Searchable encryption trades privacy for efficiency. However, the privacy loss can be tuned. For example, SE constructions will specify whether they leak search-pattern (how many of the same queries a client makes), access-pattern (the frequencies with which different items are accessed) or other things. Usually, a client can pay in storage/bandwidth to mitigate these leakages.
Yeah, I've been looking for more information and I can't really see any indication as to how they are planning on implementing it. The whole thing seems more like marketing than actual innovation: searching encrypted data isn't that complicated if you are always dealing with the entire ciphertext, it's just another string in that use case.
> searching encrypted data isn't that complicated if you are always dealing with the entire ciphertext, it's just another string in that use case.
This isn't really true because there are multiple ciphertexts that can decode to the same plaintext in any modern encryption algorithm. If you skip that property you weaken the encryption. (Chosen plaintext attacks)
