>According to Air Force Research Laboratory slides dated Aug. 3, 2020, however, the service suspected that several transistors and microchips inside the sequencer were fake
>The lab also found signs that Teledyne had destroyed evidence related to the case, the lawsuit said. Teledyne appeared to have replaced five microchips on the sequencer before sending it to the lab
3rd world tier corruption and fraud. Based on the number of failed and severely cost overrun military projects I'd say it applies to way more than just this situation
The use of "3rd world" term makes me cringe a little even in this context. Isn't it more comparable to Boeing Conspiracy and Corruption [1] or even the Fat Leornard US Navy corruption [2] - which are indeed first-world corruptions?
Definition of 3rd world has changed overtime - but overall we can agree that; it now means developing countries with (1) high rates of poverty, (2) economic and/or political instability, and (3) high mortality rates.
Yes, above factors are indeed very conducive for corruption and fraud, but does it imply there's no corruption in "First-world"? I think the difference is it’s hidden (not as consequential) and some accountability come about sometimes... e.g MDHS Welfare fraud [3] [4], not to mention Covid related frauds.
To me the term has aged and similar to saying to someone "that is so ghetto"... which its use has declined considerably as a regular American vernacular. Another intersting term often used wily-nily with negative connotation of otherness is "Banana Republic" - which is very interesting when you consider the origin and who brought such conditions that led to the term being coined.
I didn't mean to inject "wokeness" to the discussion; for one I was born is so called 3rd world country (so perhaps a little sensitive?), and more importantly I'm obsessed with origin and use of words and phrases overtime as contemporary vernacular.
I’ve always found the evolution of third world very odd. How does something go from countries that are not Cold War participants to developing countries? I tend to thinking it in the original context and often find myself misunderstanding people when they use the term. I know definitions change, but it seems like an odd transition.
I considered this for a while, being from Uruguay (a member of that great category of countries) and for me, it generally means geopolitically and even economically weightless countries.
It might be pessimistic but it -feels- like whatever happens here, be it coups, economics experiments, great innovations and the like - does not impact or even reach the rest of the world. One (mildly) rich Californian has more potential impact on the world than all of Latin America could ever have in the best of days.
While I agree that the term is outdated and should just be replaced with "developing", "third world" always had the economic side to it. "First World" countries not only were the major Western powers in the Cold War, they also had the best standards of living. "Second World" countries, despite meaning the Soviet side, also meant countries with a lesser quality of life, where store shelves were constantly empty and people often had to wait hours in line to buy even basic staples like bread and meat. And yet for the most part people weren't starving (except for the Soviet famines in the 1930s or the Chinese one in the late 1950s). This wasn't the case for the "third world" countries not part of either bloc (mostly countries just achieving independence from colonialism) which often had the worst standards of living (largely because their economies, developed under colonialism, never developed a consumer economy as they were primarily geared towards export to the country that colonized them)
Thrid world didn't always have an economic side to it. Third world was coined as a delineation of cold war participation status - it had nothing to do with economics. Switzerland, Austria, Ireland, and Finland were all included in the original definition of third world, but now no longer fit the modern definition of developing nation.
There always was the notion that first-world countries tended to be economically liberal with market economies, whilst second-world ones had controlled economies. High living standards were associated with the first group, for good and bad reasons (and propaganda). And then there are always outliers. Though your example all have moved firmly to the first world since the 1950s.
I always kind of assumed thats why they weren't Cold War participants.
If you don't have a "developed" economy you're not as useful of a trade/etc partner than a country with a developed economy. Or your country is basically semi-colonizable then it'll just be semi-colonized instead (i.e. parts of your country become a gated community for the oil field employees).
Countries not participating in Cold war? Then ie Switzerland or Monaco and so on were 3rd world, top of the world when it comes to wealth per capita. Not a definition that most people would agree with
This is a common refrain of the American exceptionalism narrative. The implication is pretty clear: anything bad must necessarily be un-American, and the solution is to be more American (whatever that means).
After the Academy, Singleton elected to study electrical engineering at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), and graduated in 1940, receiving both bachelor's (Sc.B.) and master's (Sc.M.) degrees in this field. During his first year there, he was a member of a three-man team that won the Putnam Prize in the William Lowell Putnam Mathematical Competition, administered annually by the Mathematical Association of America. Another member of the team was Richard P. Feynman, a future Nobel Prize Laureate.
And yet, since Singleton stepped down in 1986 Teledyne has had trouble with reputation. It may be that the only time they make the news is when they've committed Fraud.
For me, the sour taste comes from one of their engineers discreetly taking photos at an interoperability test event I was helping host many years ago. The NDA was clear. They knew what they were doing.
It could be! The company was from the 60s and made a lot of electronics. *dyne names were not unusual, so a movie director in the 80s who had been a kid in the 50s and 60s would have been quite comfortable with such a name.
To add to the examples of the name is the 1950s Fairey Rotodyne[1], a hybrid aircraft-helicopter-gyrocopter with jet exhausts in the tips of the rotor blades.
There is a 1954 prototype[2] at the fabulous but small Museum of Berkshire Aviation near Reading, about 30 miles west of London.
> The name is reminiscent of several real high-tech companies, including the Gyrodyne Company of America, Teledyne and Teradyne, all of which were founded a few years before Pynchon wrote The Crying of Lot 49, and Rocketdyne, an aerospace company that manufactured, among other things, propulsion systems.
> The "dyne" is the standard unit of force in the centimetre–gram–second (CGS) system of units, derived from the Greek word dynamis, meaning "power" or "force".
I think it’s short for “dynamic” given the vintage of the names, like ”ola” was popular in the early decades of the 20th century, hence “Shinola” shoeshine or “Motorola” car radios.
It is also a non-SI unit, but that might be too obscure — or might motivate nerds like the teledyne founders!
“Weyland” is because they wanted to use Leyland-Toyota but we’re sure they’d be sued, so they changed the first letter. I don’t how “Toyota” became “Yutani”.
The resulting name is better than Leyland-Toyota anyway.
Ha! I've always thought of Tessier-Ashpool every time I saw "Thyssen Krupp" brand on some piece of machinery. Eventually I found out that Krupp supported Nazi regime and used slave labor. Guess they have a fitting name for evil corporation with members of the clan behind it convicted as a criminals against humanity?
May I pass along my congratulations for your great interdimensional breakthrough. I am sure, in the miserable annals of the Earth, you will be duly enshrined.
