It's mostly Azure though that is badly designed to such an extent that multiple times there have been global outages. In general Azure availability, security (the only major cloud provider with not one but multiple cross-tenant security exploits) and usability are pretty terrible so it shouldn't be used for anything but saying "this is how it should not be done".
GCP had a similar thing once, where a BGP update knocked out their Asian regions.
AWS have never had a global outage. (And no, that time S3 in us-east-1 was down wasn't a global outage, the only customer code/workloads that were impacted was code interacting with S3 that didn't specify the region and had to rely on us-east-1 to determine it, and it didn't work anymore)
Do you have a link to an article about that? My google-fu is weak, and this sounds interesting - that should not happen to DNS - at all - and from the outside Route53 looks quite well managed. So what the heck did they do?
Someday someone will write a book about how AD, AAD, etc, exert the control they do at MS and go as unchecked (or at the time) as they do. AD's inability to execute made Azure a significantly less pleasant platform until they finally fixed accounts a couple of years back to properly do OAuth 2.0 with ARM.
Maybe the book is just "AD brings in the money" but wow, they sure bring it down as well. Global outages like that always stink of AD.
GCP had a similar thing once, where a BGP update knocked out their Asian regions.
AWS have never had a global outage. (And no, that time S3 in us-east-1 was down wasn't a global outage, the only customer code/workloads that were impacted was code interacting with S3 that didn't specify the region and had to rely on us-east-1 to determine it, and it didn't work anymore)