> First very simple point, to become insolvent you have to actually take a loss somewhere. They may have a lot of junk tokens on their balance sheet, and these tokens may be overmarked, but Alameda's cost basis (most of them were from seed rounds) is still way below their current value.
Hypothetical scenario: Alice invests $100M in seed rounds for a bunch of tokens. The token values go way up, and the holdings are nominally worth $14B. Alice borrows $7B in real dollars. Alice loses those real dollars on other bets. The nominal value of the tokens is still $14B, but Alice can't actually liquidate them for $7B in real dollars. So Alice is functionally unable to pay back the loans.
So Alice took a loss somewhere (on the other bets) and is effectively insolvent, but you can't assess that just by looking at the cost basis of the tokens that Alice still holds.
(I don't know if this actually describes Alameda; it's entirely possible that Alameda's loans are token-denominated as you're saying, in which case Alameda would be solvent. I'm just pointing out that it's more complicated than just looking at the cost basis.)
Hypothetical scenario: Alice invests $100M in seed rounds for a bunch of tokens. The token values go way up, and the holdings are nominally worth $14B. Alice borrows $7B in real dollars. Alice loses those real dollars on other bets. The nominal value of the tokens is still $14B, but Alice can't actually liquidate them for $7B in real dollars. So Alice is functionally unable to pay back the loans.
So Alice took a loss somewhere (on the other bets) and is effectively insolvent, but you can't assess that just by looking at the cost basis of the tokens that Alice still holds.
(I don't know if this actually describes Alameda; it's entirely possible that Alameda's loans are token-denominated as you're saying, in which case Alameda would be solvent. I'm just pointing out that it's more complicated than just looking at the cost basis.)