> The 1984 film The Adventures of Buckaroo Banzai Across the 8th Dimension used the name Yoyodyne Propulsion Systems for a defense contractor whose corporate offices feature the sign, "The future begins tomorrow". Yoyodyne is a front for a group of red Lectroid aliens, all with the first name John, that landed in New Jersey in 1938, using the panic created by Orson Welles' War of the Worlds radio play as cover.[0]
I'm a big fan of Buckaroo Banzai but it seems odd that you credit BB when the linked Wikipedia article is about the original source of "Yoyodyne"
> Yoyodyne was introduced as a fictional defense contractor in Thomas Pynchon's V. (1963) and featured prominently in his novel The Crying of Lot 49 (1966).
Btw, Lot 49 is a wonderful book and chock full of little cultural memes like Yoyodyne.
I assumed OP was probably remembering the 1984 film, and Buckaroo's Yoyodyne doesn't have its own wiki page. That is it. Plus the other uses are interesting even if trivial. Star Trek used the same exact form as the Buckaroo Bonzai film, "Yoyodyne Propulsion Systems," which probably isn't coincidence. I think that's neat, and that everyone should have the opportunity to stroke their chin and ponder this.
> Yoyodyne Propulsion Systems for a defense contractor whose corporate offices feature the sign, "The future begins tomorrow"
That’s an interesting slogan, as I’d have thought that “the future begins today” seems more innovative. The future beginning tomorrow seems a bit of a tautology and procrastination.
It reflects poorly on the company, but if it was really third world tier corruption, we wouldn't find out about it until the parts started screwing up during a war.
I'm sure Russia would love to be worrying about specific transistor models in their ejection seats, at this point! (note, I'm aware of the pedantic point that Russia is definitionally not third world, they are just another point of comparison in this case).
Pretty sure a transistor-level of accident analysis would be only possible in peace-time? But the 1st LT was parabellum, so maybe it counts. (Forgive my grammar)
Ukrainians are sending Russian hardware to US and other allies for analysis - immediately. But if your only ally is Iran and North Korea, perhaps you really don't have so many options...
Maybe the best source for Russian military tech since the German reunification when the BRD inherited the not too badly maintained frontline stuff from the NVA. Which was not, as opposed to most other Warsaw pact nations, export variants of Russian hardware. As a frontline state in the Cold War East Germany gear was close to Red Army/Air Force/Navy specs.
What? You replace real working parts with fake/non-working stuff, and you pocket the diff in cost. You cut all QA b/c you know it's fake, no need to test.
The government pays, but, you have a much higher profit margin if you just fake everything.
Is it worth the risk though? I suspect deliberate fraud like this will be caught by the military, it will lead to scandal, and not only will it cost money but will likely lead to prison times for the people involved.
Boeing's lies and conspiracies around the 737 MAX directly led to the deaths of hundreds. Their ultimate penalty was a settlement involving a fine equal to about 2 days of revenue, and compensation to the families of those they killed equaling to about 12 more days of revenue. [1] The release did not specify, but settlements of this sort generally require the victims to waive their right to further civil or other legal measures, so that's the end.
The people ultimately responsible for these things not only don't go to jail, they tend to make substantial profit from it after all is said and done. In a a matter of weeks everybody had forgotten (except I'm sure those related to the victims), a slap on the wrist was given, and we're straight back to giving Boeing billions of dollars in taxpayer funds to do the only thing they're good at: killing people.
On the off chance somebody doesn't understand the reference - Boeing is the 2nd largest defense contractor in the US, scoring upwards of $22 billion in contracts las year, after that settlement.
Can speak from the perspective of a finance professional constantly rolling his eyes at insider traders. Many people assume enforcement is far weaker than it is. That leads them to make stupid choices. For a period of time, during the Iraq War, enforcement was weak around military procurement. But the wheels of justice grind slowly, and I guess every generation needs its examples.
> But the wheels of justice grind slowly, and I guess every generation needs its examples
All the covid relief and stimulus fraud that's slowly being investigated is another example of this. All you have to do to disabuse yourself of the idea that law enforcement is weak is go to justice.gov and click news.
Click on any of the states, click news. Tons of covid fraud being prosecuted already in all of these places where small fry's thought they could get away with this. Medical fraud is another example.
Okay, and that's great and all, but the DOJ basically doesn't go after big fish anymore. As the commenter above you points out, lot's of these kinds of things still end up being revenue positive
I don't know of any big fish where's there's sufficient evidence that they have committed crimes and where the DOJ has decided to not charge. What are some examples?
I've been with a few separate orgs that had this exact thing happening. When you flag it, they come down from on high saying "oh, it's been waived", trusting that no one will actually ask to see the waiver. Two of those orgs ended up paying fines, nothing compared to the profit, but eh, better than nothing.
I'd say it's far more likely that Teledyne let an unauthorized, or improperly cleared, technician touch the production line, who then stole the parts for intelligence purposes and replaced them with stuff he acquired by other means (desoldered them from home stereos, purchased on eBay, whatever). That would motivate a cover-up. No American, particularly someone working in the defense industry, wants fighter pilots to die. Unless of course they have other allegiances.
This is so hilariously naive I almost don't know what to say. If anything it's the other way around nobody cares about the soldiers as long as the bottom line is met. I mean just look how the US treats their veterans, to proof the point.
Optimism bias is also a thing, they don't necessarily need to "want fighter pilots to die", but it won't stop some people trying to pocket some money ("it may never be used anyway").
Greed is much more common than sabotage. Everyone at every level of production uses 3rd party materials and counterfeit has the potential to be cheaper than non-countfit.
Defense contractors generally pay about 10% less than market for any given service, so I don't discount the possibility that my hypothetical technician may have stolen the goods in order to get some extra money. A poor financial situation is easily the most common motive for the direct perpetrators of espionage.
If revenue is fixed, the only way to make more money is to reduce costs. Using cheaper parts with less/nonexistent quality control is one way to do that. Or even just straight up laziness. The "trust but verify" approach is more work than just trusting your suppliers to never make mistakes.
Just at the start of the chip shortage.
Add in the problem that many military designs ware qualified decades ago and are based on what was available then, which are now obsolete.
There has been problems with counterfeit chips and parts infiltrating the market for decades.
The margins are also very good.
This exposes a major vulnerability in our military tech that can be (has been ?) exploited by our adversaries - likely the ones actually building the chips!
It didn't make sense already? I don't know if you need this as a separate justification—the global chip shortage and Chinese saber-rattling over Taiwan should be justification enough.
It already made a lot of sense. And it made sense decades ago. But now that we have evidence that it has already impacted operations I can see why leadership across multiple organizations is taking it more seriously.
There’s a lot of potential problems in the world, but leadership doesn’t always take them seriously.
My friend who does electronics repair says he's been shotgunning (replacing all of a part, without testing them) Electrolytic caps in transistor radios since the late 1950s. He said it almost always worked.
