Clearly, the Fourth Circuit at the time saw it that way. But that does not address the question of how was it viewed by the Framers who gaurunteed one (at least on the Federal level) in Article III. It also does not address the question (perhaps more relevant today) of what ought it to be and how ought it be treated?
It is possible, indeed likely given the history, that the Framer's saw providing nullifcation as part of the purpose of enshrining a jury trial in the Constitution.
Whether they saw it that way or not, the relevant question is, how ought we treat it? Should we treat it as an unfortunate side effect that we can't completely get rid of but should do everything we can to minimize? Or something to be embraced as essential? Or perhaps in between those two extremes, as something genuinely useful, but only "in extremis" when all better options have failed?
Well, original intent as a theory of law interpretation is considered problematic, and not really used by anyone. You can't necessarily read lawmakers' minds, and lots of law--especially the Constitution--was written by many different personalities often at odds with each other, where 'original intent' might not exist even theoretically.
Some people confuse the 'original meaning' theories of someone like Scalia with original intent, particularly since the words of the Founders could be used to support either theory. But it's a different thing. So you can talk about what the Founders meant, and it's a fine thing to think about, but it's not something that will get you far in the courtroom unless you can link that to what is written and what is in common law.
I should disclaim that I am not a lawyer, but there are legal scholars that discuss actually using original intent and courts that cite specifically to intent in their decisions. Though, I agree fully that in attempting to argue intent you must still be able to tie it to what is written.
I also fully concur that many laws may mean different things even to the people involved in passing them, yet some times they can be clear, especially when laid out in clear records of the debate or in an explicit intent section as part of the bill.
The intent, when known, can help inform the way a law will be interpreted by the courts. Prof. Ian Bartrum discusses this in "The Modalities of Constitutional Argument" and Prof. Philip Bobbit goes into more detail in "Constitutional Fate" and "Constitutional Interpretation."
You have a good point that Scalia's 'Original meaning' is different from 'Original intent' and 'Original meaning' is far more objective. But that does not mean intent is not considered. For a modern case where Congressional intent was at the center of an 11th Circ. decision look at Harris v. H&W contracting Company, 102 F. 3d 516 (11th Circ, 1996).
[Edited to remove a redundancy]
Thouh, while I think intent here has relevance, I still think the more salient question is prudential. Regardless of how it came to exist, what should the role of jury nullification be?
It is possible, indeed likely given the history, that the Framer's saw providing nullifcation as part of the purpose of enshrining a jury trial in the Constitution.
Whether they saw it that way or not, the relevant question is, how ought we treat it? Should we treat it as an unfortunate side effect that we can't completely get rid of but should do everything we can to minimize? Or something to be embraced as essential? Or perhaps in between those two extremes, as something genuinely useful, but only "in extremis" when all better options have failed?