social species could evolve beyond those more primitive defaults. And through self reflection we can now understand what pain feels like, and how inflicting it on others is harmful - to them and to us.
I’m not arguing that eating animals is never acceptable. But the way we go about it surely seems to matter, and if it matters, the implications of it mattering are worth exploring more broadly.
> If the moral implications of killing animals are roughly the same as killing plants
There is a difference in killing and suffering. I advocate to eliminate suffering and kill humanely. That's not a concern with plants.
> Why is reflection on experience the bar and not experience itself?
It is for suffering, but not for a right to life. There is no 'person' without self-awareness. Thus I don't see a need to grant a right to life.
> Animals demonstrate learned behaviors, e.g. recognizing humans from memory and resuming friendly behavior based on that recognition. Similarly, avoidance of situations that are known to cause pain.
Animals, most mammals at least, are hardwired for socialization and to avoid harm. This doesn't really indicate anything.
> this reflection reveals are the same experiences that predate our ability to self reflect
That's the key though. Self-awareness is the distinction.
> I guess what I’m fundamentally not understanding in your argument is the basis for the idea that a species gaining self reflection somehow becomes the point at which it becomes immoral to kill or harm that species.
Without self-awareness, they are not a 'person', essentially just more complex automata. They can't shape their environment, they are just a part of their environment, following their instincts.
They don't think, therefore they are not.
> Furthermore, moral behavior can be found all throughout the animal world, with clear indications of love/protection, companionship, sharing/cooperation, reciprocity, memory of transgressors, etc.
Some of that is just programmed instinct, quite different from humans. For examples, some mothers will attack their young, does this mean they 'love' them, or they have a programmed instinct to protect their young? Some of those same mothers will eat some of their young also, keep in mind before you answer.
> I’d argue that gaining the ability to self reflect is the very thing that increases our moral obligations.
Sure, to reduce harm, but not to not take a life.
Take a cod for example. It has no self-awareness, no personhood, no traits worth valuing. Its body is worth more than it's life, and if killed humanely no harm is done.
> the implications of it mattering are worth exploring more broadly.
I agree. But I've spent the last few years debating and researching this stuff, and I've come to my conclusions. They are in line with our current scientific understanding, and unless something changes it's what will continue to make sense to me.
We can't really say for certain much at the moment, but what I stated makes the most sense based on the evidence we have.
> the non-self-aware impulse-to-live would still be enough for me to find it morally significant.
That non-self-aware impulse-to-live is morally equivalent to a plant seeking sunlight IMO.
> It would feel morally significant to me euthanizing a human neonate with a lethal condition that would otherwise prevent it from ever getting to a self-aware stage of life.
The difference is humans have an innate potential for self-awareness that the animals we eat for food do not.