It was particularly bad for a few years due to supply chain issues. I worked at BestBuy at that time and it was easily 30% of our workload, computer comes in acting weird, take the side panel off and see a bunch of blown caps.
Electrolytics have a limited lifespan, that's not due to poor quality like the PCs with caps blowing out. Almost any old electronics will need caps replaced if they haven't already been.
I worked for my uncle who had arcade games then for a lottery with slot machines. Capacitors always leak I've never seen a device over 40 years where there wasn't a bad cap.
At the lottery I had a $5,000 3D multilayered monitor fail. All it needed were 3 SMD caps at maybe 1 cent total parts cost plus labour to fix. the lottery just trashed the monitor instead.
USA corporations trying their hand at vertical integration. Normally they stick to 1st world tier corruption (directly buying off politicians) which is a scale far greater than anything the third world can imagine.
This raises some interesting questions about "unit testing" hardware. I would assume one would design a board with some regular self testing. (This coukd of course be the problem).
And it would be moderately hard to cheaply fake a chips that met the requirements of form factor, power and so on - and still was able to respond to some basic interrogation but also was flawed in some way (ie the way that cuts out the expensive bit)
Inwoukd love to know the specifics here of how fake chips walk that line. Cos otherwise it feels like "OMG any electronics could fail at any moment and there is nothing we can do"
Self-testing most analog and sensing hardware is next to impossible in a circuit. Even testing them via specially designed test points can just not be possible at times.
A complex microchip can be easily caught. Simple one... Not necessarily.
Yeah, 1st world tier corruption doesn't take just one life, it fakes Weapons of Mass Destruction photos in the 3rd world to falsely justify the killing of hundreds of thousands and the disruption of the lives of millions.
If you're talking about the Iraq war, this was one of the most disapointing things the west ever did... i mean... I totally expected them to "accidentaly" find something with a CNN crew just randomly being there.. like one of those "we just 'liberated' this iraqi building, here camera crews, you can go inside with us, so we all look in the basement together, who knows what's in there, might be barrels of radioactive fuel, that we totally didn't put there ourselves, promise!", and not even that...
But somehow, american still speak about "fighting for freedom" and act as if they're the "good guys", while they go and destroy another middle eastern country.
> When the president ultimately decided that the Iraqi regime must be ousted by force, he was influenced by five key factors:
> 1) Saddam was a threat to U.S. interests before 9/11....He had developed WMD and used chemical weapons fatally against Iran and Iraqi Kurds. Iraq's official press issued statements praising the 9/11 attacks on the U.S.
> 2) The threat of renewed aggression by Saddam was more troubling and urgent after 9/11.
> 3) To contain the threat from Saddam, all reasonable means short of war had been tried unsuccessfully for a dozen years.
> 4) While there were large risks involved in a war, the risks of leaving Saddam in power were even larger. The U.S. and British pilots patrolling the no-fly zones were routinely under enemy fire, and a larger confrontation – over Kuwait again or some other issue – appeared virtually certain to arise
And probably the biggest factor:
> 5) America after 9/11 had a lower tolerance for such dangers.
But let's just ignore history and claim that there was no other impetus for war other than making accusations that turned out to be false.
I dunno, that's the intended interpretation from the headline, but the article doesn't really substantiate it. The way you'd see "fraud" in a never-used item like an ejection seat is that it just wouldn't have its components. The expensive stuff would be missing, which to my eyes would be the explosives/rockets, absolutely not the electronics.
What they found was that the electronics looked "shoddy", which isn't (again, to my eyes) the same as "fraud"[1]. More like "we can't get the original parts anymore for this order, just use this off-the-shelf transistor instead", or "crap, we stuffed the wrong parts, pull them out and rework them by hand".
[1] In the way you mean it. Obviously if it's not the specified part then it's not delivering the item ordered. But not really "3rd world tier corruption".
I would assume that everything is speced out to low weight, high G-force tolerance, and robustness under vibration. In those cases, even changing the solder formulation could be catastrophic.
How does a manufacturer of some defective part get ahold of that piece of evidence from a plane crash? NTSB investigates civilian aircraft accidents, and this kind of thing couldn't ever happen. But someone(s) on the DoD or Air Force investigative teams collected this evidence, and at some point someone sent evidence back to the manufacturer, allowing their opportunity to tamper with it? And they weren't even careful enough to not make it blatantly obvious? It's as upsetting as it is crazy.
Possibly the investigators wanted to examine some spare parts that were still in the manufacturer's possession? After all the parts that had crashed might have been too damaged to answer all their questions...
> I dunno, that's the intended interpretation from the headline
My only intentions when writing the headline were to avoid the click-bait format of the original and to communicate that it is suspected that counterfeit electronic components somehow ended up in an F-16. That is supported by this sentence from the article:
> Suppliers Atmel, Analog Devices and Siliconix provided the potentially counterfeit transistors, memory chips and accelerometer chip, according to the Air Force slides.
I have no idea how it would have happened and I hope I didn't phrase the title in a way that suggested any particular possibility.
I don't know if it meets the legal definition of fraud, but it will certainly get you in trouble.
I imagine Aviation is similar to Medical Devices and in that (my) environment, to build a device using a component with a different part than specified in the design, you need at a minimum an evaluation from an EE to see if the suggested replacement is suitable. That's considered a Design Change and the evaluation, criteria to be met, and outcome (possibly including Test Data), along with the peer review will all be documented to create an Engineering Change Order (ECO). Only when that ECO is approved and released, can you then start building the assembly with the new part. Anything else would be Non-Conforming and could cause you to have to recall all the devices that were built incorrectly.
Basically, changing a part is not a trivial undertaking. For non-critical parts, the process will be quicker but nothing can be changed without documented justification.
This could be very bad for the people in charge. A metallurgist got 10 years for falsifying reports of steel robustness recently[1], and another 15 years for uniforms made in China. Selling counterfeits to the military could even get you jailed on treason charges.
Thanks for sharing the first link. Having worked in subsea for a number of years and co-ordinating a lot of material testing QA/QC, I'm always on the lookout for such cases.
It blows my mind why she thought the testing requirements were "stupid". For those unfamiliar, subsea testing requirements set a high-bar (pun intended) because failure in operation is simply not an option. From my non-expert understanding, testing at such low temperatures is not just an order of magnitude factor thing for simulating the operating temperature of the environment, it actually helps put the material in a state to check for other things when under test (maybe increased pressure?). Steel intended for subsea use is not your everyday stuff, apart from it's role in distributing forces, corrosion resistance is designed into the alloy through other elements and the resulting structure (often normalised), to perform even after impact.
