The conclusion of this article does not follow from its premise. "Hydranencephalous babies are conscious, so materialist views of consciousness are wrong and dualism is the only explanation."
I am not familiar with hydranencephaly so I might be wrong here but, from what I can find, patients with the condition usually have some cerebral structures intact, it's just the cerebral hemispheres that are missing. Patients appear to be conscious, and react to varying degrees to their environment, though their sensory and cognitive abilities are severely impaired or outright missing. The exact degree to which they are conscious strikes me as unknowable, but there seems to be at least some level of consciousness there. All good.
Wouldn't this situation lend credence to the materialist explanation? A human being born with only basic cerebral structures intact displays only basic levels of consciousness.
The author claims that these babies are "interactive, and show a full range of emotions" and uses that as evidence for a dualist view of consciousness. He seems to conveniently ignore the severe limitations that these patients show, which appear to track fairly well with the severity of the condition. No dualism required here, at least in my view.
Now, if the author were to show evidence of a patient who displays some level of consciousness while missing all cerebral structures, I think he'd be onto something. But that's not a thing, as far as I'm aware. A materialist view should be able to explain how these patients appear to be conscious while missing large parts of their brains, and it hasn't done it so far. That is not an argument in favour of the opposing view.
I am not familiar with hydranencephaly so I might be wrong here but, from what I can find, patients with the condition usually have some cerebral structures intact, it's just the cerebral hemispheres that are missing. Patients appear to be conscious, and react to varying degrees to their environment, though their sensory and cognitive abilities are severely impaired or outright missing. The exact degree to which they are conscious strikes me as unknowable, but there seems to be at least some level of consciousness there. All good.
Wouldn't this situation lend credence to the materialist explanation? A human being born with only basic cerebral structures intact displays only basic levels of consciousness.
The author claims that these babies are "interactive, and show a full range of emotions" and uses that as evidence for a dualist view of consciousness. He seems to conveniently ignore the severe limitations that these patients show, which appear to track fairly well with the severity of the condition. No dualism required here, at least in my view.
Now, if the author were to show evidence of a patient who displays some level of consciousness while missing all cerebral structures, I think he'd be onto something. But that's not a thing, as far as I'm aware. A materialist view should be able to explain how these patients appear to be conscious while missing large parts of their brains, and it hasn't done it so far. That is not an argument in favour of the opposing view.