I haven't heard of the idea of the "hard problem of consciousness" before, but after reading this Wikipedia article, it sounds like nonsense. Like, take this passage:
> For example, it is logically possible for a perfect replica of [David] Chalmers to have no experience at all, or for it to have a different set of experiences (such as an inverted visible spectrum, so that the blue-yellow red-green axes of its visual field are flipped).
A perfect replica? So you somehow make an exact copy of a person and his environment, down the last gluon, and play time forward, and you'd think that the two people might have different experiences?
No way. In every other situation, if you set up a system in the exact same way, you'll get the same outcome. (Yes, randomness can come into play, but the distribution of outcomes will be the same.)
I agree with this:
> The philosopher Thomas Metzinger likens the hard problem of consciousness to vitalism, a formerly widespread view in biology which was not so much solved as abandoned. Brian Jonathan Garrett has also argued that the hard problem suffers from flaws analogous to those of vitalism.[1]
You are mistaking qualia and the experience of said qualia. Chalmers is asking why is there experience at all. I am not talking about memories, feelings, emotions or what have you. The question is why is there someone to observe those qualia in the first place?
> For example, it is logically possible for a perfect replica of [David] Chalmers to have no experience at all, or for it to have a different set of experiences (such as an inverted visible spectrum, so that the blue-yellow red-green axes of its visual field are flipped).
A perfect replica? So you somehow make an exact copy of a person and his environment, down the last gluon, and play time forward, and you'd think that the two people might have different experiences?
No way. In every other situation, if you set up a system in the exact same way, you'll get the same outcome. (Yes, randomness can come into play, but the distribution of outcomes will be the same.)
I agree with this:
> The philosopher Thomas Metzinger likens the hard problem of consciousness to vitalism, a formerly widespread view in biology which was not so much solved as abandoned. Brian Jonathan Garrett has also argued that the hard problem suffers from flaws analogous to those of vitalism.[1]
1. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vitalism