Can you recommend any resources for noobs (laypersons)? What's state of the art and best practices?
I've been curious about fraud, counterfeits, grey market, and such for a while.
Authenticity, in all domains, seems like a huge problem.
And an opportunity. While I was working for a fashion retailer, I suggested we should emphasis our end-to-end chain of custody, so customers knew our Gucci handbags were legit. To contrast us with Amazon & eBay, for example.
Wow. Clicking the first link I thought “there’s no amount of money that would make falsifying results worthwhile” but she literally did it for no amount of money. It was just... laziness? It’s almost unbelievable. They had no process to audit or spot check results? Were there just no controls?
>When confronted with the falsified results, Ms Thomas suggested that in some cases she gave metal positive results because she thought it was "stupid" that the Navy required the tests to be conducted at -100F (-70C)
Sounds like arrogance.
Given that there hasn't been any known issues with the steel provided, perhaps she's correct that the requirements of the test were stupid. But still not right.
It does seem "stupid" to require testing of steel at one hundred degrees below zero when the steel is going to be used in a submarine. How will the steel ever end up at a temperature of -100F?
I'm not a metallurgist, but I did take a class at MIT on the subject and worked in a metallurgy lab for a couple of summers. The temperature of steel has an effect on the nature of fractures that can occur. Ductile fractures start at a crack and the steel deforms as the crack widens. This is the way most everyday metals under everyday circumstances act. The deformation absorbs energy and dissipates the forces acting on the metal. If this occurred in a beam, it might be observed to be deformed before a catastrophic failure happens.
Brittle fracture is different. A crack forms and it travels rapidly like breaking glass. Such fractures travel through the metal at the speed of sound through the metal (over 2000 ft/sec for steel). Pipelines in Alaska can experience such fractures. Such a fracture could travel thousands of feet because at the point of fracture there is no pressure drop at all (since that drop in pressure would travel at the slower speed of sound though natural gas).
This is a concern in Alaska because a piece of steel can exhibit ductile fracture behavior at ordinary temperature but transition to brittle fracture at lower temperatures. This transition point depends on the steel composition and its history. The history of the steel includes heat and mechanical treatments during it's production, but also the stresses put on it during its use such as welding, shaping and forming, vibration, and even exposure to radiation (which will occur in some parts of a submarine since they contain nuclear reactors). I have no idea
how the steel was intended to be used, but conceivably there could be good reasons for the -100F requirement even if the steel was never going to come close to this temperature. (For example, I know nothing of the relationship of radiation embrittlement and the ductile-brittle fracture temperature transition.) So while the testing requirement sounds "stupid" it is perhaps even stupider to ignore it.
Background: I worked in the pressure vessel manufacturing industry as a design engineer and have pretty deep experience with designing around brittle fracture.
1) Just because the testing requirements say -100 °F but the temperatures will "never" get there is false.
2) There is a direct correlation between fracture toughness at various temperatures and impact testing, but testing may need to be at a different temperature than operation conditions to successfully validate the material.
Regarding 1, rapid release of a compressed gas can reach cryogenic temperatures shockingly fast, even if the surrounding environment will never reach those temperatures. This principle is widely used[0] and the correct conditions can occur in everyday situations. For example, vessels meant for operation on the Texas coast are routinely designed to withstand -20°F temperatures despite the fact that the lowest temperature ever recorded in the area is 10°F.
Regarding 2, there has been nearly a century of intense research into fracture toughness and how it correlates with low temperatures. The American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) and American Petroleum Institute (API) have published gobs of (paywalled) articles about correlating minimum design metal temperatures and fracture toughness, although here's[1] an older U.S. DOD document from 1981 outlining their findings in guns, specifically.
> I'm not even a metallurgist, and yet I know metals and other materials[1] can lose their strength at low temperatures.
I'm not defending her actions, but isn't the coldest ocean water possible still going to be warmer that 24°F? How would a submarine ever get to the top of a mountain at the South Pole (where the -100°F temps are)?
Well for one submarines have parts that are over water, and can be stored in dry bays on the continent, for repair or construction (also the steel itself is stored on the continent prior to being used). For second the coldest wind chill recorded in the US was -100°F at McGrath, Alaska in 1989. So it's not too much of a stretch to take this value a minimal value for testing the material.
McGrath, AK is at 330ft of elevation in a river basin surrounded by mountains, 170mi from it's nearest shoreline (as the bird flies). Air temperatures at sea level never reach the extremes of coldest air temperatures on Earth, which are always at elevation. This is somewhat due to air temperature being a function of air pressure (the denser the air, the warmer it gets), and air pressure is greatest at sea level. But it is largely due to the freezing temperature of sea water, and that the warmest water will be at the surface due to convection. Warm water rises to the surface, and the coldest water temperatures are at the deepest bottom of the ocean, and never colder than the freezing temperature of sea water.
That is not true. We don’t necessarily call it wind chill, but evaporative cooling certainly can decrease the temperature of non-living things below the temperature of the atmosphere.
> Wind chill only increases the rate of cooling, not the absolute value.
Right. The absolute value is related to the evaporation process, which is affected by wind.
> Evaporative cooling by definition cannot cool below the wet-bulb temperature.
Wet bulb temperature is not “the true temperature of the environment”. Besides, that is true for humans as well, so again not any different between living and non-living things.
The main point is that a thing left in a given environment can end up at temperatures lower than that of their local environment. This process depends on the atmosphere in contact with the thing, which depends on winds.
We're dealing with two misconceptions here. Wind chill is not affected by evaporative cooling. You can of course go below ambient with evaporative cooling, or air conditioning, or any number of methods.
Wind chill is explicitly and only the experienced subjective temperature caused by cold air being continuously replaced by the wind.
For example, take the US National Weather Service's wind chill formula, which only uses wind speed and tempurature as inputs and provides the wind chill in W/m².
> Wet bulb temperature is not “the true temperature of the environment”. Besides, that is true for humans as well, so again not any different between living and non-living things.
Wind chill and evaporative cooling are independent mechanisms, and the wind chill value and wet bulb temperature are separate values.
My reply was to your original comment, which said:
> For second the coldest wind chill recorded in the US was -100°F at McGrath, Alaska in 1989.
That value is not the temperature that an object could have reach at that time and place. It is the wind chill, an approximation of how cold it would have to have been on a windless day to make a person subjectively feel equally cold.
You always need to be pessimistic about operating conditions, because there is no way you’d be able to imagine everything that will happen. If you want to be sure that your structure copes with thermal contraction at -30°C, it makes sense to test at lower temperatures because even if it never gets that cold, other effects might have a detrimental effect that compounds the low temperatures (probably not for thermal expansion, but this is very important for fragile-ductile transitions). This becomes even more important in submarines, where the added cost is very small compared to the cost of losing a boat.
