> That you know about. Your house mates share the internet connection.
This is actually the least likely these days... the no.1 cause would be CGNAT, the vast majority of residential endpoints share an IPv4 address with a huge number of users, mobile networks are even worse... that's before we even get to IP recycling for dynamic IPs which happens at high frequency with mobile networks again, so you will inevitably get affected eventually.
This is why it's a bad idea to block IPs outright, because today one IP address never equates to a single individual or the same set of individuals over time. The other problem with blocking IP addresses based on abuse is considering them equal in user weight, yet one IP might have 2 users, another might have 10000 users - Blocking a TOR exit node is a good extreme example of this... people think of it as an effective defence because of the concentration of abuse on that single IP address, but they fail to consider the concentration of users behind that IP address - TOR exit nodes probably are a slightly higher source of abuse per user, but not any where as high as per IP - if you measure abuse per IP you are more likely looking a rough picture of users per IP for highly NATed IPs.
This is actually the least likely these days... the no.1 cause would be CGNAT, the vast majority of residential endpoints share an IPv4 address with a huge number of users, mobile networks are even worse... that's before we even get to IP recycling for dynamic IPs which happens at high frequency with mobile networks again, so you will inevitably get affected eventually.
This is why it's a bad idea to block IPs outright, because today one IP address never equates to a single individual or the same set of individuals over time. The other problem with blocking IP addresses based on abuse is considering them equal in user weight, yet one IP might have 2 users, another might have 10000 users - Blocking a TOR exit node is a good extreme example of this... people think of it as an effective defence because of the concentration of abuse on that single IP address, but they fail to consider the concentration of users behind that IP address - TOR exit nodes probably are a slightly higher source of abuse per user, but not any where as high as per IP - if you measure abuse per IP you are more likely looking a rough picture of users per IP for highly NATed IPs.