And quickly skimming through the linked paper, their suggested mechanism changes the "decision" to simply be a result of stochastic fluctuation in neural activity. So it resolves some of the weirdness introduced by Libet, by not having the moment of decision precede the moment of conscious experience.
But at best, it still leaves free will with a kind of ancillary role, in which it represents the "feeling" of volitional control, with the actual decision still being stochastic at best.
This is certainly possible, but not what people usually mean when discussing free will colloquially (I find).
And quickly skimming through the linked paper, their suggested mechanism changes the "decision" to simply be a result of stochastic fluctuation in neural activity. So it resolves some of the weirdness introduced by Libet, by not having the moment of decision precede the moment of conscious experience.
But at best, it still leaves free will with a kind of ancillary role, in which it represents the "feeling" of volitional control, with the actual decision still being stochastic at best.
This is certainly possible, but not what people usually mean when discussing free will colloquially (I find).