That’s just good engineering, and someone doing tests who does not understand that is clearly in the wrong industry.
That makes pretty good sense in the warmer end of temperatures, as even though sea water temperatures haven't been recorded above 130°F, friction may cause water temperatures against the hull to be much higher, and though probably never higher than the boiling point of water, it is possible for the temperature of steam to be much, much higher, though only at extreme pressures. Plus, air temperatures at sea level will be warmer than the water temperature in extremely warm areas.
But it is not possible for sea water, anywhere in the oceans, to be much colder than freezing, nor does the air temperature at sea level begin to approach the coldest temperatures recorded on Earth, which are always recorded at elevation. I can't seem to find the record lowest temperature recorded at sea level, but I can't imagine it could be much lower than a few dozen degrees below 0°F.
The question that comes to me is, why is that -100°F metal test even a standard? On the one hand, it is vanishingly unlikely a watercraft could ever experience temperatures that low or even 50°F above that, and on the other hand, temperature measure goes down all the way to -459.67°F. So why aren't they stress testing at -559.67°F? And if tests at those literally impossible temperatures were required, could we at least agree that that would be objectively stupid? And if so, there must be a way to determine what test temperatures are stupid to test at in a sliding scale diminishing towards test temperatures that are less stupid to test.
Though other comments are intolerant of the metallurgists' actions, fundamentally, she was correct, although it is clearly unethical she faked tests results, her reasons for doing so are not entirely irrational. The more intelligent and the more expert an individual is, the less tolerant they will be when asked to do things they know could never matter. Though the military is famous for requiring irrational actions, such as constantly digging a ditch to only fill it in again (which I believe has something to do with proving compliance and following orders, maybe testing the command structure), the woman was not in the military. While I do not condone faking tests, I have some empathy for her, as it is difficult for intelligent individuals to intentionally do stupid things, especially when they are required to do so by less intelligent individuals. I could only guess that most of HN members are a lot like her, and less tolerant of objectively stupid requirements.
> metallurgists' actions, fundamentally, she was correct, although it is clearly unethical she faked tests results, her reasons for doing so are not entirely irrational.
She falsified tests and produced parts that were not up to the specs required by the customer. That is very much wrong, regardless of how justified the specs are.
If the navy is overly pessimistic, the discussion needs to happen with them. Second guessing and assuming that they won’t really need that anyway is what I’d expect from a cut-throat Chinese factory selling in AliExpress, not a supplier for a major western power’s navy.
I'm sure that isn't always true, that if something performs at the extreme it necessarily means it performs in the usual. I find it difficult to believe that, if normal operating temperatures are going to be somewhere between the upper and lower limit temperatures of sea water and the upper and lower limits of air temperature at sea level, that a metal batch that failed at -100°F would need to be rejected. It's one thing for the purposes of science, to know, but my understanding is that engineering and material specifications for an actual thing needs to be more practical, especially for something that already costs $3.5B.
The big reason for these kind of "extreme" tests is that they help you verify the models and simulations you've done. If your model breaks down at -40f, you want to know that, and figure out why, what that means for the actual material, what that means for the specs you promise, and what that means for the product.
It also can be useful if these extreme test are better at revealing manufacturing defects. Maybe you literally only want the most perfect 1% of steel coming out of the foundry to actually be used, because you believe that will make a better submarine. In that case, sure maybe -100f is overkill for the specific application but you have to remember these objects are literally designed to have explosives near them. Being EXTREMELY GOOD at resisting brittleness literally will save sailors lives when it comes to close calls from depth charges.
> I'm sure that isn't always true, that if something performs at the extreme it necessarily means it performs in the usual.
That’s why we test over the operating range for the different parameters, not just at the limits.
> It's one thing for the purposes of science, to know, but my understanding is that engineering and material specifications for an actual thing needs to be more practical, especially for something that already costs $3.5B.
You need to be pessimistic about operating conditions if you don’t want it to fail unexpectedly. That is absolutely critical in engineering. Now, you set the boundary differently depending on the field and the importance of the widget you engineer (tolerances are quite different for a phone than for an aircraft), but the concept itself is part of engineering.
There are cases where practicality is less important than reliability. Things like space probes and a lot of things related to national security. That is one of the reason why they cost billions in the first place.
My best guess is that it was a proof designed to verify the success of the casting process, not resistance to theoretical real-world exposure.
All metals have a ductile-to-brittle transition temperature. Ductile failures are generally preferred to brittle (think bend/dent vs shatter). Some steels have a D2B temp around 0°C, which makes them basically untrustworthy in colder environments.
The D2B Temp can be lowered by altering the elemental makeup of the metal, controlling the crystal structure, and other various metallurgical techniques. These same techniques are utilized to produce metals with other desirable properties, like increased ductility, higher tensile strength, corrosion resistance, etc.
Casting, especially large complex castings of custom tailored alloys, are temperamental. Controlling the elemental makeup is relatively easy, but controlling the crystal structure is difficult.
My guess is that they were paying for a specific alloy & temper of metal because it had their desired properties, and successfully cast samples would have a D2B below -70°C.
It is a standard & easy test to perform, but I could see how the tech running it would not connect the dots above. That being said, they don't need to know why the test was ordered & paid for, they just need to run it.
The extreme cold temperatures of -55°F and colder are never recorded at sea level. You only get those kinds of temperatures at elevation. The ice in that video is no colder than 32°F, as the freezing temperature of water is the same as the melting temperature of ice. So a submarine breaking through the ice would never experience temperatures 32° below the freezing temperatures of water, let alone 132° below freezing temperatures.
Is this just a case of title inflation? Where the entire metallurgy department was just one person? Or did she actually have reports who were doing the work and didn't even bother tasking them to run the tests?
More Internal (or external) audits in this case would have no impact. The organisation performing the tests was most likely performing their own internal audits, had that process certified and demonstrated that satisfactorily to certifiers and customers. The only way to counter the risk of a rogue operator trying to cover their tracks is to have a second run from another operator (the risk is then the organisation not the individual), or ideally, and more expensively, have another organisation perform the same tests and a third party confirm an absence of discrepancies.
I would prefer the latter as standard but audit is always a trade off between peace of mind and cost. You can demonstrate that a process is superior and mitigates known risks (however unlikely they are) but there will be those that despite operating under in "no failure" environment will ignore the low likelihood, high impact risks because their risk process puts it in the "green" and there are far more pressing things to spend attention and money on.
Corruption spreads down, just look at the "mighty" Russian military.
If an org is corrupt (example: Trump admin), the competent, honest, people would stay away, and you just attract idiots, whose motivations might be different to doing the best job possible.
He must have done quite a lot of rotting in the whole three weeks he was a national security advisor, especially considering that role has nothing much to do with purchasing components, uniforms, or anything else really.
I agree but I think the corruption has existed for a long time and it is going to take a lot of changes and legislation. Basically, maybe in 30 years or more.
I saw a gap to make that point and shot it. There is definitely formidable institutional inertia blocking meaningful change. I’m hoping history does rhyme and we’ll see an adoption of civil service reform policies by both parties like in the late 1800s
The government audits a lot. My brother works for a gov agency and he has a unit in his business unit dedicated to audit management. Iirc about 7 employees, who are very busy who just reply to audits.
They are an effective tool, but they don’t address all issues.
There's a big difference between financial audits, especially at a massive organisation's scale, and process/compliance audits.
The claims in that article from Senate aides are a bit misleading, as it's not that unexpected or unreasonable for a department as large and complex as the Pentagon to take years to reach 100% clean audits. After all, it took DHS a decade. It's because interventions don't take effect immediately, with process changes taking time to be planned, rolled out, and have an impact on reporting. As long as the trend keeps moving upward the country is better off than not having audits.
The US DoD as a whole has always done a huge amount of compliance auditing both internally and of suppliers, as well as financial auditing at most project and unit levels, outside of the new Congress-mandated top-level auditing requirement.
...it's not that unexpected or unreasonable for a department as large and complex as the Pentagon to take years to reach 100% clean audits. After all, it took DHS a decade.
At that point, DHS had existed for just over a decade. Pentagon opened in 1943. Is there a chance that they'll file a complete audit while USA still exists?
DHS didn't start from nothing, it was formed from a bunch of other departments and agencies. Like the Pentagon, there was partial auditing in place in that various levels and entities had internal and external audits, but nothing on the overall organisation level.
The Pentagon said it expects to get fully clean audits by FY28. That seems plausible at the current rate of change in their audits.
Lots an easy statement to make as a pandering politician or internet poster.
The military is an insanely complex organization with probably thousands of different financial systems. Whatever a “complete audit” is, you can be sure it will take a long time and get extended many times as congress paints the airplane in flight and changes the standards.
This is potentially a serious federal crime but it wouldn't meet the legal definition of treason. Treason is a very specific crime; it's not just anything that harms national security or defrauds the government.
For a far better take than all the fly by commentators here, there is a ex military pilot who did a video on this a year or so ago.
The seat already had issues, was scheduled for maintenance but that maintenance was constantly deferred, and was finally scheduled for maintenance for shortly after the mishap.
His videos are great, but when this video was made, he was unaware of some of the worst details of the story of the seat’s maintenance. (Potential counterfeit parts, etc)
Yes. But I also think the details he provided are necessary to fully understand what was happening and I didn't see them anywhere else in the comments. Things like the sequencer was going to be replaced by a new model.
Oooooor, and bear with me: he was part of a disinformation campaign to make it look like it was the fault of maintenance tech and supervisor, not a major defense contractor.
I used to own a semiconductor distribution business. The amount of refurbished and counterfeit material out there is staggering. There is more money in obsolete parts than most people realize and, as a result, selling refurbs is incredibly lucrative. I'm talking 100x markup on a 5k reel when the customer needs 10pcs.
This story, while sad, is not the least bit surprising.
Even here in small-scale embedded land we get bitten by it from apparently reputable vendors. We've had to cultivate direct relationships with certain companies to avoid it, and setup a whole acceptance pipeline for some of our parts. Frustrating as hell.
But the part I don't get is that those three companies are manufacturers not suppliers or distributors. If you're manufacturing your own device, how is it counterfeit?
Wut? I have no idea what you're trying to say here.
Suppose I make a proprietary electronic component. There is no other source of that component. If I can't keep up with supply, where are these "outsourced" parts going to come from?
[edit]
re-reading the article, I think the author or someone else who made the presentation misinterpreted the facts.
FTA: "Suppliers Atmel, Analog Devices and Siliconix provided the potentially counterfeit"
What's most likely the case is that the potentially counterfeit parts were labelled with Atmel, Analog Devices and Siliconix markings/logos and they were misidentified as the source of those parts. That's the only thing that makes sense.
The person you replied to is making an accusation of intentional fraud.
Although I don’t think that is likely. If you were going to defraud your customers with components you know are fake, the US government would be the last customer you’d choose to send them to.
So, I've never done anything where lives and health are on the line, but I've built tons of stuff out of salvaged space-age transistors. What's particularly wrong with refurbishment as a practice? There is a lot of good material out there, much of which is no longer made and has no contemporary equivalent.
The issue is that the process of refurbishment is fairly hard on the components. Companies in China will obtain decades old ewaste boards and then have workers hold the boards over fires to melt the solder and pull the chips out with pliers. The chips are then sanded, "blacktopped" (covered in a tar-like coating that looks like the IC plastic), and re-marked. This crude process (exposure to extreme heat, no controlling for ESD, etc) can result in chips that have latent defects, on top of the unknown age and uptime of the chips. Another issue is that companies will commonly lie on the re-marking, doing stuff like changing the grade from consumer to military spec, lowering the access time, upgrading the die revision, or mislabeling the chip entirely. For example, Amiga and Atari ST fans have had issues buying Motorola 68060 chips from Asian vendors, as they will commonly relabel 68LC060 chips (which don't have an FPU) as regular 68060 chips.
Thanks. That wasn't what I was imagining. I was imagining disassembling a retired aircraft (or other thing) and putting the parts back in inventory, not sourcing vaguely recovered parts from god-known-who.
The first problem is a lot of refurbs are poorly done. I've had parts that were literally something else with a different print on them. Entire controllers that were marked as X but were Y in reality.
The second problem is the buy side. Government especially has regulations for quality control and counts on suppliers to do their part. Check out MVP Micro for a company a decade or so ago where the owners were profiteering off refurbs and wound up in prison.
I've seen this several times in projects, not in defence though. I've heard of it there though.
In one instance, we were building a bunch of very bright lcd displays for big video ads in times Square. This was when it was a cutting edge thing to do. To deliver on our project, we needed to buy every single Golden dragon 2 white led in the world at the time (200k or so). We bought the entire stock of digikey, RS, mouser, etc. all at once. For each led also needed a zener diode, which we had similar issues sourcing. Once all the boards were built zeners started blowing up and literally popping off the boards. It turns out about a third of thr zener we bought, from reputable suppliers, were counterfeit. No way to know until they blow up.
Before reading the article I was guessing the seat failed to ignite. But it was actually worse -- the seat was ejected but the chute didn't open, what an awful way to die.
>The lab also found signs that Teledyne had destroyed evidence related to the case, the lawsuit said. Teledyne appeared to have replaced five microchips on the sequencer before sending it to the lab
How exactly is this not a big red flag that something's fishy?
Surely it is a big red flag, but with military hardware yelling about its shortcomings publicly is tantamount to advertising that your deterrent is broken. You don't do that. Note that the original report was apparently not made public.
Well, that's terrifying. The people who built the ejection seats seem oddly casual about their material sourcing, and "if the damned things would actually work if needed." You're having a very, very bad day if you need the seat, the last thing you want to worry about is if it's going to fail because of counterfeit parts.
> Prove my client knew it was fake, remember innocent until proven guilty + beyond reasonable doubt
It’s a civil case against the contractors not the government, it carries a much lower burden of proof, just needs to prove preponderance of the evidence (more than 50% chance of the claim being true).
Plus you have discovery and depositions to help build your case.
Oh and if they don’t comply with discovery, well then the judge will just find them liable and then the case will just be about how much money they owe (see the Alex Jones cases going on right now).
>>"Prove my client knew it was fake, remember innocent until proven guilty + beyond reasonable doubt" - defense lawyer
>>Acquitted
It does not work like that.
The client has already signed off, under penalty of perjury, that the parts ARE NOT FAKE, and that the company and the parts (respectively) comply with any number of Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) requirements applicable to the contract.
If the part is bad, it is going to be up to the "client" to prove that his statements were not false.
Are all your comments like this? Would love to train a holistic scenario condensation language model to turn complex stories into minimized sensibile lines. :-] (e.g. wouldn't it be nice for the average voter to have access to condensed information like this?)
I believe you meant to spell "hypocrisy", but actually "hypocracy" is such a wonderful neologism because it does seem that, wherever we are, we're governed by hypocrites.
If only there were a documentary called Hypocracy, with just a bunch of footage of hypocritical things done by politicians. Heck, it could have a weekly segment it happens so often.
I believe this is among the most cryptic and niche compliments I have ever come across on any social platform, but would need to have a sufficiently large sample size of similar compliments to train a language model.
That particular C-Corp or LLC, sure. The people behind it that know all the secret sauce, connections, etc, to get awarded contracts just go mint a new one.
I think that's exactly how it would have gone done except for the fact Teledyne is accused of replacing the counterfeit parts when the board was sent to them for inspection, which would almost certainly prove they knew they were fake.
If the government took the supplier to court for supplying counterfeit parts it would most likely be in civil court[0]. The standard is preponderance of the evidence[1], which is much lower than that in criminal court:
> Under the preponderance standard, the burden of proof is met when the party with the burden convinces the fact finder that there is a greater than 50% chance that the claim is true. This is the burden of proof in a civil trial.
If the supplier were criminally liable (as they also can be, for trafficking in counterfeit goods or services[2]) then because the bar is higher the prosecution would (should) only move forward if they believe they have the requisite evidence to meet that standard.
As it is, the widow is taking the suppliers to court in civil court[3]:
> Now, two years later, the 32-year-old has filed a federal civil lawsuit against defense giant Lockheed Martin, Collins Aerospace and several sections of Teledyne Technologies, alleging that components of her husband's ejection seat may have been counterfeit, leading to his death on June 30, 2020.
The aforementioned law was passed in Dec 2011 by the House of Representatives, which the Republicans held a majority in, and the Senate, which the Democrats held by a slim majority[4][5].
I'm not sure what your comment is about other than trying to appear knowledgeable through cynicism. Ironic that you would complain about others' HN comments.
Really late here, but I have some first hand experience with this exact issue (raiding our business and everything.)
To be brief, and what I assume happened, is that military electronics specs lots of old outdated/obsolete electronic components. It can be exceedingly difficult to get that part changed (if it works don't fix it) and often can be exceedingly difficult to find parts from authorized distributors. On the back end too, those distributors also need to ensure they are getting legit parts.
SO what can end up happening is you desperately need a part to move production along, and you yank on all your distributors to get you some. One of those distributors then goes out and gets "contaminated" parts from a "usually good" source.
You end up with those parts, test them all, they test good, put them in, and by doing so assume all responsibility for them. "All responsibility" means you are legally liable for using that part. Cue FBI raid.
Really the core issue is that the military uses a lot of stuff that works amazing, but is contracted from parts that are long out of production. Updating is a difficult and risky task, because it's not really an "update" as much as a "find similar parts to build the same thing". Which means moving from a tested and known good product, to a brand new untested one. Naturally, there is a lot of resistance to this, and a changing something like a single chip could take a year or more of testing and auth.
> To keep an eye on potential degradation, contractors tested 60 sequencers in 2017 and 2018, the lawsuit said. Three were flagged for further evaluation. Teledyne found that two of the three units would have functioned properly in an ejection.
> Two years after that testing, the lawsuit claims, the companies hadn’t said whether the third unit passed muster. Still, the Air Force relied on the test data when it decided to continue using the sequencer that ended up in Schmitz’s F-16, the lawsuit said.
I don't want to be too facetious, but if you very eagerly said that 2 out of 3 worked and say nothing about the last, I'm going to assume that last one completely failed.
In a way, it's worse than the case few years ago in Poland [1] - there, the company that ended up servicing the ejection seat was just incompetent and no attempts at destruction of evidence happened as far as I know.
[1] A shearable component was replaced with thicker part, with larger strain capacity, resulting in pilot not separating properly from the ejection seat
Without pronouncing any judgement (as if there are any options here) just commenting on technical side, I wonder, given the age of the design, if the original components weren't available anymore, and somebody just substituted the stuff with whatever closest was available. That reminds about how at the end of the 1990ies some electronics components sent to the space station Mir to make repairs were "sourced" from a large flea market in St.Petersburg ("Avtovo" for who knows/remembers, had a large electronics and computer section).
When repairing military avionics, you have to use the exact parts approved by the military from sources supplied by the military. The government works very hard to make sure that parts for its aircraft are available, even if they are expensive. If the parts aren't available then you simply can't repair the unit without some sort of arduous waiver process. Anything else is a breach of contract at best.
Actually it's even worse. A batch of counterfeit parts can be blamed on the supplier, but destroying evidence in this case is entirely on the manufacturer.
For those who want to understand the full details of this mishap, former Air Force F-16 pilot C. W. Lemoine did a detailed analysis of the public report.
Took many years for one to understand people can be malicious and or incompetent at the same time, but the key lesson was understanding the liability is the same.
At sea, we were told the legal system does not make a distinction for the maritime zones. If you make a mistake and someone dies, than it is considered a murder rather than manslaughter or criminal negligence.
If someone knowingly used counterfeit parts, than it could fall under espionage laws as well. i.e. the public will not know why someone was thrown into a hole for 40 years.
Here is how to fix the counterfeit supply chain issue:
You execute the CEO and board of directors of the companies that had the contract for treason and sabotage.
You do that once, and I bet the next CEO takes supply chain issues seriously.
EDIT:
And before you tell me that you wouldn’t be able to find CEOs if you executed the bad ones, there are lots of Americans who work in coal mines, oil rigs, and high rise construction where they face a risk of death for far less money.
Obligatory Preface: I've never worked on defence projects but...
The issue of initial quality and provenance of the chips aside, I don't understand how this wasn't picked during Functional Performance Testing (FAT) of the system before final acceptance.
For such a critical safety system you would expect that all tests were performed and that it was operating correctly within it's design parameters. You would expect whoever was responsible for procuring (either principal or contractor) would have witness points were a suitably qualified person from their side (or third party independent verifier) would witness and sign-off on the test being performed to spec, and the results were within expectations. This is why these processes exist.
NB: The test in this case might not even need the actual parachute, just testing that the circuit pulses at the right time in the right place, or that a solenoid activates.
Then again, maybe it did pass all these checks but the poor quality of the parts meant they degraded at an accelerated rate because they weren't designed to operate in those conditions. Who knows. As things get smaller and more abstract (digital v. analogue) it's much more difficult for us to rely or even expect traditional methods of "trust but verify" to satisfy our requirements. It's becoming more and more incumbent on the end-owner to know their asset as it becomes harder and harder to understand it.
The real offender here is the design of the seat...
The design should be self-testing continuously. If any wire, microchip, or other component were to go bad inside the ejector seat, it should flash a big warning light on the dashboard saying "unsafe to fly".
In the case of an ejector seat sequencer, the electronics could run through the full ejection process, but with the power supply to the explosive detonators super low. Then another system detects that the right detonators are being activated at the right time. If they aren't... red light and buzzer.
If your design is good, cheap parts won't make it fail dangerously. Cheap parts will just lead to more time being repaired.
Military systems do usually have extensive self-test functionality in place, but when it comes to things like ejection seats and canopy detonation circuits that absolutely must fire reliably the more logic you have in between the higher the risk that it won't work when needed.
Nor is self-testing 100% reliable, as counterfeit chips might work well enough during a self-test sequence on the ground but fail when exposed to the extreme temperatures and vibrations of an ejection. It's not just about whether the part meets the spec, it's about meeting the spec in all conditions.
That's why for things like this and similarly crucial things like munitions-related circuitry the preference is for circuits and components that are as simple as possible and to use process control to ensure that all components are reliable.
A pre-flight readiness check could do the 'dry run' with the explosives redirected to a test rig instead. As an armchair engineer, I would imagine this check shortly prior to munitions load, which would also be the best time to validate the rest of the platform fitness.
That would be extremely expensive in terms of the rocket and cartridge usage and would subject the seat to a huge amount of stress, substantially reducing its lifespan. Even then, you can't be sure that the issue wouldn't only show up mid-flight for some reason, at different temperatures, or different vibration levels from wind resistance in a high speed ejection.
Ejection seats are not designed to be used again and again, they're designed to be used exactly once and work flawlessly when that one moment comes. Rigid process control and verification in the manufacturing, storage, and installation steps is the only way to be certain it'll work.
I get that you're just playing armchair engineer here, but you're ignoring nearly all the actual complexity and engineering challenges.
You've clearly misunderstood, probably the common term 'dry run'.
The test would be of the electronics _only_; not the explosives or any other single use component. Single use items are usually validated by randomly sampling from within the batch / production run.
My apologies, you mentioned the explosives being 'redirected', when I guess what you meant was that the explosive circuitry would be redirected.
Even so, those checks aren't sufficient to handle counterfeit parts that might only fail under stress, rather than the safe conditions of a ground test.
The best approach is what it has always been: Strict process control of the entire supply chain, rigorous component and subsystem testing under extreme conditions before delivery, deep analysis of failed components coming off the flight line, and regular inspections for anomalies.
I think Rafale uses Martin-Baker seats. The only story I can find in the news is that time a retiree actidentally ejected himself by grabbing onto the ejection seat handle though.
Fake components are an enormous problem in these fat military contracts. There are any number of ways they can find their way into the supply chain at different stages (component, sub-assembly, assembly, finished products, service/replacement/upgrade boards). Often the fakes aren’t “terrible” but just arent 100% within spec.
We have a family who lost a bright young man who volunteered to serve his country and lay his life down to protect the ones he loved. And what did the Air Force brass do? Everything they could to deny him an honorable send off.
They pinned the blame squarely on the soldier who died . This would be low for even the communists. I hope they rot in prison and the Feres doctrine is amended to allow suits for malice like we see here.
I wonder why that electronics is actually there. I'd rather expect something pyrotechnic, some contraption out of delay fuses. Is there a source that explains what needs to happen under the hood that requires electronics?
To maximise survivability the seat needs to be able to orient itself optimally, then you need a number of sensors reading air speed, temperature, air pressure, and acceleration to determine when the best time for each sequence step is.
For instance, you don't want to deploy the drogue while the rockets are still firing. You also don't want to deploy it if the seat is oriented in the wrong direction and the drogue might get stuck in the seat.
Then, you don't want to release the main chute until the seat has stabilised and the speed is right. You also want to control the speed of release and inflation depending on the altitude at which the ejection happened, with a more rapid release at the lowest altitudes.
Early seats used simple delay fuses and didn't have the ability to sequence events based on sensor inputs, resulting in a lot more post-ejection deaths and injuries.
Wow, this is some real All My Sons type shit. In the play, the protagonist sells defective airplane parts to the US military during WWII, and several planes end up crashing and killing the pilots.
The Pentagon is not judged on its performance in war. (That's convenient, because the Pentagon hasn't won a war in generations.) Rather, the Pentagon is judged by its ability to increase profits of armaments manufacturers. Since the case described in TFA features increased profits, it is not surprising. The only potential for surprise would be the possibility that one or more executives of these firms could be punished for this. Instead, one expects that some low-level technician will be selected as a scapegoat.
>The lab also found signs that Teledyne had destroyed evidence related to the case, the lawsuit said. Teledyne appeared to have replaced five microchips on the sequencer before sending it to the lab
3rd world tier corruption and fraud. Based on the number of failed and severely cost overrun military projects I'd say it applies to way more than just this situation